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Resolving Agency Costs in United Kingdom Private Companies  
 
Abstract 
In companies, agency cost analysis generally focuses on agency costs arising between 
owners and managers. The purpose of this thesis is to offer an holistic theoretical overview 
of different types of agency costs and externalities which arise in different types of business 
organisations and the legal responses to them. From this analysis, it emerges that high agency 
costs (directly and indirectly manifested) and externalities are, in the main, mitigated by 
mandatory rules. There is one exception to this: indirect manifestations of majority/minority 
agency costs (that is, agency costs which are transmitted through directors) are not mitigated. 
Worse, they are actively exacerbated by what are referred to in this thesis as ‘twin 
exacerbations’: the ability of the shareholders (by majority rule) to assume powers of the 
company; and their ability (by majority rule) to remove directors. This thesis undertakes 
historical, comparative, doctrinal, and empirical research into these twin exacerbations. A 
general historical overview confirms the theoretical proposition of this thesis: that, 
historically, mandatory rules have been used to resolve the main examples of agency 
costs/externalities in company law. Applying historical analysis to the twin exacerbations, it 
is argued that the first occurred by accident, while the second does not adequately resolve 
the wrong it is designed to. Comparatively, different jurisdictions have attempted to resolve 
equivalent problems, and while Delaware resolves them it does so in a way which makes 
being a shareholder in a Delaware company differ fundamentally from being a shareholder 
in a UK company.  Doctrinally, other areas of company law do not act to mitigate the twin 
exacerbations: directors' duties are neutralised; shareholders owe no duties to each other 
when voting; minority protection is weak; and soft law does not work for private companies. 
Empirically, this thesis undertakes a leximetric study to establish whether the 'market' 
resolves the twin exacerbations. If we establish that it does not, and may not be able to, 
legislative reform becomes inevitable. By resolving the twin exacerbations, we align the law 
regarding indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs with the general 
proposition established for company law: rules in business organisations should operate by 
default, unless an agency cost/externality arises, in which case mandatory (or, where there 
are public markets, ‘comply-or-explain’) rules should apply. This reform resolves the 
theoretical, historical, comparative, doctrinal, and empirical issues highlighted in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been stated that: 
[C]orporate law performs two general functions: first, it establishes the structure of 
the corporate form as well as ancillary housekeeping rules necessary to support this 
structure; second, it attempts to control conflicts of interest among corporate 
constituencies, including those between corporate ‘insiders’, such as controlling 
shareholders and top managers, and ‘outsiders,’ such as minority shareholders or 
creditors.1 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the second of these functions. In particular, it explores 
these conflicts of interest, how the law responds to them, whether it responds consistently, 
how it has arrived at its current position, how any exceptions to the general principle have 
evolved, whether they appear in other jurisdictions, and whether they have been otherwise 
resolved by law or by the market. In order to achieve this goal, this thesis engages theoretical, 
historical, doctrinal, comparative and empirical methodologies. 
Chapter 2 reviews these conflicts of interest by undertaking a general analysis of the 
conflicts. From this it emerges that they can be broken down into agency costs and 
externalities suffered by three constituents: third parties experience externalities from 
organisations; owners experience agency costs from managers; and minority owners 
experience agency costs from majority owners. Chapter 2 also reviews the characteristics of 
business organisations in the United Kingdom (UK) to establish whether these different 
characteristics result in different risks of such costs in different organisations: is the risk of 
agency costs suffered by a retail shareholder in a traded company from the managers of that 
company the same as such risks within a partnership? Similarly, is the risk of externalities 
arising from a limited company any different from the risk of externalities arising from a 
partnership? Chapter 2, therefore, focuses on a theoretical analysis of costs which arise 
within different business organisations. It compares and contrasts the different organisations 
and their characteristics and identifies which risks are greater in what types of organisation.  
Risks of agency costs/externalities on their own, however, do not provide the complete 
analytical picture as they do not indicate how these costs may manifest for the sufferer. For 
these costs to manifest the organisation must do something. Chapter 3, therefore, reviews 
                                                     
1 R Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (3rd 
edn, OUP 2017) 29. 
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the legal framework applicable whenever an organisation attempts to do anything across 
three categories of rules which govern its actions: capacity rules; third party protection rules; 
and governance rules. It breaks this legal framework into four types of rule: permissive rules 
(which can be opted into); default rules (which apply unless opted out of); ‘comply-or-
explain’ rules (similar to default rules but where there must be a public disclosure of opting 
out); and mandatory rules (which cannot be opted out of). By plotting a matrix between the 
rule type and rule category, we can establish when different types of rule are used. By 
applying this matrix to our agency cost/externality analysis, we gain insights into when 
different types of rule are used.  Chapter 3 explores the types of rule generally used to resolve 
or mitigate risks of high agency costs or externalities. Externalities are suffered directly by 
the third party from the organisation in question and, therefore, can only manifest in this 
direct manner. However, agency costs can manifest indirectly: for example, a manager may 
push for preferential terms between the company she manages and a different company 
which she owns. This would initially appear to be a cost between the company and the third 
party, but is actually a manifestation of owner/manager agency costs which arises indirectly 
from a third party. Similarly, the majority may force managers to act to the detriment of the 
minority. While this, too, initially appears to be an owner/manager cost, it is in fact an 
indirect manifestation of majority/minority agency costs. By mapping these potential 
manifestations of agency costs, we can establish whether there is a uniform solution to 
resolve the risks of such costs. Chapters 2 and 3, therefore, provide the theoretical basis for 
the thesis. This analysis reveals that some form of non-default rule mitigates direct and 
indirect manifestations of agency costs and externalities with one notable exception: indirect 
manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in private companies are not only 
unmitigated by non-default rules, they are actively exacerbated by the operation of two 
techniques designed to reduce owner/manager agency  costs – the ability of shareholders to 
change the division of powers between themselves and directors; and the ability of 
shareholders to remove directors. As each of these actions is subject to majority capture, 
they form twin exacerbations of majority/minority agency costs in private companies. 
Chapter 4 undertakes an historical analysis of UK company law to establish whether the 
historical development of company law reflects the agency costs/externalities analysis 
undertaken. It then reviews the historical development of any exceptions identified in the 
analysis to understand how these exceptions arose – were they deliberately created (and if 
so, to what end), and, if deliberately created, do they match the policy purposes for which 
they were created. Chapter 4 takes the form of an historical analysis which explains the 
current legal landscape, and also verifies the theoretical approach. If the history of company 
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law supports the theoretical position advanced, then the analysis changes from the purely 
normative to become reflective of the legal landscape: making any exceptions starker.  
If Chapters 2 and 3 create a theoretical framework for how company law should operate, 
Chapter 4 contextualises this analysis within the historical development of UK company 
law. Accordingly, Chapter 4 seeks to reinforce the conclusions reached in the theoretical 
section of this thesis. 
Chapter 5 moves from the past to the present and examines any such exceptions in current 
UK law. Other jurisdictions are reviewed to establish a comparative basis from which to 
explore whether (and, if so, how) other jurisdictions have resolved any exceptions. Any such 
exceptions will already be mitigated if they are resolved in other ways in the UK, either by 
legal rule or market practice. Chapter 6, consequently, considers whether extant UK legal 
rules, primarily directors' duties, shareholder voting, and minority protection mitigate these 
risks. Accordingly, Chapter 6 undertakes a doctrinal analysis of other elements of company 
law to establish whether any exceptions are resolved by other legal rules.  
Chapter 7 is a quantitative leximetric analysis aimed at establishing whether the market has 
perhaps adequately resolved these issues. This introduces an empirical element to the 
analysis. Chapter 8 proposes how to resolve any exceptions in a manner which is compatible 
with the theoretical, historical, comparative, doctrinal, and empirical approaches outlined. 
Ultimately, this thesis identifies the highest risks associated with agency costs/externalities 
are owner/manager agency costs in traded companies, and majority/minority agency costs 
in private companies. It also shows that high agency costs are, as a rule, remedied by 
mandatory rules. This corresponds to the theoretical proposition that rules should apply by 
default unless there is an interest which needs to be protected by mandatory or ‘comply-or-
explain’ rules. But this is not always the case.  The peculiar characteristics of a private 
limited company mean that an indirect manifestation of agency costs is not resolved: 
mandatory rules provide protection where directors do something against shareholders 
(primarily through protections against personal appropriation of company assets) and in 
respect of the interaction between majority and minority shareholders (primarily through 
mandatory voting thresholds and notice periods), but there is a lacuna where this process is 
mediated and directors undertake activity designed to benefit the majority shareholders to 
the detriment of the minority. As the risk of majority/minority agency costs within private 
companies is high, this lack of mandatory legal protection sits as an exception. The position 
is even starker, as not only is the indirect manifestation of majority/minority agency costs in 
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private companies not mitigated by mandatory rule, it is exacerbated by two elements. As 
division of powers between shareholders and directors is a matter for the articles of 
association, the shareholders can assume the management powers of the company by 
resolution; and shareholders are entitled to remove directors. These are referred to as the 
‘twin exacerbations’ in this thesis. Each increases the likelihood that directors will act to 
appease the majority to the detriment of the minority, so exacerbating the indirect 
manifestation of agency costs.  
This thesis shows that since the repeal of the Bubble Act, company law has developed 
through periodic mandatory responses to perceived agency costs/externalities. It 
demonstrates that the emergence of the division of powers as a default approach happened 
by accident, and that the ability of shareholders to remove directors has been neutralised by 
its interpretation by the courts. It further shows that while the United States (US) adopts a 
(generally) mandatory division of powers, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia adopt 
default rules. Only the US, therefore, addresses the first exacerbation, while neither Australia 
nor New Zealand adequately mitigates the second exacerbation. The US does mitigate the 
second exacerbation, but uses tools that make broader changes to company law, the 
parameters of which had to be established by the courts. This resulted in a period of 
uncertainty. It then establishes that other elements of company law in the UK – directors' 
duties, shareholder voting obligations, minority remedies, and potential soft law responses 
– do not adequately mitigate indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in 
private companies.  
This is followed by a quantitative empirical study to establish whether the market has 
mitigated these exacerbations. The question asked in this empirical study is whether the 
market has the potential to mitigate the twin exacerbations. Having identified that the twin 
exacerbations exist as a theoretical and historical exception, un-remediated in most 
jurisdictions and remedied by way of a blunt tool in the US; un-remediated by UK company 
law; and un-remediated (and arguably un-remediable) by market practice, this thesis 
undertakes to resolve the exacerbations in Chapter 8. 
Identifying such exceptions is of academic importance as it exposes an incoherence at the 
heart of company law. It also raises a vitally important and highly relevant practical issue. 
The corporate vehicle is one of the key drivers of economic expansion.2 Companies exist 
                                                     
2 ibid 1.  
  11 
 
because ‘a more complicated form of association, with a large and fluctuating membership, 
requires a more elaborate organisation’ than a traditional partnership.3 A company is a 
private company by default.4 As at 2015, while there were in excess of three million 
companies on the public register, only around 7,500 were public companies with the vast 
majority of the rest being private.5 Private companies are, as a rule, associated with smaller 
companies while public companies are seen to denote larger companies.6 However, this is 
not always the case: many large companies are private,7 and the private company is used 
structurally in several industries, most notably in private equity.8 Private companies are, 
therefore, important commercial vehicles and any structural flaws in them have far-reaching 
effects. While considerable research has been undertaken into public companies,9 private 
companies remain under-analysed and they are therefore ripe for study. Identifying the 
structural flaws in the functioning of these entities is of considerable practical importance – 
remedial action is long overdue.  
                                                     
3 PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower: Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2016) paras 1–2 (‘Gower and Davies’).  
4 Companies Act 2006, s 4(2). 
5 Gower and Davies, 1–23. 
6 See A Cosh and A Hughes, ‘Size, financial structure and profitability: UK companies in the 1980s’ in A 
Hughes and DJ Story, (eds) Finance and the Small Firm (Routledge 1994)18. 
7 See Anon, ‘FRC consults on new governance principles for large private companies’ [2018] Company 
Lawyer 328. 
8 E Berry, ‘Limited partnership law and private equity: An instance of legislative capture?’ [2018] Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 1. 
9 For example, R Kraakman and others, Anatomy of Corporate Law ch 8 (Control Transactions) relates 
exclusively to control transactions in listed companies. Similarly, in AA Berle and G Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (rev edn, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc 1967) the modern theory that 
company law exists to deal with the separation of ownership and control arose in the context of US listed 
companies. SM Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (OUP 2008) 12 
acknowledges that his ‘director primacy’ theory is effectively a theory for public companies only. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. SITUATIONS RESULTING IN AGENCY COSTS IN COMMERCIAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Our first query is into the types of issues that can arise within different forms of business 
organisations. Organisations exist when two or more individuals join together to achieve a 
common goal. In a business context, their goal is to create lower transaction costs than would 
otherwise apply were separate individuals to interact repeatedly.10 These business 
organisations tend to be known as ‘firms’ in economic literature.11 This should be 
distinguished from the narrower, more technical meaning of ‘firm’ which denotes an 
unincorporated, general partnership.12 For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘firm’ is used 
to indicate a UK entity with more than one participant which exists for the purpose of profit. 
For any firm it is important to establish how it can make decisions and what it can do. Arrow 
indicates that in any firm decisions can be made by way of consensus or by the imposition 
of authority.13 Either of these requires a form of rule: if decisions are made by imposition, 
who is entitled to impose and what limits are there on such imposition; and if decisions are 
made by consensus, who is entitled to count towards the consensus, does it require 
unanimity, and are there situations in which an individual can be excluded from decision 
making? As a result, even ostensible requirements as to unanimity result in some actor in the 
firm making decisions on behalf of others. Jenson and Meckling have stated that whenever 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent,14 
there is an incentive for that agent to enrich herself rather than the principal. These costs are 
known as ‘agency costs’ and underpin much of corporate law analysis.15 Agency costs reflect 
the internal conflicts of interest arising within corporate constituents. Third parties, or 
                                                     
10 R Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Partnership Act 1890, s 4(1). 
13 KJ Arrow, The Limits of Organisation (Norton 1974). 
14 MlC Jensen and WH Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure' (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 308. 
15 See, eg, R Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 2. 
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external actors to a company, experience a different type of cost known as ‘externalities’. 
Pigou describes externalities as: 
A, in the course of rendering services, for which payment is made, to a second 
person, B, incidentally also renders services or disservices to other persons (not 
producers of like services) of such assort that payment cannot be exacted from the 
benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured parties.16 
This can be contrasted with agency costs, which are the costs experienced by B when A 
renders services to B. These externalities can be positive or negative. Pigou argues that 
negative externalities should be resolved by the state,17 whereas Coase argues that they will 
be bargained away where it is efficient to do so.18  The result is: 
What is involved is a value judgment: if you believe that markets internalize 
everything, you will believe that externalities do not exist; on the other hand, if you 
believe that markets do not internalize side effects, you will believe in the 
persistence of externalities as deviations from an attainable optimum…it is thus 
doubtful whether the term ‘externality’ has any meaningful interpretation, except as 
an indicator of the political beliefs and value judgments of the person who uses (or 
avoids using) the term.19 
We refer to agency costs and externalities together as ‘Costs’ in this thesis. This chapter 
begins by examining different types of firm and their key features. It then examines the Costs 
that exist within firms generally, ie, externalities suffered by third parties, and agency costs 
between owners and managers and the majority and the minority. It turns then to the degree 
of Costs which exist across types of firm in the UK to establish which actors within which 
types of UK firm are exposed to greater agency costs and/or externalities. 
  
                                                     
16 AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 184 (4th edn, Macmillan 1932). 
17 ibid 127–130. 
18 R Coase ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
19 CJ Dahlman, ‘The Problem of Externality’ (1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics 141, 156. 
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2.2. Types of Firm 
Before we analyse Costs arising within different firms, it is necessary to identify the 
characteristics of the different firms available in UK law so as to link the particular 
characteristics to the presence of such Costs. This will, in turn, provide a deeper 
understanding of situations in which Costs arise. On a spectrum moving from simplest to 
most complex, these are: partnerships; limited partnerships (or LPs); limited liability 
partnerships (or LLPs); private companies; public companies; and publicly traded 
companies. We turn now to the key features of each. 
2.2.1. General Partnerships  
Partnerships were recognised at common law,20 but much of this common law was codified 
in 1890.21 The Partnership Act 1890 is not a complete codification of the law of partnerships, 
but rather a key starting point.22 Partnerships do not require incorporation or registration, but 
arise ‘between persons carrying on a business in common with a view to a profit’.23 While 
not essential, it is common for partnerships to be constituted by formal agreement between 
the partners.24 Partnerships enjoy separate legal personality in Scotland but not in England 
or Wales.25 This means that only Scottish partnerships are entitled to own property and 
contract in their own name. Lord Lindley provided the following key characteristics of a 
partnership: 
The partners are the agents and sureties of the firm: its agents for the transaction of 
its business; its sureties for the liquidation of its liabilities so far as the assets of the 
firm are insufficient to meet them. The liabilities of the firm are regarded as the 
liabilities of the partners only in case they cannot be met by the firm and discharged 
out of its assets.26 
In other words, there is no discernible distinction between the assets and liabilities of the 
partnership and those of its individual partners. It should also be noted that, while there is 
flexibility between the parties to agree contractually on the rights and obligations of partners, 
legally all partners are treated equally.27 Therefore, all partners, regardless of their agreed 
                                                     
20 RI Banks, Lindley and Banks on Partnership (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) para1-01 (‘Lindley and 
Banks’). 
21 ibid. 
22 Hopper v Hopper [2008] EWCA Civ 1417 para 45; 
23 Partnership Act 1890, s 1(1). 
24 Lindley and Banks, ch 10. 
25 Partnership Act 1890, s 4(2). 
26 Lindley and Banks, para 3-03. 
27 ibid para 2-26. 
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rights and obligations, are responsible for the liabilities of the firm. The partnership is the 
most basic of the forms we review. 
2.2.2. Limited Partnerships 
Limited partnerships (LPs) are more complex, and were introduced as a result of the efforts 
of Sir Frederick Pollock to introduce the European partnership en commandite to UK law.28 
His desire to introduce LPs arose from flaws facing passive investors in the partnership form: 
receiving profit from a partnership did not make someone a partner who would otherwise 
not have been one;29 this ‘did not go so far as to enable a person to become a partner and at 
the same time avoid unlimited liability’.30 Given the increase in the ability to secure limited 
liability by registration,31 it appeared logical to expand this protection to certain partnerships. 
Thus the Limited Partnership Act 1907 created a new entity termed the Limited Partnership, 
or LP. The general rules of partnership apply to LPs save where expressly otherwise 
provided.32 The LP itself is ‘registered’ rather than incorporated.33 This has several 
implications, including that an LP does not rate as an incorporated vehicle under various 
pieces of legislation.34 Limited partnerships have two types of partners: general partners 
(who have unlimited liability); and limited partners (whose liability is limited to the amount 
of capital sum they agree to contribute, but who are excluded from taking management 
decisions for the LP).35 As with partnerships, LPs are tax transparent,36 so partners are taxed 
on their share of the LP’s profits rather than the LP being taxed on its profits and then the 
individual partners being taxed on distributions. They also avoid the publicity requirements 
of filing accounts.37 This has made the LP popular as a private equity vehicle and, in 
Scotland, for agricultural holdings.38 Unlike other jurisdictions, the UK does not expressly 
allow for a single entity to be both a limited partner and a general partner of an LP.39 An LP 
                                                     
28 ibid para 28-01. See also J Hardman, A Practical Guide to Granting Corporate Security in Scotland (W 
Green 2018) para 2-36. 
29 Cox v Hickman (1860) 8 HLC 268, put on a statutory footing in the Partnership Act 1865. 
30 Lindley and Banks, para 28-04. 
31 Commencing with the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. 
32 Limited Partnerships Act 1907, s 7. 
33 ibid s 5. 
34See Hardman, Granting Corporate Security para 2-39. 
35 Limited Partnerships Act 1907, s 4(2). 
36 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, s 848. 
37 Unless the general partners are all companies. See Partnership (Accounts) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/569) 
reg 4(1). 
38 Hardman, Granting Corporate Security para 2-36, and E Berry, ‘Limited partnership law and private 
equity: An instance of legislative capture?’ [2018] Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1. 
39 Unlike Jersey and Guernsey. See the Limited Partnerships (Jersey) Law 1994, art 6 and the Limited 
Partnerships (Guernsey) Law 1995, s 2(2). 
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is, therefore, a more complex form of a partnership: one which allows certain partners to 
receive the benefits of limited liability in exchange for their exclusion from management.  
2.2.3. Limited Liability Partnerships 
Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) are still more complicated than LPs and were 
introduced by the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000. This form of organisation 
resulted from pressure from the professional services community –  primarily to protect the 
personal assets of partners of auditing firms. LLP status also made it easier to sue 
professional bodies.40 Only Scottish partnerships and LPs have separate legal personality,41 
whereas all LLPs enjoy that status.42 Unlike LPs, the default position for LLPs is that 
partnership law does not apply unless specifically provided otherwise.43 An LLP can be seen 
as a hybrid entity somewhere between a partnership and a company.  There are five key 
elements to an LLP: 
1. Separate personality (like a company); 
2. Limited liability (like a company); 
3. Disclosure of accounts (like a company); 
4. Tax transparency (like a partnership); and 
5. Inherent conflation of ownership and control based on partnership-
style default governance rules.44 
An LLP can be formed by two or more persons associated for the purposes of carrying on a 
lawful business.45 This formulation does not require all members of an LLP to contribute to 
the LLP.46 An LLP must also have designated members who effectively act as its compliance 
officers,47 for example, if there is a winding up of the LLP it is the designated members who 
                                                     
40 V Finch and J Freedman, ‘The limited liability partnership: Pick and mix or mix-up? [2002] Journal of 
Business Law 475. See also J Freedman and V Finch, ‘Limited Liability Partnerships: Have accountants 
sown up the "deep pockets" debate?’ [1997] Journal of Business Law 387. 
41 Partnership Act 1890, s 4(2). 
42 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s 1(2). 
43 ibid s 1(5). 
44 Finch and Freedman, [2002] Journal of Business Law 475,  481–495. See also J Hardman, ‘The Moral 
Hazard of Limited Liability? An Empirical Scottish Study’ (2018) 6 Nottingham Insolvency and Business 
Law eJournal 30. 
45 Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s 2(1)(a). 
46 J Whittaker and J Machell, The Law of Limited Liability Partnerships (4th edn, Haywards Heath: 
Bloomsbury 2015) para 2.5. 
47 ibid para 12.2. 
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make any necessary solvency statements.48 In addition, if the LLP breaches any of its 
statutory duties (eg, filing accounts) the designated members are also liable.49 The 
designated members, however, have no greater role in the management than other members 
– each member has a share and interests in the LLP. Neither the share nor the interests is 
defined50 but both involve a series of rights and obligations, primarily relating to finances 
and governance.51  There is, therefore, only one constituency of corporate participant in an 
LLP and that is the members. 
2.2.4. Companies 
This can be contrasted with companies. The common view is that company law ‘developed 
seamlessly from the law of partnership’.52 However, arguably the modern company is, 
rather, a hybrid between a partnership and a company incorporated by Royal Charter.53 The 
modern company is now governed by the Companies Act 2006, and allows shareholders to 
elect to subscribe for shares at a predetermined price54 to be held in a vehicle with separate 
legal personality55 which is then managed by appointed individuals called directors.56 
Amongst other options, a company can be a ‘private’ company or a ‘public’ company.57 The 
primary difference between a private and a public company is that the latter is able to offer 
its shares to the public – although it is not obliged to do so.58 
The final three forms of firm are private companies, public companies, and those companies 
whose shares are publicly traded. Whether a company is private or public must be stated in 
the company name, which generally ends with ‘Limited’ or ‘Ltd’ in the case of the private 
companies, and ‘Public Limited Company’ or ‘plc’ in the case of public companies.59 
Legislation governing both public and private companies is contained a single Act, which is 
                                                     
48 Insolvency Act 1986, s 89(1). 
49 Whittaker and Machell, Limited Liability Partnerships para 12. 
50 Hardman, Granting Corporate Security para 2-44. 
51 Whittaker and Machell, Limited Liability Partnerships para 8.18. 
52 O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1098 (Lord Hoffman). 
53 PG Mahoney, 'Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law ' (2000) 34 Georgia 
Law Review 873 and the discussion in J Hardman, The Duomatic Principle 2017 LLM(R) Thesis, University 
of Glasgow  7–9. 
54 Companies Act 2006, s 3. 
55 ibid s 16(2). 
56 ibid s 40. 
57 ibid s 4. 
58 ibid s 755; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 74 and Gower and Davies, para 1-18. 
59 Companies Act 2006, ss 58–59. 
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unusual and raises the risk of insufficient consideration being paid to the rules which 
distinguish the two forms of organisation.60  
Public limited companies are companies whose shares may be offered to the public61 
although they do not have to be. We shall use ‘public limited companies (plcs)’ to describe 
companies that take this legal form but are not publicly traded, and ‘traded companies’ to 
describe those that take this legal form and are publicly traded.62 The plc form is very similar 
to the Ltd form, but is subject to additional rules. Once a plc is publicly traded on certain 
markets63 it is referred to as a ‘listed entity’, the etymology of which is that the plc then 
appears on a bourse's ‘list’ of shares available.64 Listed entities, therefore, are traded on 
specific bourses whereas traded companies are traded on any bourse, which makes listed 
entities a subset of traded companies.  Traded companies are subject to additional 
requirements which untraded companies are not. The basis for the majority of the additional 
traded requirements stem from EU law,65 which is incorporated in UK law under various 
pieces of UK legislation.66 These requirements restrict various aspects of the traded 
company's life ranging from what it can offer to the public, to the disclosure of market 
information to ensure that a false market in shares is not created. Accordingly, the additional 
rules exist to protect shareholders invested (or considering investing) in the traded entity. 
Traded companies also have additional requirements regarding the public disclosure of 
information that do not apply to non-traded companies, again to protect investors and ensure 
that the price of traded securities reflects all relevant information.67  
We can therefore see a wide range of business vehicles available within the UK. In essence, 
these fall into two categories, partnership vehicles and company vehicles.68 Each of these 
                                                     
60 This can be compared to civilian systems (eg, Germany) which  have separate legislation to govern the 
equivalent of public companies and private companies. See Gower and Davies, paras 1-19, 1-20. 
61 Companies Act 2006, s 755. 
62 There is an additional subset of traded companies, being those traded on the main market. These are 
referred to here as ‘listed’ companies.  
63 Following the definition deployed in Gower and Davies, para 25-5 
64 ibid. 
65 See the Admission and Reporting Directive 2001 (EU 2001/34/EC); the Prospectus Directive 2003 (EU 
2003/71/EC); the Transparency Directive 2004 (ED 2004/109/EC); Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (known as MIFID) (EU 2004/39/EC); and the Market Abuse Directive (EU 2003/124/EC) for 
examples of EU directives leading regulation in this sphere. 
66 See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000; Prospectus Regulations 2005; Companies Act 2006 Part 28; 
and Financial Services Act 2012. See general discussion in Geoffrey Morse and others (eds), Palmer's 
Company Law (Release 164, Sweet & Maxwell 2019) 5.105-5.106.  
67 Companies Act 2006 ss 414CA and 414CB. 
68 Gower and Davies, para 1-2. Ultimately partnership vehicles do not separate the ownership function from 
the management function, as all participants in either are ‘partners’. Whilst a partner can choose to not have 
any involvement in the management of the partnership (Ward v Newalls Insulation Co Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 
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types of corporate vehicle arose from different pressures at different points between the 
1800s and 2000s.69 In summary, the principal characteristics of these entities are: 
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Partnership No No No Yes No No No 
LP Partial Partial No Yes No No No 
LLP Yes No No Yes No No No 
Ltd Yes Yes No No No No No 
Plc Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Traded Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Thus, a partnership offers no asset shielding through limited liability,70 does not envisage 
the separation of an ownership interest from a management interest, offers tax transparency, 
does not require minimum capital, and cannot have its interests offered to the public. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, a traded company offers limited liability for its shareholders, 
envisages separation of ownership and management, requires independent management, is 
not tax transparent, has a minimum capital requirement, can offer its shares to the public, 
and does so.  
On one level, this appears to allow those establishing a business maximum flexibility to 
choose their business type. However, this is not the case – it allows those establishing a 
business flexibility in choosing the characteristics that constitute their business type, but 
                                                     
1723), she remain a partner. Even the LP, which does have spit roles, deems both roles to be partners. 
Company forms formally distinguish between owners (shareholders) and managers (directors). 
69 Gower and Davies, para 1-47. 
70 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, 'The Essential Role of Organizational Law' (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 
387.   
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once they have decided on those characteristics their options are inherently limited. 
Consequently, it is not possible to offer ownership interests to the public without having 
limited liability. Similarly, if entities want tax transparency and limited liability for all 
owners, they must use the LLP as their corporate vehicle. This means that corporate 
participants whose firms meet the required criteria do not in fact enjoy flexibility in their 
choices – there is only one business form available to them. They are faced with a menu71 – 
one can either pick chicken and potatoes or fish and beans, but it is not possible to choose 
chicken and beans. International analysis holds that no rule is truly mandatory as a business 
can simply incorporate in a different jurisdiction which offers the requirements for a business 
entity which it seeks.72 This practice is commonly known as regulatory arbitrage.73 However, 
there are many drivers of jurisdiction.74 In this light, jurisdiction becomes another feature to 
factor into the above: if business participants want a vehicle in the UK in which owners have 
partial limited liability, they must use a limited partnership – and all the other characteristics 
that are associated with it. As McDonnell states, 
in choosing whether to incorporate in Delaware or Minnesota, one might 
conceivably prefer Delaware's case law on the duty of loyalty but Minnesota's case 
law on the duty of care and good faith. In that example, it is nearly impossible to 
mix and match – the corporation must either choose Delaware's law as a whole or 
Minnesota's.75 
Accordingly, the ostensible choice of business entity is in fact illusory. It is not open to 
participants to choose freely between business forms once they have established the 
characteristics they wish their business form to have.  
This overview of the types of firms offers necessary background for the discussion of the 
application of rules within these firms. We now review the types of agency costs within 
firms generally, before moving on to the specific agency costs arising within individual firm 
types. 
                                                     
71 I Ayres, ‘Menus Matter’ (2006) 73 The University of Chicago Law Review 1.  
72 See R Romano, ‘Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws’ 
(1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1599;  H Hansmann and R Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate 
Law' (2000) 89 The Georgetown Law Journal 439; R Romano, ‘Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle’ (1985) 1 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 225. 
73 V Fleischer, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2010) 89(2) Texas Law Review 227. 
74 Especially tax and reputation driven. See O Kun, ‘Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate 
and Economic Implications’ (2003) 29 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 313. 
75 BH McDonnell, ‘Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law’ (2007) 60 SMU Law Review 383, 
422. 
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2.3. Costs  
We have seen that agency costs arise when one person undertakes activity for another, and 
externalities arise where the action of parties A and B create effects for third parties over 
which the third parties have no control – they arise structurally within firms as defined in 
paragraph 2.1.76 To begin, let us consider the firm as an entity: 
As part of its normal commercial activity, this entity must interact with others. According to 
Kraakman and others, the first cost arises out of this interaction as there is a risk that third 
parties may suffer costs as a result of the use of the firm form by way of externality:  
 
The best illustration of such cost is limited liability. It is frequently stated77 that a logical 
result of a firm’s owners enjoying limited liability is that the owners will use the firm for 
riskier projects, exporting risk from themselves to third parties.78 This would result in third 
                                                     
76 Kraakman and others, Anatomy of Corporate Law 2.   
77 For example, M-L Djelic and J Bothello, ‘Limited Liability and its Moral Hazard Implications: The 
Systemic Inscription of Instability in Contemporary Capitalism’ (2013) 42(6) Theory and Society 589. 
78Whilst this risk is theoretically sound, evidence of it is empirically lacking in qualitative studies (C Lennox 
and Bing Li, ‘The Consequences of Protecting Audit Partners’ Personal Assets from the Threat of Liability’ 
(2012) 54(2-3) Journal of Accounting and Economics) 154 and quantitative studies (J Hardman, ‘The Moral 
Hazard of Limited Liability? An Empirical Scottish Study’ [2018] Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law 
e-Journal 30). 
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parties experiencing the Cost of the form of the firm being used. This is clearly an example 
of an externality, and yet Kraakman and others classify it as an agency cost.79 
Agency costs in fact arise within the firm. Thus we can split the main participants in any 
firm into owners and managers: 
 
Managers run the firm, while owners are entitled to the residue of profits and capital within 
the firm, raising the risk of agency costs being inflicted on the owners by the managers. This 
provides us with the second category of Costs: 
 
The issue is neatly summarised in an example provided by Bainbridge: 
Suppose the board of directors of Acme, Inc., is musing over the following question: 
‘I can either spend $100 million on a new corporate jet or I can distribute the $100 
million to the shareholders by increasing the size of the dividend.’ Can anyone 
doubt that some board will buy the jet?80 
                                                     
79 Kraakman and others, Anatomy of Corporate Law 1, 29–31. 
80 SM Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (OUP 2008) 6. 
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Therefore, managers acting in their own interests, at the expense of the owners, represents 
an agency cost suffered by the owners. Within the category of the owners there is a further 
agency cost. If there is more than one owner, a complication is added: 
 
In such circumstances there is a risk that any imposition of authority is undertaken by the 
majority for their own ends and to the detriment of the minority. Thus, the third category of 
agency costs exists between the majority and the minority: 
 
Displaying Costs in this manner helps show the impact of the classic formulation of Costs 
in firms. Third parties have one form of Cost to which they may be subject (externalities 
from the firm), as do the majority owners (from managers). Minority owners, however, 
experience two categories of agency costs: in their capacity as owners from managers; and 
in their capacity as a minority from the majority. Minority owners are the only category of 
actors who experience such double Costs.  
Calling agency costs and externalities ‘Costs’ is a misnomer. The term ‘Costs’ is generally 
used in law and economics to denote actual, realised and quantifiable costs and/or 
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expenses.81 There are costs of this type which fall within the above analysis: paying 
managers arms' length wages for managing the firm would be realised and quantifiable costs 
which would, on one level, be manager/owner agency costs. However, the above examples 
show that agency costs go further than this. Bainbridge is not concerned with the payment 
of agreed, reasonable, pay to managers; but rather that managers may use their position to 
their own advantage and the disadvantage of owners. Thus, the costs we are dealing with 
move away from being definable and quantifiable, towards being more ethereal. 
Bainbridge's example shows that the costs we are discussing actually concern the 
motivations people experience in certain situations. These motivations can arise as a result 
of legal stimuli (for example, the introduction of limited liability) or economic stimuli (if 
there is only one shareholder, or 100 shareholders each holding one share, there is no 
majority to create an agency cost against a minority. But if one owner holds 90 per cent of 
the firm and the rest is split evenly between 100 owners, there is a risk of majority/minority 
agency costs). 
It is possible that Kraakman and others, include what should be externalities within agency 
costs for the connotations of agency costs: whilst the existence and resolution of externalities 
may depend on value judgment; agency costs are universally derided as inefficient.82 It could 
be that by classifying these third-party costs as agency costs Kraakman and others are 
adopting a shorthand approach to refer to negative externalities which are not internalised. 
By inaccurately calling these costs ‘agency costs’ the debate is avoided as to whether these 
costs will (or could) in fact be internalised to provide an efficient outcome. Rather, it 
presumes that they will not be internalised and that these costs are suffered by third parties. 
The position of majority/minority costs is more complicated as they do not appear to fit 
neatly into agency costs or externality analysis: the minority have neither appointed the 
majority as their agent, nor are they third parties. Ultimately, majority/minority issues are 
agency costs as the majority are taking decisions which affect shareholders as a whole, of 
whom both the majority and the minority are part. The majority's decisions bind both the 
minority and the majority. They therefore do not meet Pigou's criteria for externalities: they 
are not the by-product of the majority rendering services to another person, but rather the 
                                                     
81 For example, transaction costs. See RC Ellickson, 'The Case for Coase and Against Coaseanism' (1989) 99 
The Yale Law Journal 611, 615. 
82 R Aguilera and others, ‘Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance’ in in M Wright and others 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (OUP 2014) 25 and M Roe, Political Determinants of 
Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact (OUP 2003) 134. 
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costs suffered by person B for the services she received from person A. This makes them 
agency costs rather than externalities. 
Agency costs and externalities are both important as they are costs suffered by the recipient 
(the principal or third party). There are links between the two as both are motivations that 
one experiences when placed in certain situations. For a director, the decision is whether to 
take the jet or recommend a dividend; for a business, the decision is whether to pollute the 
local environment or adopt a more costly but cleaner manufacturing process. In each case, 
the decision by the ‘cost generator’ is a rational economic decision. In any event, both agency 
costs and externalities raise issues for the sufferer. Each is also a two-step process. First, 
there must be the legal and factual matrix which allows the potential for the Cost to exist: 
the motivations highlighted above. From the externality perspective, this generally means 
the ability to externalise risk to third parties, and for owner/manager agency costs this usually 
means strong, centralised agents acting for weak, de-centralised owners.83 This potential, 
however, is not enough: we also need to consider the ability of the putative Cost causer to 
actually generate that Cost. There will be no agency cost under Bainbridge's example if there 
are mandatory caps on methods of executive travel. Similarly, there will be no externalities 
under the pollution example if there is a mandatory prohibition on polluting. In other words, 
it becomes necessary first to examine the incentives which create the potential Costs, and 
second, to examine the Cost causer's ability actually to manifest those Costs. For example, 
limited liability might result in an externality between the firm and third parties (ie, an 
incentive which creates the Cost), but a company selling a faulty asset to a third party and 
distributing the proceeds of the sale would be a manifestation of such externality (ie, the 
method by which the cost causer manifests the Cost). Law provides two potential routes to 
lower Costs: in this example it could provide unlimited recourse to any manager of a firm 
for any losses caused by third parties, which would lower the incentive element of the 
externality. Alternatively, it could provide limitations on distributions which would help 
mitigate the manifestation of this externality.  
We can consider two categories of manifestation. Firstly, direct manifestations of agency 
costs/externalities are those that arise directly from the decision-making actor to the recipient 
of the agency costs/externalities. Thus, the example above shows how externalities between 
the firm and third parties can manifest directly. Similarly, Bainbridge's jet provides an 
example of a direct manifestation of manger/owner Costs. A majority owner voting in favour 
                                                     
83 MJ Roe, Strong Managers Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton 
University Press 1994).  
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of a preferential buyback of only her own shares (and not those of the minority) is an example 
of a direct manifestation of Costs between majority and minority owners. 
Second, we can identify indirect manifestations of agency costs. These occur where agency 
costs between actors are not manifested directly between the relevant actors. For example, a 
director of company A who owns all of company B, may want company A to contract with 
company B on preferential terms. This enriches the director at the expense of the owners 
(and is therefore an owner/manager agency cost) but it manifests between the company and 
third parties. Owner/manager agency costs can manifest indirectly through third parties – 
these manifestations arise from an owner/manager relationship but do not manifest from the 
manager qua manager. Indirect manifestation also occurs between the majority and the 
minority. In every type of firm which acknowledges a difference between managers and 
owners,84 it is usual for the owners to select the managers.85 It is possible, therefore, for 
majority/minority agency costs to be indirectly manifested as agency costs from the 
managers. This can arise either because the majority instruct the managers to act in a certain 
way which benefits them, or the managers act in such a manner anyway to keep the majority 
happy. It is not possible for externalities to manifest indirectly: a third party experiences 
these directly from the firm only – whether the pollution is sanctioned by the shareholders 
or by the directors, the third party still receives negative externalities from the firm. From 
three Costs, we can therefore identify five manifestations of Costs: 
1. Direct manifestation of externalities between the firm and third parties; 
2. Direct manifestation of agency costs between owners and managers; 
3. Direct manifestation of agency costs between the majority and the 
minority; 
4. Indirect manifestation of agency costs between owners and managers; and 
5. Indirect manifestation of agency costs between the majority and the 
minority. 
                                                     
84 Being the LP, private company, public company, and publicly traded company. 
85 For example, see the Model Articles for Private Companies (The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 
2008 SI 2008/3229 Sch 1) and Companies Act 2006, s168 (the ‘Model Articles’). 
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Reviewing these manifestations will allow us to establish whether the law reacts uniformly 
to both Costs and their manifestations. In turn, this analysis will allow us to gain insights 
into of the interaction between the law's treatment of agency costs/externalities. 
It has been argued that law's role in firms lies in minimising and mitigating agency costs,86 
in that ‘agency costs destroy…value’.87 By including externalities within their analysis, it is 
to be assumed that Kraakman and others extend the analysis to externalities. It therefore 
appears that it is law which should reduce these Costs. There are two linked elements to this: 
does the Cost exist; and can it be acted upon to the detriment of the sufferer. To examine 
law's general response to Costs, we therefore need to follow a two-step process: first, identify 
the situations generating the Costs; and, second, identify the manifestations of those Costs. 
Only if there is a situation creating such a Cost, and an ability for this Cost to be manifested, 
will there be actual detriment to the sufferer. Should both be present, the detriment can be 
alleviated either by neutralising the situation, or by mitigating the manifestation. We begin 
by discussing situations generating Costs across our three categories: first, externalities 
between a firm and third parties; second, owner/manager agency costs; and third, 
majority/minority agency costs. 
2.4. Situations Generating Externalities 
We first examine the externalities experienced by third parties in the different types of firm. 
Partnerships do not enjoy limited liability. Externalities between the partnership and third 
parties are therefore minimised as there is no incentive to use the partnership form to 
externalise any risk: any third party has recourse to the assets of the individual partners. This 
means that partners obtain no personal asset-shielding from using this corporate form.88 The 
LP introduces partial limited liability, and therefore produces a higher risk of externality 
than a partnership. However, general partners remain liable for the debts of the LP. The 
unlimited liability of the general partners means that general partners tend to be special 
purpose vehicles with very few assets which are set up specifically to be general partners.89 
General partners, therefore, have no incentive to create such externalities as they risk being 
held personally liable. Limited partners are excluded from the management of the LP.90 The 
result is that externalities are also minimised for LPs: those with an incentive to create 
                                                     
86 For example, M Roe, Political Determinants 134. 
87 Aguilera and others, ‘Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance’ 25. 
88 Hansmann and Kraakman, 'The Essential Role of Organizational Law' (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387.   
89 R Ambery and S Bowmer, ‘The use of limited partnership special purpose entities in property 
securitisations’ [2001] Journal of International Banking Law 153 at 155. 
90 Limited Partnerships Act 1907, s 6(1). 
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externalities have no ability to do so; those with the ability to create externalities have no 
incentive. 
All other vehicles provide for limited owner liability. This means that externalities are higher 
in the case of LLPs, private companies, public companies, and traded companies. How high 
these externalities are depends on the ability of the owners to withdraw their investment 
from the firm: if owners can withdraw their money at will, externalities will be higher (as, 
at the margins, owners are encouraged to make the firm undertake risky transactions and 
withdraw their funds) than if owners are not able to withdraw their funds. These are known 
as capital maintenance rules. It becomes more difficult for owners to withdraw their capital 
from the firm the more complicated the type of entity the firm is. Thus, each partner is able 
to withdraw her funds at any time and determine the partnership by notice.91 This is logical, 
as the lack of limited liability means that third parties have recourse to the assets of partners 
should there be a shortfall in partnership funds. Members of an LLP are also able to withdraw 
their capital should they so wish. Given the limited liability of members of an LLP, the risk 
of heightened externalities experienced by third parties is real. However, externalities are 
reduced by the ‘clawback’ rule: if the LLP becomes insolvent within two years after a 
payment to a member and that member knew, or ought to have known, that there was no 
prospect of the LLP avoiding insolvent liquidation, a court can order the member to repay 
the funds.92  Unlike partnership firms, shareholders in companies cannot withdraw their 
capital due to capital maintenance rules developed by the English courts93 and statute.94 Rock 
and Wachter consider this a core characteristic of the company: it enables shareholders to 
invest jointly in an asset which is more important to the business than its value in isolation 
suggests.95 This allows creditors and future shareholders to be more confident about 
committing their resources to a vehicle from which other shareholders are not likely to 
withdraw funding.96 Shareholders in a private company are generally prohibited from 
withdrawing their capital97 other than in certain, exceptional circumstances.98 It is generally 
held that this makes it easy for private companies to redeem capital.99 This is correct. 
                                                     
91 Partnership Act 1890, s 26. 
92 Insolvency Act 1985, s 214A (5). 
93 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409. 
94 Companies Act 2006, s 641(1). 
95 See EB Rock and ML Wachter, ‘Waiting for the Omelette to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression’ in RK Morck (ed), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (University of Chicago Press 2000). 
96 Rock and Wachter, ‘Waiting for the Omelette’ 209, 219. 
97 Companies Act 2006, s 658(2). 
98 ibid s 709. 
99 Gower and Davies, para 13-12. 
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However, to achieve this end requires shareholder agreement by way of majority 
resolution:100 so giving the majority a veto over the redemption process. 
Public companies have minimum capital requirements. Thus a plc must have share capital 
of at least £50,000,101 of which at least a quarter of the nominal value and all of the premium 
must be paid up.102 This rule helps lower externalities as the plc must have a minimum 
capitalisation, which a private company need not have. There are further capital maintenance 
requirements such as a prohibition on purchasing or redeeming the company's own shares 
from its capital;103 a prohibition on reducing its capital using a solvency statement;104 and a 
public company is more restricted as regards issuing shares for non-cash consideration than 
a private company.105 If the assets of a public company fall below half of its issued share 
capital, the directors must call a general meeting.106 This provides even tighter capital 
maintenance rules than exist for private companies and, in turn, lowers externalities. In 
addition, the Takeover Code applies to plcs – even those not actually traded.107 Traded 
companies are subject to the same requirements, but also to additional capital maintenance 
requirements. Consequently, the Listing Rules provide that shares can only be traded on the 
main market if their market value (at the time of listing) is expected to be at least £700,000,108 
so offering initial comfort to third parties as to the quantum of the assets the firm owns. 
These capital maintenance rules have the effect of lowering externalities in that they ensure 
that (in the case of private companies) funds cannot be withdrawn and will be available for 
use by the firm, and (in the case of public and traded companies) consist of a minimum 
amount. This restricts the incentive for generating externalities, as funds remain trapped in 
the firm. As a result, the third party has recourse to those funds if externalities do manifest. 
We can, therefore, identify differences in the externalities between firms within this 
category. Those firms without limited liability present a lower risk than those with limited 
liability. In those firms with limited liability, third parties are protected by capital 
                                                     
100 For example, Companies Act 2006, s 694(2)(b). 
101 ibid s 763(1). 
102 ibid s 586. 
103 ibid s 709. 
104 ibid ss 642–644 (unlike private companies). 
105 ibid s 593. 
106 ibid s 656. 
107 ibid Part 28 and the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, 12th edn available at 
<http://www.thetakeoverpanel. org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=8Jan2018> A3(a) (accessed 
on 5 December 2019)  (the ‘Takeover Code’). 
108 Listing rule 2.2.7(1). 
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maintenance or clawback rules. The protective effect of these rules escalates as one moves 
further along the spectrum of complexity of firms. 
 
2.5. Situations Generating Agency Costs between Managers and Owners 
The next category is agency costs arising between managers and owners. Both partnerships 
and LLPs have only one category of corporate actor, and therefore there is no difference 
between managers and owners and so no possibility of agency costs arising in these 
categories of firm. In the case of LPs, owners and managers are separated to an extent: a 
partner does not enjoy the protection of limited liability unless she agrees to opt-out of 
management. The practice of general partners being special purpose vehicles with no assets 
(to avoid risks of a lack of limited liability) means that the general partner does not wish to 
acquire assets to which third parties will have recourse. Thus, while in theory this category 
of agency costs exists for LPs, in practice the Costs are minimised. 
Companies have a formal separation of roles between directors and shareholders.109  This 
increases owner/manager agency costs making these Costs higher than in partnerships or 
LLPs (where there is only one category of actor and so no such agency costs can arise), and 
LPs (where the personal liability of the manager for the debts of the vehicle as a whole 
mitigates this category of agency costs). As regards differentiating between the different 
types of company, private companies are more likely to be closely held, and it is generally 
held that closely held companies have lower agency costs in this category because unity 
among the owners allows them to exert greater control over the managers.110 Conversely, 
publicly traded companies with wide shareholder bases have high owner/manager agency 
costs.111 Agency costs between management and owners are therefore likely to be high in 
traded companies given the power disparity between centralised management and diverse, 
small shareholders. The result is that traded companies experience a wider separation of 
ownership and control,112 and managers become more powerful as it is more difficult for 
owners to collectivise and therefore exert any of their rights against managers. 
                                                     
109 Companies Act 2006, ss 11–12. 
110 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Close Companies and Agency Costs’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 
271. 
111 See LA Bebchuk, ‘Limited Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments’ (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 1820; and LA Bebchuk and A Hamdani, ‘Optimal Defaults 
for Corporate Law Evolution’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 489. 
112 AA Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev edn, Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc 1967). 
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To an extent, this risk is mitigated by the public market for shares which gives shareholders 
dissatisfied with management an opportunity to exit the vehicle. This is, of course, preferable 
to being an investor in a private company. The result tends to be that shareholders express 
their opinions by exit rather than voice.113 Should sufficient people be unhappy with the 
management of the vehicle, the share price will be driven down. This can be minimised in 
practice through the use of dividend policies.114 The use of such techniques by managers to 
keep owners happy has the potential to keep a check on owner/manager agency costs – but 
these techniques are not universally used. Indeed, the exercise by a dissatisfied owner of exit 
over voice, may resolve the agency cost experienced by that specific owner, but offers no 
solution for the firm as a whole. 
We can therefore see that agency costs within this category generally rise the further along 
the spectrum of complexity one goes. Although LLPs have lower risks in this category than 
LPs as the former have only one category of actor whereas the latter divides the actors into 
management and passive investors. 
2.6. Situations Generating Agency Costs between the Majority and the 
Minority 
The final category of situations giving rise to agency costs are those between the minority 
and the majority. The close nature of the partnership creates the potential for this to arise, in 
that majorities are more likely to form.115 Once again, agency costs in this category are 
reduced where owners are able to exit the firm. Partners are able to fix a set period for their 
firm, or if no period is set, they are able to determine the partnership at any time and 
withdraw their investment.116 This provides a minority partner with an opportunity to 
withdraw her capital from the firm at any time, which lowers majority/minority agency costs. 
The ability to exit a firm prevents agency costs suffered by the minority: the majority have 
no incentive to abuse their dominant position, as this would result in having to liquidate the 
firm to return funds to the minority should they feel disenfranchised.  
                                                     
113 See AO Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States 
(Harvard University Press 1970). 
114 See BR Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (OUP 2010) 77. 
115 Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Close Companies’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 271; C O'Kelley, ’Filling 
Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis’ (1992) 87 Northwestern University 
Law Review 216. 
116 Partnership Act 1890, s 26, 
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2.6.1. LP Costs 
LPs cannot be dissolved at the will of a limited partner.117 Unless the partnership agreement 
stipulates otherwise, the consent of the general partner(s) is required to transfer a limited 
partner's share to another party.118 Therefore, unlike in the general partnership, a limited 
partner does not have a way of exiting the partnership. This gives rise to the potential for 
agency costs to arise in this category, but once again they are mitigated by practice: limited 
partners are excluded from management, and therefore cannot manage the LP in a way 
adverse to the interests of a limited partner. We have seen that market practice (responding 
to legal stimuli) means that general partners do not have sufficient capital invested in the LP 
to secure a sufficiently dominant ownership stake to create this form of agency costs. They 
have unlimited liability for the debts of the LP and, therefore, any asset, including a valuable 
stake in the LP, can be recovered by the LP’s creditors. As a result, those with dominant 
ownership have no management rights, and those with management rights have no incentive 
to form a majority. Thus the form of the limited partnership creates the potential for agency 
costs to arise in each category of agency costs, but the practical effects of using this form 
reduces these Costs. 
2.6.2. LLP Costs 
A member of an LLP cannot dissolve the LLP at will. However, LLPs have no capital 
maintenance rules and so members are able to withdraw capital from the LLP119 subject to 
the clawback rules noted above. This means that minority interests are able to exit their 
investment subject to the LLP agreement. These rules have the effect of lowering 
majority/minority agency costs. However, they also increase externalities between the LLP 
and third parties, as third parties are at risk if all members withdraw their capital. This can 
be seen as an example of a displacement of an agency cost: attempts to reduce Costs in one 
category, result in increased Costs elsewhere. These, in turn, require mitigation by way of 
the clawback regime. 
2.6.3. Company Costs 
Shareholders in private companies, however, are open to the risk of an agency cost within 
this category due to the likely concentrated ownership of the vehicle creating the risk of an 
                                                     
117 Limited Partnership Act 1907, s 6(5)(e). 
118 ibid s 6(5)(b). 
119  Lindley and Banks, para 2-41. 
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owner majority. Agency costs within this category are higher than within traded and non-
traded public companies as there is not (and cannot be) a secondary market on which to sell 
their shares. The absence of a liquid market and the inability to withdraw capital means that 
there is no easy way for minority shareholders to exit the company and recoup their 
investment if the majority acts in a way which generates agency costs. Easterbrook and 
Fishel argue that this is not the direct harm it appears to be: 
Consider the extreme case in which a majority shareholder appropriates 100% of 
the firm's income for himself. Even if a minority stockholder had an unrestricted 
ability to sell his shares, nobody would buy them. Illiquidity is not the problem.120 
Instead, they identify four main problems inherent in closely held firms: valuing the residual 
claim becomes difficult; the absence of an easy exit means that investors who need cash may 
push for distribution rather than exit; an investor cannot rely on the monitoring power of the 
market which helps constrain and align managers' interests to those of the vehicle; and it 
prevents future capital raising by preventing people from valuing the stake they should 
receive in exchange for an established investment.121 The result of these is to increase agency 
costs for minority shareholders in private companies. These costs do not exist in isolation: 
majority shareholders normally exercise control over the composition of the board of 
directors.122 Accordingly, agency costs in this category can manifest in two ways: directly 
between majority and minority shareholders; and between (minority) shareholders and 
managers. The latter can be seen as an indirect manifestation of an agency cost arising 
between majority and minority shareholders.  
Rock and Wachter offer three examples. First, a minority and majority shareholder are both 
employed by a close company. The majority of value extraction is by salary. The majority 
shareholder sacks the minority shareholder, leaving her without income from the investment, 
with no ability to leave, and with little value remaining for dividends. Second, a majority 
shareholder encourages the company to buy back its own shares but not those of the minority 
shareholders. Third, a majority shareholder sells its stake in the company without bringing 
the minority shareholder along with it.123 Other examples of this indirect manifestation can 
                                                     
120 Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Close Companies’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 271, 275. 
121 ibid 275–276. 
122 Companies Act 2006, s 168 contains a statutory right for a shareholder majority to remove a director, and 
the ability to appoint directors is contained in the articles of association (Gower and Davies, para 14-24). The 
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amend the articles of association. 
123 Rock and Wachter, ‘Waiting for the Omelette’ 202–203. 
  34 
 
be easily imagined: timing dividends and corporate transactions to suit majority 
shareholders, and a myriad of other decisions by management which are, directly or tacitly, 
influenced by the preferences of a majority shareholder. Empirically, majority shareholders 
receive greater financial reward than is justified by their proportion of equity holding.124 It 
has been argued that this is a trade-off: minority shareholders allow majority shareholders to 
receive private benefits in exchange for undertaking advanced monitoring of the firm.125 
However, in light of what has been said above, it is a further manifestation of agency costs 
within this category. 
Agency costs between majority and minority shareholders in public companies are lower 
than in private companies because of the application of the Takeover Code.126 This provides 
that when a shareholder hits an ownership threshold (currently 30%) she must make an offer 
for all shares issued by the vehicle.127 This discourages shareholders from reaching the thirty 
per cent threshold and obtaining a majority. Accordingly, to generate agency costs, a 
shareholder would need to negotiate with other shareholders to form a coalition. However 
this would have to be done on a case-by-case basis to avoid the coalition being seen to be 
shareholders acting in concert and, therefore, to be deemed jointly to have triggered the 
threshold.128 It is possible for a comparative majority to create costs in this category. For 
example, if one shareholder holds 29.9 per cent of the shares in a public limited company 
and all other shareholdings are held in amounts of 0.1 per cent, then the 29.9 per cent 
shareholder would be the most dominant shareholder. However, the collective ability of the 
other shareholders to override the dominant shareholder, means that agency costs within this 
category are lower than within the private limited company. 
Traded companies within this category have even lower agency costs as shareholders are 
able to exit the company at the then-prevailing rate. Accordingly, although they are not able 
to withdraw their capital from the firm, they are able to exit their investment. If a dominant 
29.9 per cent shareholder acts oppressively, smaller shareholders will exit so depressing the 
price of the traded vehicle. This acts as a disincentive for the dominant shareholder to act 
oppressively, which lowers the agency costs for trade companies in this category. 
                                                     
124 L Enriques and others, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and non-shareholder 
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Thus we see lowered agency costs for partnerships, LPs, LLPs, public companies, and traded 
companies within this category. However, we see a high risk of agency costs for private 
companies within this category by way of both direct manifestation (majority shareholders 
receiving financial benefits exceeding their pro rata shares) and indirect manifestation 
(management acting in the interests of the majority). 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
We have reviewed the situations which create Costs in different types of firm. They can be 
summarised as follows: 
Entity Type Externalities Owner & Manager 
agency costs 
Majority & 
Minority agency 
costs  
  Partnership Low (unlimited 
liability)  
None (only one legal 
category)  
Low (partners can 
determine 
partnership)  
LP Structurally lowered 
(exclusion of those 
with limited liability 
from management) 
Structurally lowered 
(general partner has 
unlimited liability) 
Structurally lowered 
(LPs excluded from 
management and GP 
has unlimited 
liability) 
LLP Lowered by 
clawback 
None (only one legal 
category)  
Lowered by ability to 
withdraw capital 
Ltd Lowered by capital 
maintenance 
Lower than other 
companies due to likely 
shareholder strength 
Highest and 
exacerbated by lack 
of ability to exit 
Plc Lowered by higher 
capital maintenance 
requirements 
High, but the analysis 
depends on the 
shareholder base 
Lowered by 
mandatory takeover 
code 
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(whether akin to ltd or 
traded) 
Traded Lowered by even 
higher capital 
maintenance 
requirements 
Highest Lowered by 
mandatory takeover 
code and exit 
 
Incentives for externalities are linked to limited liability. The LP provides partial limited 
liability, and through its structure the incentives for externalities are lowered. Situational 
risks for all types of company with limited liability are the same in this category, but are 
reduced by capital maintenance rules. Owner/manager agency costs are linked to whether 
there are separate categories within the firm, and the ability of the owners to collectivise 
their powers to keep managers in check. The traded company faces the highest potential 
agency costs within this category, although the ability of shareholders to exit freely is a 
limiting factor. 
Majority/minority agency costs depend on the ability of a majority to form and the ability of 
a minority to exit. These costs are highest in private companies: shareholders are better able 
to form majority blocks, and minorities are unable to exit. We can therefore see two areas of 
high agency costs within UK firms: between owners and managers in traded companies; and 
between the majority and the minority in private companies. 
The foregoing identifies the Cost-generating situations which can arise. However, this does 
not tell the entire story in that it fails to reflect any restraints there may be on these costs 
manifesting. Strong management and weak, diverse ownership alone, or a shareholder 
owning 51 per cent of the shares in a company while her fellow 3,000 shareholders each 
owns a single share, does not in and of itself create a problem for the owners or minority 
respectively. The existence of a situation giving rise to a Cost does not mean that such Cost 
will automatically manifest – this depends on whether there are legal restraints to the actual 
manifestation of the cost in question: the legal rules governing the five manifestations of the 
three Costs identified. Accordingly having established the likely Costs across different types 
of firm, it is necessary to establish legal responses to manifestations of these Costs. The mere 
existence of situations causing these Costs is not sufficient: there needs to be an opportunity 
for the Cost generator to actually manifest the Cost to create a concern.   
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CHAPTER 3 
3. PROTECTING AGAINST MANIFESTATIONS OF COSTS IN FIRMS 
3.1. Introduction 
It is one thing to have incentives to create Costs, and another thing to be able to act on such 
situations in a way which manifests these Costs. We have already examined structural 
incentives which create the potential for Costs within firms and have established that the 
most common situations giving rise to the potential for Costs stem from the owner/manager 
agency cost for traded companies and the majority/minority agency cost for private 
companies. It is therefore necessary to explore manifestations of Costs. 
Manifestations of Costs can only occur when a firm does something: if firms remain passive, 
asset-holding vehicles there is no opportunity for Costs to manifest. It is only when decisions 
are taken – and activity undertaken – that these Costs can manifest. We have further seen 
that the potential for Costs is created by situational incentives. Costs will therefore be 
manifested in any manner in which the actors can manifest them. Five methods of 
manifestation have been identified. However, as Costs are intangible there is limited value 
in trying to explore an exhaustive list of specific manifestations between the categories of 
actors or the legal response to these manifestations. Instead, we need to undertake a broader 
analysis to understand what can be deduced as regards legal responses to the manifestation 
of Costs. The best way to analyse manifestations of Costs is to explore the laws applicable 
whenever a firm does anything. This chapter, therefore, examines the rules applicable within 
firms when they attempt to do something. It explores three categories of rules used within 
firms: rules relating to the capacity of the firm; protection for third parties when dealing with 
the firm; and governance rules in respect of the firm. We then turn to the types of rules which 
may be used in any given situation. These rules vary, depending on the level of optionality 
available to the participants, from those that do not apply unless the parties opt-in 
(permissive rules), those that apply unless the parties opt-out (default rules), those with 
which parties must either comply or explain their non-compliance (comply-or-explain rules) 
and lastly, those rules which parties cannot opt out of (mandatory rule). This chapter then 
examines how these rules are used in firms. This will result in a matrix which clarifies the 
types of rules used within different categories of firm. This matrix has columns setting out 
the different categories of costs and rows outlining the different types of rules. Populating 
this matrix will provide a pathway to an analysis of rule usage: we can see when different 
types of rules are used in different categories of rules across different types of firm. By 
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mapping this matrix to Costs, we can identify which types of rules are used in different 
circumstances and why. 
 
3.2. Categories of Rule 
Before acting, the firm must first decide to undertake the activity concerned. Whenever the 
firm does anything, there are rules which provide who can bind the firm and act in its name. 
We can discern three subcategories of rules. 
Capacity rules dictate whether a firm may undertake the activity proposed at all. For 
example, a rule which allows participants to state that their legal entity is only entitled to 
undertake certain activity, and for the firm to not be bound outside this activity, is a capacity 
rule. If an action is within the capacity of the firm, the participants need to establish whether 
the firm wishes to undertake such activity. Governance rules are internal rules in that they 
do not involve any external interaction or activity; they dictate the internal mechanics when 
an entity decides to do something. These can be contrasted with third-party protection rules, 
which lay down protection for third parties whenever a firm undertakes any activity. The 
third-party protection rules we consider are those that apply whenever there is doubt as to 
whether the vehicle has performed an action, or whether one of the actors for the vehicle 
acted in a manner outside her authority for which the vehicle should not be held responsible. 
In other words, third-party protection rules regulate how a firm interacts with third parties. 
Third-party protection rules proceed from the premise that the action itself may be 
undertaken by the firm.  
There are additional rules which dictate what any firm can do. These are external rules which 
govern the activities of any entity. Thus, criminal law imposes centrally-established 
punishments if activity breaches these rules; tort/delict provides a bilateral remedy for 
wronged parties if activity breaches the rules; and contract law provides a bilateral remedy 
for a wronged party if activity breaches obligations undertaken by the breaching party. As 
external rules apply equally across the full range of legal persons, they are not included under 
capacity rules. Rather, we concentrate on the rules which limit the capacity of the firm 
specifically. These types of rules also map on to Costs more generally: governance rules 
cover owner/manager, and majority/minority interactions, whereas third-party protection 
rules cover interactions between the firm and third parties. Capacity rules govern interactions 
between the firm and third parties, but also between managers and owners.129 The rest of 
                                                     
129 Although, as we shall see, the ability of capacity rules to influence manager/owner agency costs has 
diminished over time and is now limited. 
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chapter analyses the governance, third-party protection, and capacity rules applicable to key 
firms under UK law. It also maps them on to responses to manifestations of Costs. In order 
to analyse rules applicable within each category, it is also necessary to establish what choice 
of rules are available within any category of rules. We can then establish discernible trends 
as to the application of different types of rules to the different categories of rules across 
different legal entities. These categories of rules, consequently, provide the columns in the 
matrix of rule type. 
 
3.3. Types of Rule 
How do we classify the types of rules deployed within our three categories? Law has 
historically provided several taxonomies of legal rules. Analysis of law and economics in 
the 1980s,130 divided rules into property rules (where a party had a right which she could 
bargain away), liability rules (where a party had to pay an objectively-calculated amount if 
she injured another) and inalienable rules (which could not be deviated from).131 However, 
this taxonomy has become less relevant over time, as law and economics consider there to 
be little economic merit in either of the final two options: if ability to injure is established 
then there are limited arguments in favour of the amount to be paid for such injury being set 
by a third party rather than the injured party, and taking matters one step further, economic 
orthodoxy indicates that one should be able to alienate such rights as one desires in exchange 
for whatever one sees fit. The result is that the property rule element has become the 
dominant tool for theorists, so rendering the taxonomy of limited worth.132 This narrowing 
of focus created analytical space for a new taxonomy of rules to be created in the context of 
corporate law: that between permissive rules,133 default rules, ‘comply-or-explain’,134 and 
mandatory rules.135 
                                                     
130 See EA Posner, ‘Economic Analysis of the Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?’ (2002) 112 The 
Yale Law Journal 829. 
131 See G Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, 'Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
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132 See RA Epstein, 'A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules' (1997) 106 The Yale 
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133 See BR Cheffins, Company Law Theory, Structure and Operations (OUP 2008) 227–263, and discussion 
in Hardman, The Duomatic Principle para 2.1.3. 
134 See Gower and Davies, para 14-78. 
135 Also known as 'immutable' rules – see I Ayres and R Gertner, 'Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules' (1989) 99 The Yale Law Journal 87; or 'inalienable' rules. – see G 
Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 
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Permissive rules are those to which parties can opt-in. They are therefore generally stated to 
enable pre-established frameworks of otherwise ‘doubtful legal validity’ which the law 
creates expressly to allow such activity – for example, the framework for limited liability.136 
This analysis applies equally to parties opting-in to apply specific contractual terms which 
have been previously tested by the courts.137 For example, if courts have previously held that 
a certain type of discretion accorded to one counterparty must be applied reasonably,138 then 
including that type of discretion in a contractual arrangement between two parties ‘opts-in’ 
to that legal regime. 
Default rules are rules which parties are able to elect not to apply should they wish. Default 
rules can be regarded as ‘opt-out’ rules. For example, laws of intestacy provide a default set 
of rules for the division of someone's estate, which the individual can alter if she wishes.139 
Similarly, the transfer of title in goods is subject to default rules which can be amended by 
express or implied agreement.140 Default rules have, therefore, been said to be ‘gap fillers’ 
in contracts;141 they exist until and unless expressly excluded. 
‘Comply-or-explain’ is the tool under which market participants can choose either to comply 
with a provision, or to explain their non-compliance. The aim of the tool is to encourage 
disclosure of sub-optimal behaviour,142 which in turn allows the market to react 
appropriately to such disclosure. Fear of such negative reaction, it is hoped, will discourage 
such sub-optimal behaviour. As such, the approach may only produce results for 
shareholders and not for wider stakeholders.143 It has been stated, however, that the principle 
offers ‘maximum flexibility to extremely diverse fields of activity, incentives and 
strategies’.144 This approach has been criticised as encouraging a tick-box exercise which 
can ignore the reasons behind non-compliance and not sufficiently analyse the quality of 
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compliance.145 The ‘comply-or-explain’ approach is described as a ‘Pascalian Wager’ to be 
used by policy makers: either the policy achieves compliance or it causes no harm and so is 
worth trying.146 Comply-or-explain displays similar characteristics to default rules, in that 
the actors are able to opt out. However, the purpose of comply-or-explain is to discourage 
opting out: in order to opt out, actors must disclose why they have opted out to the market. 
This means that comply-or-explain forms its own sub-type of rule: it is a deliberate attempt 
to make actors more likely to follow the rule than if it were a pure default rule and, therefore, 
is a ‘stickier’ rule than a default rule.147 
Mandatory rules are those that cannot be contracted out of. They therefore always apply 
regardless of intention. Parties cannot, for example, contract out of criminal law. These rules 
are commonly designed to protect parties who may not be yet be known or knowable – 
general torts and criminal law act to discourage behaviour which may result in future damage 
to the public, rather than to protect specific, known individuals. In addition, they can be used 
to protect against known risks which are not otherwise adequately protected. 
When examining the manifestation of Costs, we need to evaluate whether mandatory, 
permissive, comply-or-explain, or default rules should be used in firms. Having done so, we 
examine how these types of rules are used within the categories of governance, third-party 
protection, and capacity rules in UK commercial law: they form the rows of our matrix. 
 
3.4. What type of rules should be used 
Which of these rules should apply to firms? The modern consensus is that corporate law 
consists of a series of default rules which can be varied by market participants.148 This 
matches the conception of the company as a ‘nexus of contracts’,149 with market participants 
able to choose the rules that best apply to their corporate form.150 If this is the case, then rules 
should primarily be default rules.  
Cheffins strengthens this analysis by highlighting two main weaknesses in mandatory rules. 
Firstly, it is difficult to get a mandatory rule correct. Law makers either tend to impose rules 
                                                     
145ibid 271. 
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which all corporate participants would anyway apply – so what is the point – or to impose 
inefficient rules which market participants would not otherwise adopt. Neither of these is 
good for the corporate market.  Secondly, when a mandatory rule is inefficient (either by 
design or following supervening events) it is difficult to update it. Limited bandwidth of law 
makers means that market participants may be stuck with rules which they do not want for 
prolonged periods. Accordingly, Cheffins concludes that corporate law should proceed on 
the basis of default rules rather than mandatory rules.151 
Gordon, however, offers five potential reasons for corporate law to proceed on a mandatory 
basis: 
(a) to protect investors. Managers are likely to have more information than 
investors, and therefore mandatory rules have a role in protecting investors 
from victimisation by managers; 
(b) to provide certainty. If each company proceeds on entirely different rules, 
then the participants in the marketplace may not be aware of how their 
particular arrangement will be construed. If all companies proceed on the 
same, mandatory set of rules, those rules are more likely to be tested in the 
courts and so offer greater certainty; 
(c) to provide a public good. Contractual freedom between participants in the 
corporate venture will result in externalities for third parties (including 
creditors and other stakeholders) which can be avoided by way of a 
mandatory form; 
(d) to improve the innovation of the rules governing companies. This can be 
seen as related to point (b) above: if all companies are subject to the same 
mandatory rules then debates about improving those rules will be centred 
on one set of rules. Applying minds to the same set of rules is likely to 
improve those rules; and 
(e) to prevent opportunistic amendment by dominant stakeholders at different 
points in the lifecycle of the company.152 
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Gordon's analysis is based on the notion that mandatory rules act to protect those who will 
invest, weaker stakeholders, and those with less knowledge. Gordon's argument is 
epitomised by his final bullet point: default rules allow for opportunistic amendment by 
dominant parties. There is, therefore, a place for mandatory rules in protecting interests 
within a firm. This can, however, sit with Cheffins's argument that rules should be default if 
this is reformulated to provide that default rules should be used unless the interests of any 
category of actor need to be protected. The interests which require to be protected map on to 
our three Cost-generating situations. The way to protect those interests is to mitigate against 
our five manifestations of Costs. This protection can also be achieved via the comply-or-
explain route encouraging best practice within the firm. Comply-or-explain works by 
requiring disclosure of the reasons for opting out of rules. This can only be effective in 
achieving policy goals if the act of disclosure has an effect on the business entity. In any 
untraded company, the most important effect of such disclosure – that on the price of issued 
shares in the company – is eliminated. The other effect of failing either to comply with a 
provision of the UK Corporate Governance Code or explain non-compliance, is that the 
traded company breaches the listing rules if it is listed on the main market.153 This may, in 
turn, bring sanctions on the company. Thus, when faced with no market to react to negative 
disclosure, and no regulator to force compliance or disclosure, it seems that moving ‘comply-
or-explain’ to a non-traded firm will offer little benefit.  
Proponents of a default-rule approach emphasise the contractual flexibility the approach 
offers: when faced with a default rule, those who value it will observe it, whilst those who 
do not will be able to bargain it away.154 That mandatory rules have any place within this 
analysis is disputed as geographical flexibility as to jurisdiction of incorporation means that, 
ultimately, no rules are mandatory: companies can be incorporated globally according to 
rules they prefer155 so making every rule optional. This approach is frequently criticised: 
involuntary creditors (ie, tort victims) cannot price any interaction and so cannot be defended 
by a default rule,156 imperfect information between the parties may result in the bargain being 
ineffectively struck,157 and the disparity in bargaining power between those who need 
protection and those who would oppress means that the market for default rules does not 
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operate in the way proposed.158 In addition, we have seen that when it comes to selecting a 
business entity, choice is actually illusory, and that the ‘menu’ approach means that once 
business characteristics have been chosen, there is no choice of business entity. It may 
therefore be that there is less flexibility within the market, and that mandatory elements play 
a larger role than initially envisaged by Cheffins. 
Accordingly, our theoretical proposition is that rules should be default rules unless there is 
a high Cost which needs to be mitigated, in which case alternative solutions should be found. 
Does this match how rules are used in practice within the UK? In order to establish this, we 
shall now review the types of rules which are used across capacity, third-party protection, 
and governance rules across different types of firm in the UK. This will enable us to populate 
our matrix and see when different types of rules are used across different categories of rules 
in different types of firms. 
 
3.5. Capacity Rules 
Capacity rules dictate whether the firm can undertake an activity. There are very few 
capacity rules which apply to partnerships. Generally, anything that an individual can do a 
partnership can do. There are, however, two key limitations. Firstly, a partnership must be 
formed with a view to making a profit. This includes ‘every trade, occupation or 
profession’,159 and need neither be repeated nor endure for a prolonged period.160 This has 
been interpreted permissively, including issues that are not generally regarded as those of a 
business.161 The two or more people do not all need to be active in the business for a 
partnership to exist,162 and they do not need to be carrying on the same business – provided 
there is some form of mutuality between them.163 The important thing is the intention to 
make a profit, rather than actually realising that profit.164 The second limitation relates to 
illegal partnerships.165 This is an extension of the general rule that illegal contracts are 
unenforceable.166 Thus, when one highwayman sued another highwayman for his share of 
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the spoils of their joint adventure, the court held that no valid partnership existed.167 
However, there is no presumption of illegality in a partnership – the party alleging illegality 
must prove it.168  The two capacity rules outlined above are mandatory. They are, however, 
couched widely – every opportunity to deem a partnership as falling within the test of 
partnership is taken. Conversely, illegality must be proved. Accordingly, the mandatory 
capacity rules for partnerships are set in a broad way.169 This approach is the same for LPs.  
An LLPs’ capacity is unlimited.170 The explanatory notes to the Act introducing LLPs state 
that an LLP ‘will, therefore, be able to undertake the full range of business activities which 
a partnership could undertake’.171 Actually, an LLP's capacity is wider than that of a 
partnership:  there are certain, albeit limited, circumstances in which a putative partnership 
would not be a valid partnership. However, the position is different for an LLP – once a 
certificate of registration of an LLP has been issued, it serves as conclusive proof that the 
LLP exists.172 The courts have been quick to hold that the law applicable to partnerships 
does not apply to LLPs unless specifically enacted otherwise.173 It is true that an LLP 
requires more than one member on its incorporation, and that these members must carry on 
a lawful business with a view to a profit.174 This, therefore, appears to correspond to the 
requirements for a partnership. However, once an LLP is incorporated this test has been 
passed. If the membership of an LLP falls below two, the effect is not that the separate 
personality and incorporated nature of the LLP fall away. Rather, after six months the sole 
member becomes liable for the debts of the LLP on a joint and several basis with the LLP.175 
This means that the LLP retains unlimited capacity, but the sole member acquires liability 
for such debts in addition to the liability of the LLP. This places the LLP in line with the LP 
and the partnership as having mandatory capacity rules. However, as opposed to 
partnerships, the LLP's capacity rules contain no protection for its members to argue that the 
LLP is not bound.176 Accordingly, the LLP's mandatory rule is more difficult to avoid than 
the broadly-couched mandatory rules for the partnership and the LP.  
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We have seen that capacity rules are linked to externalities, and that LLPs have a higher 
situational risk of externalities due to the presence of limited liability. It is, therefore, logical 
that an LLP has wider capacity than an unincorporated partnership, which aligns to our 
theory that default rules should be used unless there is an interest to protect which should be 
covered by other types of rules – in this case, mandatory rules. Capacity rules also link to 
protection against owner/manager agency costs, although this is irrelevant in the partnership 
and the LLP which each only has one category of actor. 
Capacity rules in companies have a long history.177 The concept of a company not being able 
to enter into an arrangement because matters were ultra vires was transported from public 
law.178 Nyombi flags that its initial purpose was twofold: to protect investors by limiting 
corporate activity to matters expressly provided for in the constitution; and to protect third 
parties from companies overstepping the activities they were created for, each of which maps 
neatly to the owner/manager agency costs and externalities respectively. However, once 
members were able to ratify ultra vires acts, the protection for third parties decreased.179 
Indeed, this changed the concept of an agreement being set aside on the ground of a lack of 
capacity from something which protected third parties, to something which actively hindered 
them – they could no longer prevent a company from acting on the ground that the action 
fell outside its constitution.180 This rule left third parties exposed; whilst they were entitled 
to assume that any procedural requirements in the company's articles had been met, a 
company would not be bound if the matter fell entirely outside its capacity. This increased 
the direct manifestations of externalities to a higher level than the protective function served 
by using rules in this category to mitigate direct and indirect manifestations of agency costs 
between owners and managers. As a result, the Companies Act 1989 added a new provision 
which stated: 
[T]he validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on the 
ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company’s memorandum.181 
This formulation remains in the Companies Act 2006 but with a slight amendment – the 
word ‘memorandum’ has been expanded to ‘constitution’.182 This means a company has 
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unlimited capacity vis-á-vis third parties.183 However, whilst a company cannot evade 
liability on the basis of its own incapacity,184 shareholders may use the courts to restrain an 
action by the directors which is outside the company's powers,185 and directors have duties 
to act in accordance with the company's constitution.186 Accordingly whilst action in breach 
of the constitution will still stand unless specifically injuncted,187 it may have consequences 
for directors. For our purposes, it suffices to note that from the perspective of a third party, 
the capacity of a company is unlimited. This is therefore a mandatory rule of the same type 
as for an LLP, but is more difficult for the vehicle to use to escape liability than the 
mandatory rules which apply to partnerships more generally. This formulation of the 
capacity rule, therefore, provides greater protection for third parties dealing with a company 
and so mitigates manifestations of externalities arising from companies opportunistically 
attempting to escape agreements. Its ability to mitigate manifestations of owner/manager 
agency costs also remains via the rights of owners to act against managers. Capacity rules 
have, however, changed over time from narrowly-construed means by which to protect 
shareholders from owner/manager agency costs, to widely-construed means of protecting 
third parties when the harm they suffer from the application of the former approach 
outweighs the benefits. 
The same general framework applies to public companies.188 However, there are additional 
restrictions, including the prohibition on a public company providing financial assistance in 
respect of its own shares. Financial assistance means giving or loaning money to, 
guaranteeing the debts of, waiving or releasing rights, or otherwise reducing assets189 of a 
public company, in each case to help someone acquire shares in the assistance provider.190 
Prohibitions on financial assistance have a long provenance under UK law, but have been 
watered down over time. The Companies Act 1985 permitted financial assistance by private 
companies if a certain procedure – known as a ‘whitewash’ procedure – was followed.191 
This procedure triggered the start of the private equity boom in the UK.192 The Companies 
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Act 2006, removed this procedure but only prevented public companies and their 
subsidiaries from providing financial assistance.193 The precise effect of breaching this 
provision has been debated. It was initially held that the only effect of a breach was 
punishment of the officers involved, and so the unlawful financial assistance remained 
effective.194  Gower and Davies refer to these decisions as ‘calamitous’ and now ‘accepted 
to be heretical’.195 The current position, confirmed by the House of Lords, is that unlawful 
financial assistance is unenforceable by either party.196 This also applies to other parts of 
transactions which cannot be severed from the unlawful financial assistance.197 The 
prohibition on financial assistance for plcs therefore limits the activity that they can 
undertake compared to private limited companies. This would appear to increase the risk of 
externalities manifesting by providing categories of action which can be ex poste declared 
void. However, in substance this prevents a firm’s resources from being diverted to, 
ultimately, its shareholders. Accordingly, it acts to keep funds within the firm and helps 
protect third parties and, further, illustrates the purpose of capacity rules. These capacity 
rules apply equally to traded firms. 
Capacity, therefore, provides us with our first insight into the operation of rules. All capacity 
rules reviewed are mandatory. We can, however, see a shift in their focus over time: for 
companies, these rules initially helped investors to protect against manifestations (both direct 
and indirect) of agency costs suffered by owners. But, given that this resulted in increased 
manifestations of externalities, these protections were removed and replaced with rules 
which protect third parties. All capacity rules are currently couched in wide terms. All act to 
mitigate Costs: primarily those suffered by third parties, but also those suffered by owners 
in certain situations. Within these mandatory rules we can see differentiation. For most 
matters, partnerships and LPs will find it easier to allege that the action sat outside their 
capacity under the mandatory rules applicable to them, than will LLPs and companies. These 
differing levels correspond to the Cost risk identified for third parties: they are lower for 
partnerships (and, to a slightly lesser degree, LPs) as some or all partners are subject to 
unlimited liability. This means that third parties have wider recourse to the owners of the 
firm. Accordingly, there is less of a need to protect third parties from externalities and so the 
mitigation of manifestations can be lower. Capacity rules are all mandatory rules, which 
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mitigate externalities, with the level of obligation depending on the degree of externality that 
they mitigate. 
 
3.6. Third-Party Protection Rules 
We turn now to third-party protection rules. These are rules which dictate when a third party 
has contracted with the firm in question. Within partnerships, the starting point is that every 
partner is an agent of the firm and is able to bind the firm in its ordinary business – unless 
the partner in question is not entitled to do so under any relevant partnership agreement, and 
the third party is aware of that lack of authority, or does not believe that the person in 
question is a partner.198 This has been analysed as a two-limb test – generally a partner is 
able to bind the firm in its ordinary business, and only if that proves to be incorrect, is the 
second limb necessary.199 This is reinforced by a provision which states that if the partners 
agree that one (or more) of them cannot do something, then any act by a partner in breach of 
such restriction is not binding on someone who knows of the restriction.200 Similarly, if the 
partner only purports to undertake activity in her own name and not the name of the 
partnership, the partnership will not be bound.201 The partnership is not liable if one partner, 
without the authority of the others, pledges ‘the credit of the firm for a purpose apparently 
not connected with the firm's ordinary course of business’.202 The emphasis falls on the 
ordinary course of the partnership rather than on the role each partner usually fulfils within 
the firm;203 but this is a matter of fact for which guidelines are very difficult to formulate.204 
A partnership cannot itself decide to amend the effect of acts by its partners on third parties. 
It is therefore not possible for partnerships to decide that third parties acting in good faith 
are not bound by one partner acting in the course of the partnership's business. This makes 
the rule mandatory. However, the mandatory rule is rather ‘firm-friendly’ – the ‘binding’ 
test applies only to activities within the ordinary course of the partnership's business. Any 
third party takes a risk that her interaction with the partnership is not in the ordinary course 
of the partnership’s business and, therefore, that her only recourse lies against the individual 
partner with whom she contracted rather than against the partnership (and the assets of 
partners). Accordingly, despite being a mandatory rule, there is maximum flexibility for 
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partnerships to pick their ‘ordinary course of business’. This corresponds to a lower risk of 
externality experienced by third parties and in terms of our theoretical framework, a lower 
need to use mandatory rules to protect third parties against manifestations of externalities. 
Third-party protection rules for LPs are based on those for partnerships. General partners 
can bind the LP whereas limited partners cannot.205 Lindley and Banks identify two natural 
extensions – admissions by a limited partner are not evidence against the firm; and notice to 
a limited partner is not automatically extended to the firm.206 They also state that a limited 
partner may be expressly authorised to act on behalf of the firm in the same way as any party 
can be an agent. This, however, risks the limited partner ‘taking part in management’ and so 
losing her limited liability.207 This may be correct, but is misleading. In order to enjoy such 
decision-making authority it must have been expressly conferred upon the limited partner by 
the general partners. Therefore, the underlying decision-making process sits with the general 
partners rather than the limited partners and the limited partners have no greater general 
ability to bind the LP than would a putative agent for any natural person. The rules governing 
the ability of general partners to bind the LP also apply the rules of partnerships more 
generally.208 Accordingly, the third-party protection rules as to who may bind the LP are 
mandatory, and are subject to the same conclusions applicable to general partnerships: it is 
easy for partnerships and LPs to avoid being bound on the ground that the activities of the 
relevant partner fell outside the scope of the activities of the partnership, which corresponds 
to lower externalities and so the less need to use mandatory rules to resolve their 
manifestations. 
For LLPs, all members are agents of the LLP.209 However the LLP is not bound by a member 
if she is not in fact authorised to take the action in question,210 AND, the third party in 
question is aware of that lack of authority, or does not know or believe that she is a member 
of the LLP.211 It has been held that this section is not sufficient to render an LLP liable for 
fraudulent misrepresentations by a member.212 Members only bind the LLP if they are acting 
in the ordinary course of the LLP's business,213 which ties in with the analysis provided in 
respect of partnerships more generally. Once again, members cannot opt out of these rules, 
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which makes them mandatory. This appears anomalous as the risk of externalities is higher 
in LLPs than other partnerships due to limited liability. However, we have seen that these 
are lowered by the presence of mandatory clawback rules if members of LLPs withdraw 
their funds.  
A company's internal rules may provide for the point at which the company is bound.214 
Complications arise, however, when it comes to: 
[H]ow to deal with situations where either board or shareholders go beyond the 
powers conferred to them by the articles…. An immediate question thus arises: is 
the contract binding on the company if the board (or the shareholders) act outside 
the powers conferred upon them by the articles of association?... Overall, the 
development of the law in recent times has been….towards preserving third parties' 
reasonable expectations that the body purporting to contract as the company had 
power to do so, even if that power was restricted by the articles…The modern view 
is thus away from the notion that restrictions in the company's articles on the 
contracting powers of the board are something with which third parties are expected 
to familiarise themselves215 
The change began in the 1800s. Turquand's case involved company articles which allowed 
the directors to exercise the borrowing powers of the company up to an amount set by the 
shareholders.216 The company borrowed more than the authorised amount, and attempted to 
evade liability. Jervis CJ stated: 
We may now take for granted that the dealings with these companies are not like 
dealings with other partnerships, and that the parties dealing with them are bound 
to read the statute and the deed of settlement. But they are not bound to do more. 
And the party here, on reading the deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition 
from borrowing, but a permission to do so on certain conditions. Finding that the 
authority might be made complete by a resolution, he would have a right to infer 
the fact of a resolution authorizing that which on the face of the document appeared 
to be legitimately done.217 
This has been called the ‘indoor management rule’218 but did not apply to third parties who 
had constructive or actual knowledge of the lack of capacity.219 This protection is now 
enshrined in statute. The Companies Act 2006 states that: 
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[I]n favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith, the power of the 
directors to bind the company, or authorise others to do so, is deemed to be free of 
any limitation under the company’s constitution220 
This framework applies to both public companies and traded companies. 
Thus we see mandatory third-party protection rules. As with capacity rules, the level at 
which third-party protection rules are set rises in response to the potential for third parties to 
be exposed to externalities – as is also the case under capacity rules. Ultimately, mandatory 
rules in both the capacity and third-party protection categories are used, as Gordon 
suggested, to mitigate externalities; the higher the risk of externality, the higher the 
obligation under the mandatory rule.  
3.7. Governance Rules 
We have seen that modern mandatory capacity rules and third-party protection rules mitigate 
externalities. There are therefore four categories of manifestations of agency costs which are 
not affected by capacity or third-party protection rules: direct owner/manager 
manifestations; indirect owner/manager manifestations; direct majority/minority 
manifestations; and indirect majority/minority manifestations. These are all covered by 
governance rules. Governance rules dictate how a firm makes decisions – in short, they 
govern owners/managers, and majority/minority owner interactions.  
3.7.1. Partnerships 
For partnerships, the 1890 Act contains a set of rules for the internal governance of the 
partnership. However, each of these provisions states that it only applies in the absence of 
agreement to the contrary between the partners.221 This agreement is not required on the 
establishment of the partnership, and can be varied at any time: 
The mutual rights and duties of partners, whether ascertained by agreement or 
defined by this Act, may be varied by the consent of all the partners, and such 
consent may be either express or inferred from a course of dealing.222  
Therefore, governance rules in respect of partnerships are default rules decided by the 
partners. Whilst default rules are provided, there is flexibility for the partners to follow them 
or to opt out.  There is, however, a limitation on this flexibility as each partner owes fiduciary 
duties to each other partner. Indeed, Lord Bacon stated: 
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If fiduciary relation means anything I cannot conceive a stronger case of fiduciary 
relation than that which exists between partners. Their mutual confidence is the life 
blood of the concern. It is because they trust one another that they are partners in 
the first instance; it is because they continue to trust each other that the business 
goes on.223 
Accordingly, partners face limitations in their governance as they must act in a fiduciary 
manner towards each other. This fiduciary duty is particularly notable as it applies both to 
each partner's actions in respect of each other partner, and to the firm (unlike, the position 
for companies which is discussed later).  Partnerships are noteworthy for their reduced risk 
of agency costs: they have a single category of actor. This removes both direct and indirect 
manifestations of owner/manager agency costs, and indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs.224 Members have the ability to withdraw their capital, 
lowering risks of majority/minority costs. Therefore, the only manifestation to mitigate 
against is a direct manifestation of majority/minority agency costs, which is already lower. 
This means that the majority of rules can be default rules, with the only mandatory protection 
to mitigate manifestations of agency costs being the mandatory fiduciary relationship 
between the partners. The content of these fiduciary duties, however, can be adjusted by 
agreement between the partners.225 
3.7.2. Limited Partnerships  
In terms of the governance rules of LPs, general partners are treated as if they were normal 
partners in an unregistered partnership. This includes fiduciary duties between partners: even 
limited partners have a fiduciary duty to every other partner.226 However, limited partners 
cannot take part in the management of the business.227 This rule cannot be contracted out of 
and is therefore mandatory. LPs generally have only one general partner, which tends to be 
a special purpose vehicle with limited assets.228 There is, currently, no cap on the number of 
general partners.229 Should there be more than one general partner, a majority of general 
partners takes decisions on behalf of the firm.230 This is a default rule which can be varied 
by express or implied agreement between the parties.231 Accordingly, the governance rules 
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of the general partners are also default rules. This leads to a situation in which the governance 
rules for limited partners and for the interaction between limited partners and general 
partners, are mandatory, whereas the governance rules for general partners are default rules. 
This can be reformulated to the proposition that the category of persons entitled to make 
decisions is a mandatory rule, but how such decisions may be taken by those entitled to do 
so is a default rule.  
As with general partnerships, those who make decisions have fiduciary duties to their 
partners. To cast this in the light of manifestations of agency costs, an LP has different 
categories of managers and owners which introduces the potential for direct and indirect 
manifestations of owner/manager agency costs and indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs. The agency costs between these parties, however, are lower 
than those in corporate vehicles, and are mitigated by the requirements for fiduciary 
relationships – this mitigates both direct and indirect manifestations of owner/manager 
agency costs. The likely majority are limited partners, for the reasons set out above which 
are, structurally, disenfranchised in an LP, lowering the risk of majority/minority agency 
costs.  
Nevertheless, mandatory rules are used to mitigate these further by two key methods. Firstly, 
mandatory fiduciary duties mitigate the remaining agency cost in respect of management of 
LPs by their general partners (which is already lowered by the unlimited liability of general 
partners), and dominance by the majority. This mitigates both direct and indirect 
manifestations of each type. Secondly, preventing limited partners from involvement in 
management of the firm prevents financially dominant limited partners from directing the 
will of the firm. Furthermore, the unlimited liability of general partners provides a structural 
disincentive to general partners obtaining a financially dominant stake in the LP. This lowers 
the risk of such agency costs. 
3.7.3. Limited Liability Partnerships 
The governance rules for LLPs are contained in regulations made under the 2000 Act.232 
These are, however, subject to any other agreement between the members.233 Accordingly, 
the governance rules for LLPs are default rules.234 LLPs do not apply partnership rules, 
                                                     
232 Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1090). 
233 See Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, s 5(a); Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations ibid reg 7. 
234 See also JJ Henning, ‘Partnership law review: The joint consultation papers and the Limited Liability 
Partnership Act in brief historical and comparative perspective’ [2004] Company Lawyer 163 and 169. 
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which has been held to mean that there is no fiduciary duty between one member and 
another.235 We can here again see responses to manifestations of agency costs. As with 
partnerships, there is only one category of actor, removing owner/manager costs and indirect 
manifestations of majority/minority agency costs from the equation. Also as with 
partnerships, there are no restrictions on the withdrawal of capital (subject to a clawback 
rule), which lowers majority/minority agency costs as the minority are able to exit, even 
though they do not benefit from fiduciary duties. As our two categories of agency costs are 
lower, there is no need to mitigate their manifestations and so default rules can be used. 
3.7.4. Companies: General 
There are two key governance bodies in any company. Shareholders receive the residual 
value in the company236 and their financial input is limited. When exercising their decision-
making powers, shareholders are generally entitled to vote entirely in their own interests.237 
Conversely, directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and the company only.238 This is 
an important difference from the position in partnerships. In partnerships, this fiduciary duty 
is owed to each individual partner, which means that the fiduciary relationship protects each 
partner, including the minority who receive the benefit of this fiduciary duty and have 
recourse to any breach of it by another partner. However, for companies this duty is owed to 
the company itself. This is of more than theoretical importance in that it is fairly easy to 
conceive of a situation in which the actions of a director can cause harm to an individual 
shareholder as a way of meeting her fiduciary duties owed to the company. This is not the 
case in partnerships, as partners owe fiduciary duties to the firm AND to every other partner. 
Duties to the company translate, during solvency, as the success of the company for the 
benefit of the members as a whole,239 and any breach of this fiduciary duty can be ratified 
by the shareholders.240 Kershaw and Schuster have pointed out that the success-of-the-
company provision in the Companies Act 2006 is, in fact, subject to the proviso that it can 
be replaced by the interests of parties other than the members as a whole. It is, however, 
unclear who has the authority to exercise this ability to orchestrate the shift.241  
                                                     
235 F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch). 
236 As on a winding up, any surplus after paying off the creditors is distributed to the shareholders. 
237 North-West Transportation Co v Beatty (1887) 12 Appeal Cases 589. See further the discussion in para 
6.3. 
238 Companies Act 2006, s 172. 
239 ibid s 172(1). 
240 ibid s 239(2). 
241 D Kershaw and E Schuster, ‘The Purposive Transformation of Company Law’ (unpublished, on file with 
the author) 5–9. 
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Interactions between shareholders and directors are a matter of construction of the articles 
of association.242 Thus, whilst the UK is generally seen as a jurisdiction which embraces a 
form of shareholder primacy,243 it is impossible to 
make general statements about the typical division of authority between 
shareholders and the board and management, because that is, in the main, open to 
be tailored to suit the individual company in question,244  
In general, however, articles of association confer wide powers on the board.245 Given that 
owner/manager interaction is a key area of Costs, this is the first manifestation of high Costs 
which are not subject to a mandatory rule. Whilst partnerships have no mandatory rules, the 
risk of Costs within this category is lower than in private companies.  Articles are adopted 
by the shareholders,246 and thus shareholders retain the power to redress any power 
imbalance they may perceive. Whilst this may mitigate a direct manifestation of 
owner/manager agency costs, it exacerbates the risk of indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs. Apart from being removed from office, the directors may 
be stripped of their powers if they act in a manner of which a dominant shareholder does not 
approve. This threat, or the perception of such a threat, is likely to ‘encourage’ directors to 
act in the interests of majority shareholders. These two powers enjoyed by shareholders – to 
remove directors and to shift powers of the company to the shareholders – therefore 
constitute the twin exacerbations of indirect majority/minority agency costs. This approach 
is illogical. Whilst, as we have seen, third parties enjoy protection when dealing with 
directors as agents of the company, there is no equivalent protection for third parties 
interacting with shareholders as agents of the company. Whilst third parties are able to rely 
on statutory provisions as to when a company acting through a director will be bound to a 
contract, it is unclear at what point a third party can be assured that shareholders are able to 
bind the firm. In addition, articles generally provide that directors have all the powers of the 
company and so, in the normal course, shareholders are excluded from acting on behalf of 
the company. A company is free to choose its articles of association on incorporation and at 
                                                     
242 Gower and Davies, para 14-3. 
243 Which means that the shareholders are the primary organ of the company. See A Keay, ‘Shareholder 
Primacy in corporate law: Can it survive? Should it survive?’ [2010] European Company and Financial law 
Review 369. This can be contrasted with the ‘director primacy’ which is argued to exist in the US whereby 
directors are the primary organ. See Stephen M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and 
Practice (OUP 2008) 63, and ‘stakeholder primacy’, which no jurisdiction fully embraces although there are 
frequent normative claims that all stakeholders in a company should have equal claims to primacy. See JEO 
Abugu, ‘Primacy of shareholders' interests and the relevance of stakeholder economic theories’ [2013] 
Company Lawyer 202.  
244 Gower and Davies, para14–5. 
245 Cheffins, Theory, Structure and Operations 603; Hardman Granting Corporate Security para 3-02. 
246 Companies Act 2006, s 21(1). 
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any stage thereafter. Unless the company elects to have different articles on incorporation, 
the model articles of association set down by the Secretary of State from time to time will 
apply.247 The current model articles provide for all powers of the company to be exercised 
by directors.248 
3.7.5. Companies: Directors and Shareholders 
From the above, the need emerges to examine the decision-making rules of each organ of 
the company. The articles will generally dictate how directors take decisions within their 
competence.249 Should the articles be silent, the position is governed by various common-
law rules.250 Certain matters can never form part of directors' decision-making competence. 
For example, ratification of a breach of duty by a director requires shareholder approval.251 
In addition, if a director of a company, or someone connected with her, enters into a 
transaction with the company for a ‘substantial non-cash asset’, shareholder approval is 
required.252 An asset qualifies as a substantial non-cash asset if its value: (i) exceeds ten per 
cent of the company's asset value and is more than £5,000; or (ii) exceeds £100,000.253 A 
similar regime applies to loans to, and guarantees of the debts of directors.254 These 
provisions mean that there are elements of mandatory rules in the otherwise default regime 
we have outlined. These mandatory rules aim to prevent the directors from acting in a manner 
which would enrich them at the expense of the company. All these mandatory rules 
concentrate on directors acting in their own interests, and so prevent direct manifestations of 
owner/manager agency costs. Mandatory rules also govern directors' conflicts of interest – 
they must declare transactional conflicts of interest to the other directors, and any situational 
conflicts of interest must be authorised by the other directors or by the shareholders.255 When 
ratifying any breach by directors, any shareholder connected with the director is excluded 
from the decision-making process.256 However, the definition of those connected to a 
director is restricted to those personally linked to the director257 – if a director breaches her 
duties on the instructions of the majority shareholder (who is otherwise unconnected to the 
director), that shareholder would not be ‘connected’ and therefore would be able to vote for 
                                                     
247 ibid s 20. 
248 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 SI 2008/3229 Sch 1, art 3. 
249 ibid art 9. 
250 Hardman, Granting Corporate Security para 3-06. 
251 Gower and Davies, paras 16-117 to 16-120. 
252 Companies Act 2006, s 190. 
253 ibid s 191. 
254 ibid s 197. 
255 ibid ss 175–182. 
256 ibid s 239. 
257 ibid s 252. 
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such ratification. These mandatory rules mitigate against directors being interested in third 
parties involved with the company, and therefore against indirect manifestations of 
owner/manager agency costs. We have seen with the indirect manifestation of 
majority/minority agency costs that a risk to minority shareholders may arise as a result of 
directions (or informal pressure or, most dangerously, a desire by directors to avoid any 
informal pressure) from majority shareholders that the shareholders will assume the powers 
of the company or remove the directors. Mandatory rules in respect of directors' conflicts of 
interest protect shareholders as a whole against direct and indirect manifestations of 
owner/manager agency costs, but they do not protect the minority shareholder against the 
risk of indirect manifestation of these costs. The conflict-of-interest regime provides strong 
protection against owner/manager manifestations, which means that the additional powers 
conferred upon shareholders to exercise the powers of the company or remove directors are 
not required.  Indirect manifestations of majority/minority Costs contain no legal 
mitigations, but are exacerbated by these unnecessary powers given to shareholders. It 
therefore appears that, analogously with historical capacity rules for companies, the harm 
inflicted by the ability for shareholders to adopt these additional powers outweigh the harms 
they seek to avoid. It should be noted that there are certain protections for the minority: they 
have remedies if the firm is run in an unfairly prejudicial manner;258 and in certain limited 
situations they are able to institute action in the name of the company.259 These provide ex 
post remedies rather than ex ante restrictions, and are discussed further in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. 
Unless the articles or statute provide differently, shareholders take decisions termed 
‘ordinary resolutions’ by simple majority.260 There are also ‘special resolutions’ which 
require a 75 per cent majority and are mandatory for matters such as amending the 
company’s articles of association,261 or re-registering a private company as a public 
company.262 Therefore, a special resolution is required where a major change is proposed by 
the company. In addition, articles can contain provisions that require a percentage higher 
than 75 per cent – these are referred to as ‘entrenched’ articles that can set their own 
requirements for amendment.263 When it comes to the form of decision making by 
shareholders in private companies, there is an option of either a written resolution by the 
                                                     
258 ibid s 994(1) and see para 6.4. 
259 ibid s 260 and see para 6.4. 
260 ibid s 281(3). 
261 ibid s 21(1). 
262 ibid s 90(1). 
263 ibid s 22(1). 
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shareholders264 or a resolution adopted at a shareholders’ meeting. Written resolutions 
cannot be used to remove a director265 or the company's auditors.266 The Companies Act 
2006 prescribes technical requirements as to the written resolution procedure, but these can 
be varied by the articles of association.267 However, any provision in the articles of 
association which prevents written resolutions is void.268 Meetings of shareholders are 
termed general meetings of the company, and are convened for private companies on 
fourteen clear days’ notice,269 although the articles can stipulate a longer period.270 
Shareholders can consent to a shorter period if 90 per cent (or such higher number as the 
articles may provide to a maximum of 95 per cent) of shareholders agree to such shorter 
period.271 Failure to meet this period results in the invalidity of the meeting, and of all matters 
decided there.272 These rules act to require an element of formality for decision making 
amongst shareholders, which can protect minority shareholders from the overt and direct 
actions of the majority273 – in other words, from direct manifestations of majority/minority 
agency costs. However, they do not protect against indirect manifestations of the 
majority/minority agency costs seen in private companies.  
3.7.6. Conclusion 
The governance rules of private companies are a mixture of default rules and mandatory 
rules: the division of decision-making power between shareholders and directors is, in the 
main, default, with some mandatory elements which protect against conflicts of interest by 
directors. The methods by which directors make decisions are default rules, but the methods 
by which the shareholders make decisions are primarily mandatory rules with some default 
rules included. This means that governance rules provide mandatory mitigations against 
direct and indirect manifestations of owner/manager agency costs. The mandatory use of 
formality in shareholder decision making acts to mitigate direct manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs. However, indirect manifestations of majority/minority 
                                                     
264 ibid s 288. 
265 ibid s 288(2)(a). 
266 ibid s 288(2)(b). 
267  The period for agreeing to a written resolution is 28 days unless the articles provide otherwise 
(Companies Act 2006, s 297(1)), and members can requisition a written resolution if requested by 5% of the 
members or such lower percentage as the articles may prescribe (Companies Act 2006, s 292(5)). 
268 Companies Act 2006, s 300. 
269 This excludes the date of the circulation of the notice and the date of the meeting. See Companies Act 
2006, s 360. 
270 Companies Act 2006, s 307(3). 
271 Companies Act 2006, s 307(6)(a). 
272 For example, Woolf v East Niger Gold Mining Co Ltd (1905) 21 TLR 660. 
273 R Simmonds, 'Why must we meet? Thinking about why shareholders meetings are required' (2001) 19 
Company and Securities Law Journal 506; Hardman, The Duomatic Principle 23–27. 
  60 
 
agency costs in private companies  – which we identified as one of the highest risks of Costs 
– are unmitigated: indeed they are further exacerbated by unnecessary protections designed 
to further mitigate already mitigated manifestations of owner/manager agency costs. 
There are additional mandatory rules which apply to companies listed on the main market. 
When a company enters into a related-party transaction with a director or shareholder, the 
company's sponsor must confirm that it is fair and reasonable.274 This has the effect of further 
mitigating direct and indirect manifestations of owner/manager agency costs. Having 
identified in Chapter 2 that owner/manager agency costs are very high for this type of firm, 
it is important to note the higher levels of comply-or-explain and mandatory rules used to 
mitigate their direct and indirect manifestations. These rules also mitigate direct 
manifestations of agency costs arising between the majority and the minority. Listed 
companies are also under additional obligations to act independently of any of their 
controlling shareholders – ie, shareholders who hold more than 30 per cent of shares in the 
firm.275 This means that, even if a majority does form, there are limitations on its activities. 
In addition, any controlling shareholder must enter into a legally binding agreement to ensure 
that its interactions with the firm are at arms' length, as well as limitations as to the 
resolutions it may bring.276 This involves requiring the shareholder to show that she does not 
exercise improper control over the firm, including influencing it outside of normal 
governance structures.277 This, in turn, has the effect of entirely removing any indirect 
manifestation of  majority/minority agency costs. The majority are not able to influence the 
firm, nor can they circumvent proper governance structures. More importantly, the majority's 
inability so to act means that the directors need not be concerned that they might do so. This 
reduces the risk of directors acting in a manner designed to appease the majority.  
The base analysis for governance rules in plcs is the same as in private companies. The 
division of responsibility between directors and shareholders is also a default rule.278 
However, there are differences when it comes to the mandatory procedural rules. Whilst 
private companies must allow shareholders to make decisions by way of written resolution, 
this is not possible for public companies.279 There are also additional requirements for a plc 
compelling it to hold an annual general meeting,280 lay its accounts before the general 
                                                     
274 Listing rule 11. 
275 Listing rule 9.2.2. 
276 Listing rule 6.5.4. 
277 See guidance issued in respect of listing rule 6.5.3. 
278 See The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, Sch 3. 
279 Companies Act 2006, s 288. 
280 ibid s 336. 
  61 
 
meeting,281 have a company secretary,282 and have at least two directors – whereas private 
companies may only have one director.283 These mandatory rules act to increase formality 
in shareholder decision making which, when coupled with the Takeover Code restricting the 
percentage holding that a major shareholder may have, further mitigates all manifestations 
of agency costs when compared to majority/minority agency costs in private limited 
companies. The starting point is that the framework applicable to plcs also applies to traded 
companies. In addition, however, the listing rules284 provide that the UK Corporate 
Governance Code also applies to listed companies,285 on a comply-or-explain basis. This 
means that the company does not have to comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
if it can explain why it has failed to do so. The Code adds different obligations in respect of 
the corporate governance of the listed company. Thus, there should be a balance between 
executive and non-executive (including independent) directors,286 with at least half the 
board287 and its chairman being independent.288 To engage the workforce, the board should 
allow the workforce to appoint their own director, and appoint a formal panel, or designate 
a non-executive director to liaise with them.289 All directors should be subject to annual re-
election,290 and the chair should cease to be chair after nine years from her initial 
appointment.291 The Code mandates appointment of an audit committee292 and a 
remuneration committee which sets director remuneration,293 each of which must consist of 
independent, non-executive directors. This role of independent directors in this sphere 
further mitigates direct and indirect manifestations of owner/manager agency costs.294 In the 
UK, the primary application of comply-or-explain arises for listed companies under the 
listing rules in respect of the UK Corporate Governance Code. Thus, the annual financial 
report of a listed company295 must contain various statements, including a statement as to 
                                                     
281 ibid s 437. 
282 ibid s 271. 
283 ibid s 154. 
284 Contained in the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, available at https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/ 
handbook/LR.pdf (the ‘Listing Rules’) accessed on 5 December 2019. 
285 Financial Reporting Council, July 2018, available at https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-
50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF accessed on 5 
December 2019. 
286 UK Corporate Governance Code, Principle F 
287 ibid Provision 11. 
288 ibid Provision 9. 
289 ibid Provision 5. 
290 ibid Provision 18. 
291 ibid Provision 19. 
292 ibid Provisions 24–26. 
293 ibid Provisions 32–34. 
294 See M Martynova and L Renneboog, ‘An International Corporate Governance Index’ in M Wright and 
others (eds) Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance 111–112 
295 Companies Act 2006, s 415. 
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how the company has applied the Code's principles296 and various additional confirmations. 
The company must either state that it has complied with the Code in full, 297or, if it has not, 
the time period of and reason for non-compliance.298 This encourages compliance as non-
compliance is publicly announced and the announcement affects the share price of the 
vehicle. 
3.8. Conclusion 
We have seen different types of rules being used in our different categories. Thus the rules 
governing third-party protection and capacity rules are all mandatory. Within governance 
rules, a hybrid approach is followed. We can now complete our matrix reflecting rule 
function and rule type. We see: 
 Capacity Third Party 
Protection 
Governance 
Permissive None None None 
Default None None All partnership provisions other than the 
presence of fiduciary elements 
All GP decision making provisions within 
an LP other than the presence of fiduciary 
elements 
LLP decision making 
Division of powers between shareholders 
and directors in companies 
Methods of decision making by directors 
subject to fiduciary elements. 
Comply-or-
Explain 
None None Board structure, composition and role in 
listed companies 
Director’s pay in listed companies 
Mandatory Partnerships Partnerships Partners' and director’s fiduciary duties299 
                                                     
296 Listing rule 9.8.6R(5). 
297 Listing rule 9.8.6R(6)(a). 
298 Listing rule 9.8.6R(6)(b). 
299 The presence of the duties is mandatory, but their content can be varied by consent. 
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LPs 
LLPs 
Private 
Companies 
PLCs 
Traded 
LPs 
LLPs 
Private 
Companies 
PLCs 
Traded 
Exclusion of limited partners from LP 
business 
Minimum requirements as to shareholder 
voting mechanics in all companies 
Limitation on director self-dealing in all 
companies 
Limitation on conflicts of interest in all 
companies 
Listing rules preventing related party 
transactions 
Listing rules governing controlling 
shareholders agreements 
 
As proposed by Gordon, the mandatory rules are those designed to protect. Therefore, all 
third-party protection and capacity rules are mandatory, and mitigate manifestations of 
externalities. Within governance rules, default rules generally map on to areas which were 
considered to have low – or lower – risks of generating Costs, whereas mandatory rules 
generally map onto areas with higher Costs. Comply-or-explain also fulfils a protective 
function, but only within listed firms (firms with markets which can react to disclosure). 
This analysis reflects the theory outlined above – default rules are the ‘rule of thumb’ unless 
there is an interest which needs to be protected.  
We can map this analysis on to our Costs analysis. First, we can note that default rules do 
not provide much protection against Costs as they are subject to opting out, whereas 
mandatory or comply-or-explain rules can potentially mitigate manifestations of Costs. We 
can now establish correlations between mitigants to Costs and the Costs themselves. By 
adding the possible manifestations of Costs and their mitigations to our previous matrix, the 
following picture emerges: 
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We can draw certain conclusions from this matrix. Firstly, almost every category of 
manifestation in respect of which of Costs were high, has a rule which is not a default rule. 
These are most commonly mandatory rules, but for listed vehicles comply-or-explain rules 
are also used. Generally, the higher the Cost, the higher the protection for the potential 
victims of that Cost. Mandatory protections also increase the more complicated the vehicle 
becomes: a partnership has fewer protections than exist for a traded firm. There is, however, 
one exception to both of these rules. There is no consistent protection against 
majority/minority agency costs. 
Each partner in a partnership enjoys the benefit of fiduciary duties owed by their fellow 
partners. This reduces direct manifestations of agency costs within the majority/minority 
category. There is only one category of actor and this removes the risk of indirect 
manifestations. Within LPs, there is a mandatory division of power between the two actors 
which, when coupled with mandatory fiduciary duties, mitigates against both direct and 
indirect manifestations. Within LLPs, there is only one category of actor, which excludes 
the possibility of indirect manifestations. The minority is able to withdraw its capital from 
each of the partnership firms at will, which provides it with an exit option. At the other end 
of the spectrum, traded companies experience lower risks of agency costs in this category as 
the ability to form majorities is reduced. In addition, minorities have the ability to exit at any 
time, and there are mandatory rules restricting related-party transactions which protect 
against direct manifestations of majority/minority agency costs and, in the case of controlling 
shareholders, protect against indirect manifestations. Plcs are also subject to the Takeover 
Code, which limits the possibility of majorities forming. 
Minorities in private companies, however, enjoy little protection under the rules examined 
so far. We saw in Chapter 2 that they experience higher Costs because they cannot 
unilaterally withdraw capital, majorities can form, and these majorities control the 
composition of the board. Minorities' primary protection against direct manifestations 
appears to be formality in decision making. Whilst it may be better for minorities to have 
the benefit of formality than not, fundamentally it will not prevent a majority from acting in 
a certain way. Indeed, the rules we have examined appear to exacerbate this agency cost for 
the minority in the private company – the division of powers is default, which enables the 
majority to remove powers from the board whenever they wish. In addition, shareholders 
are able to remove directors at will. Each of these exacerbates an indirect manifestation of 
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the majority/minority agency cost, as these rules make it more likely that directors will act 
to appease the majority. The minority in private companies are also disadvantaged not being 
able to exit the company and by a lack of fiduciary duty from the majority. 
This category is, therefore, an exception: we have identified that minorities in private 
companies are exposed to high Costs within a category, yet these are neither minimised by 
structure, nor are their manifestations mitigated. The primary protection shareholders appear 
to enjoy against directors in private companies is against the directors’ self-dealing and 
conflicts of interest. Whilst these are efficient at mitigating the direct and indirect 
manifestations of owner/manager agency costs, they do not mitigate indirect manifestations 
of majority/minority agency costs. Subjecting directors to fiduciary duties has the potential 
to do so, however, these duties are owed to the company rather than the shareholders. 
Further, the interests of the company equate to the interests of the shareholders, and any 
breach of these duties can be ratified by the majority (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). 
Accordingly, these protections are also subject to capture by the majority which increases 
the risk of indirect manifestation of majority/minority agency costs.  This can be contrasted 
with the other high category of agency costs identified (those between owners and managers 
in traded companies), which use a series of mandatory and comply-or-explain rules to 
mitigate direct and indirect manifestations of such Costs. Therefore, indirect manifestations 
of majority/minority agency costs in private companies do not fit into the conceptual 
framework for the use of rules aimed at mitigating Costs across UK commercial firms. 
This is interesting but somewhat abstract. The theoretical proposition may be sound, and this 
is what is tested in the remainder of this thesis. To this end, we engage historical, 
comparative, doctrinal, and empirical methods. In order to explore this further, we review 
the history of company law to establish whether it confirms our theoretical proposition, and 
the history of our ‘twin exacerbations’ of indirect manifestations of majority/minority 
agency costs in private companies. Has company law always provided mandatory rules to 
mitigate Costs and their manifestations? Why are these twin exacerbations – division of 
power and the ability to remove a director – structured as they are? Is it deliberate, and do 
their benefits outweigh the harm for the minority in private companies? If company law 
history, in general, can be said to support the theoretical proposition that high Costs have 
been mitigated by mandatory rules, then this theoretical proposition must be verified.  
Having reviewed these, we then review the modern law of majority rule, and the twin 
exacerbations of indirect manifestations of agency costs – control over board composition 
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and the ability to exercise the rights of the company – in order to establish in further details 
the current issues and comparative position. We review these comparatively: have they been 
resolved in other jurisdictions? We then undertake doctrinal analysis to establish whether 
other areas of company law adequately mitigate these manifestations. The legal analysis 
reviews whether: 
1. the substance of directors' duties; 
2. rules in respect of shareholder voting;  
3. rules in respect of minority protection more generally; and/or 
4. other soft-law responses, 
act effectively to mitigate these exacerbations. We then undertake empirical research to 
establish whether the market provides an adequate response to the twin exacerbations. This 
takes the form of quantitative empirical research to establish whether companies have 
themselves undertaken any action to mitigate the exacerbations of indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority Costs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. HISTORY OF COMPANY LAW 
 
4.1. General  
What relevance does the history of corporate law have for a modern study of the Costs? In 
his history of UK company law, du Plessis makes two key arguments. Firstly, he argues that: 
It cannot be disputed that corporate law cannot be understood without a proper 
knowledge of the historical context in which it developed.300 
In other words, the historical development of the legal framework for corporate law is 
important to understanding the current framework of the legal system. Secondly, he argues 
that: 
In corporate law history… it has been observed that ‘in every stage of social 
evolution there are particular needs which have to be met, and particular tendencies 
in human character which call either for repression or stimulus’.301 
By this, du Plessis is arguing that the historical development of corporate law is linked to 
the perceived ‘particular needs’ of any given time. In other words, different historical 
contexts create differing aims for company law within those contexts.  Put together, the two 
propositions mean modern corporate law is a function of historical contexts and the peculiar 
ills of the specific ages which law makers were trying to remedy.  We can track this onto our 
theoretical analysis to establish which Costs law makers were interested in resolving at 
different times, and the responses they identified to such Costs. Whilst focus on Costs has 
not been an explicit policy debate over the history of company law, there has been an implicit 
focus on them. Only by analysing these developments can we establish why the current legal 
framework exists as it does. In addition, a finding that company law has resolved Costs by 
the application of mandatory rules, will confirm the theoretical position advanced in previous 
chapters.  
To trace the role of Costs in the history of company law, we identify the origins of the 
modern-day company and the non-legal pressures which dictated its development. 
Unfortunately, the pre-history of company law is not seemingly based on any discernible 
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Cost. Originally, use of the corporate form was linked to public good: it was expected that a 
company would act for the benefit of society rather than its members.302 This, however, 
changed with the rise of monopolies during the Elizabethan era. The government linked the 
granting of the corporate form to a grant of a monopoly which could be exploited for the 
benefit of the corporation’s members.303 The result was that: 
Through the system of monopolies there thus came a change in the purpose of 
incorporation. The Elizabethan monopolies had encouraged the idea of a public 
purpose latent in private economic advantage.304 
The company form moved from being inextricably linked to public good, to be inextricably 
linked to private gain. At the time, incorporation was granted by the Crown on a case-by-
case basis.305  As a result of the power of the government in the process and its link to private 
wealth for corporators, some form of personal gain was extracted by government officials – 
for example, the South Sea Company gave stock and favourable loans to members of 
Parliament and Lords to secure its incorporation.306 Indeed, this was the ‘custom of the 
times’.307 The comingling of the grant of corporate status with the grant of a monopoly for a 
certain industry, was abolished in 1623 with the abolition of monopolies.308 The value which 
government officials could extract from private corporators dropped as new charters no 
longer guaranteed monopolistic returns. In response, government officials began to tighten 
the geographic, temporal or industrial terms of charters. By doing so ‘parliament could 
increase the value of charters’309 as they were able to grant more charters which, through 
specificity, appeared to offer monopolistic advantages. Unless limited by time, a charter 
could not be withdrawn. An unforeseen outcome was that a second-hand market in the re-
sale of existing charters grew. This took money out of government coffers (as charters could 
be acquired from their owners rather than purchased/bribed from the government) and, 
unsurprisingly, government moved to restrict such re-sale. At the same time, several 
government-supported charters–including the South Sea Company – became concerned that 
there was undue competition for investment from other companies. As a result, in the early 
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1700s there was pressure to limit access to the corporate form. This pressure, however, arose 
not as a result of a desire to lower Costs, but rather to maximise personal income for those 
with the power to decide the form of the legal framework. 
Partnerships could not compete in capital markets as partners' ability to withdraw capital 
undermined their attractiveness as investment vehicles.310 The difficulty and costs associated 
with securing a charter from the government, created the need for a third type of business 
form and the joint stock company emerged. This entity did not have a charter, but was rather 
an unincorporated association managed by directors which held assets in trust for its 
shareholders –  a hybrid charter company and partnership.311 This joint stock company was 
competition for charter companies, something which the holders of charters were unhappy 
about and which undermined the value of charters (and therefore the private gain that 
lawmakers could extract from the process). As a result, the Bubble Act of 1720312 was 
adopted. The official purpose of the Bubble Act was to: 
[R]estrain the extravagant and unwarrantable practice of raising money by 
voluntary subscription for carrying on projects dangerous to the trade and subjects 
of the UK.313 
These lofty goals appear to map neatly to Costs, particularly owner/manager Costs. 
However, it is more likely that the Bubble Act was introduced to increase the value of 
charters, and so also the value that could be extracted by governmental officials.314 
Alternatively, it has been argued that the Bubble Act was a political attempt to control the 
actions of private individuals by a government increasingly seeking to control private 
associations.315 In either case, it was not introduced to reduce Costs. The Act achieved its 
aim by providing that an organisation which ‘presumed to act as a corporation’ was a public 
nuisance316 and declared as illegal: 
[S]ubscriptions, assignments, transfers and other things for furthering such 
undertakings; the acting or presuming to act as a corporate body; the raising of 
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transferable stock, or the assigning of such stock without authority either by act of 
parliament or by charter.317  
 
The promoters and brokers of any company not registered by charter were penalised.318 The 
Bubble Act stopped legal entities other than those incorporated by charter, from allowing 
the free transferability of shares. The practical effect was that joint stock companies started 
to allow the transfer of shares only with the consent of other shareholders.319 In practice, this 
meant that the deed of settlement of joint stock companies did not allow for the creation of 
freely-transferable shares.320  
Accordingly, and contrary to popular belief, the Bubble Act was not introduced because a 
bubble had collapsed, but rather because the rise in unincorporated entities acting as if they 
were incorporated, hurt the private incomes of government officials.321 This analysis shows 
that the issues which the Bubble Act – described as the first ‘attempt at a Companies Act’322 
– was attempting to resolve had nothing to do with Costs as envisaged in twenty-first century 
legal analysis. It was instead an attempt by officials to protect their income streams. The 
value of Bubble Act as insight into Costs is, therefore, somewhat limited. The general 
structure of 17th century companies was to have a court of proprietors known as a ‘general 
court’, and a court of directors which had executive power and was elected by the general 
court.323 The court of directors dealt with day-to-day matters, whilst the general court was 
responsible for major policy changes.324 It is here that we see the origins of majority rule 
(which enables the creation of majorities in the first place). Scott states:  
As a general rule, up to 1620 and for some years afterwards, no special 
arrangements had been made in the charters as to the relation of the votes to the 
shares. In most cases the usual clause, which gave the companies powers to make 
bye-laws, was held to provide for the determining of the amount of the qualification. 
The charter granted in 1604 to the society of Mines Royal was an exception to this 
rule, since, in it, it is stated ‘the voice of everyone, having a quarter part, is to be 
held as of great account as the voices of two others, having but half-quarter parts a 
piece, and so the voice of any other, having a greater part than a quarter, to be 
esteemed of as great force as so many several other persons, having but a half-
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quarter a piece’. It was the practice of the East India company to decide questions, 
where there was a difference of opinion, by a show of hands amongst those present 
at the meeting, and the same method was adopted by the Virginia company up to 
1619.325 
Companies, therefore, adopted majority voting out of necessity given to the large number of 
shareholders – it was the only method by which shareholders as a whole could make 
decisions. 
The Bubble Act retarded development of joint stock companies.326 It has been said of the 
Bubble Act: 
The history of the business corporation or joint stock company in England during 
the one hundred and fifty years following the statute of 1720 is the story of an 
economic necessity forcing its way slowly and painfully to legal recognition against 
strong commercial prejudice in favour of ‘individual’ enterprise, and in the face of 
determined attempts of both the legislature and the courts to deny it.327 
 
Joint stock companies still flourished based on the concept of ‘trust’ – members paid their 
subscription funds into a trust managed by the directors. As a result, directors of joint stock 
companies at this time were seen as agents of the shareholders.328 It is from this form that 
we start to see the rise of fiduciary duties by directors in their capacity as trustees of the 
members' funds – by transposition of law rather than by deliberate action to remedy Costs. 
Once again, there is little evidence from this period that company law was concerned with 
Costs. 
The Bubble Act was repealed in 1825. The repeal was unexpected, and arose after the 
Equitable Loan Company’s promoters were prosecuted under the Bubble Act at a time when 
the Charter was being extensively debated in Parliament and seen as likely to be granted.329 
The case, which focused attention, concerned interpretation of the deed of settlement in 
respect of the Equitable Loan Company, but:  ‘Lord Eldon astonished Counsel by turning 
his attention from the content and interpretation of the deed to the question of the legality of 
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the company altogether.’330 As a result, a private members’ Bill to repeal the Bubble Act 
was introduced by a director of the Equitable Loan Company who was also an MP. The 
House of Lords appeared to favour retaining the Bubble Act to protect government bonds, 
but the private interests of MPs won.331 The private members’ Bill was avoided on a 
technicality, but the Bubble Act was ultimately repealed on legal grounds. The Attorney 
General stated that the Bubble Act's ‘meaning and effect were all together unintelligible’.332 
Lord Eldon, who was also Lord Chancellor, indicated that he would instruct judges that the 
subject matter was anyway prohibited by the common law. Ultimately, Harris states that 
‘[i]deological considerations played only a minor role in the process that led to the repeal of 
the Bubble Act’.333  
Accordingly, the implementation and repeal of the Bubble Act, is of little of relevance to our 
study of Costs. Political considerations regarding access to public markets, together with 
personal rent-seeking, were the key considerations: for the government in maximising 
charter revenue for the introduction of the Bubble Act; and for MPs whose business interests 
were harmed by Eldon's broad interpretation of the Bubble Act for its repeal. Whatever 
ideological considerations may have played a minor role in the repeal of the Bubble Act, 
they were not related to Costs. Such considerations first appeared in a report into partnership 
law delivered by Bellenden Ker in 1837. This report also included joint stock companies in 
its ambit, and expressly refers to them as a ‘type of partnership’.334 In particular, the report 
examined difficulties in litigating against large numbers of partners. It also considered 
whether limited partnerships, based on continental forms, should be introduced.335 Bellenden 
Ker concluded that the problem with the crash of the South Sea Company was that investors 
wanted to be able to withdraw their investment, which created a necessity of free transfers 
of stock held by members. The issue arose when the transfer of shares itself became a trade 
(known as stock-jobbing), which created a speculative market unconnected to the underlying 
economic performance of the company.336 This harmed investors. One of Bellenden Ker's 
main considerations, therefore, was protection of the shareholders: the first consideration of 
Costs.  
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Bellenden Ker considered it important to note that limited liability would not be accorded to 
such companies and, accordingly, no minimum capital requirements would be necessary.337  
Bellenden Ker's key considerations, therefore, could be the protection of shareholders 
against agency costs on the ground that externalities were lower than they would be if faced 
with limited liability. The report went on to note that there was public support for the concept 
of limited liability (although not LPs based on a French model), and that there was no 
evidence that charter companies having limited liability hurt creditors.338 
The Bellenden Ker Report was followed in 1844 by a report specifically into joint stock 
companies chaired by Gladstone (the ‘1844 Report’).339 The 1844 Report noted some issues 
which had arisen with joint stock companies since the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825. 
These fell into three categories:  
1. some joint stock companies were being set up with no financial viability at 
all – which links to agency costs suffered by shareholders against managers 
and externalities; 
2.   some joint stock companies were being mismanaged – which links to 
owner/manager agency costs suffered by shareholders against managers; 
and 
3.   some fraudulent joint stock companies were being set up with the sole aim 
of creating a second-hand market (ie, for the purpose of stock jobbing) – 
which links to owner/manager agency costs.340 
The 1844 Report's recommendation to resolve points 1 and 3, was mandatory publication of 
names of directors, deeds of settlement, and the amount of capital that each company had.341 
In other words, the 1844 Report proposed mandatory rules to resolve Costs: supporting the 
theoretical proposition advanced in this thesis. The 1844 Report considered that category 2 
issues arose because: 
The directors themselves are often indifferent and careless, trusting too much to 
their officers, shareholders purchase on the strength of their names, without inquiry, 
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and thus confer factitious support, so that one set of persons relying upon another 
set, the delusion is sustained for a longer space of time.342 
For the 1844 Report, the solution to category 2 was therefore to increase mandatory 
governance requirements for joint stock companies, 
… by the periodic holding of meetings, by the periodic balancing, audit and 
publication of accounts, and by making Directors and officers more immediate 
responsible to the shareholders, which may probably be accomplished by 
facilitating and improving the remedies available to Joint Stock Companies and 
their shareholders inter se.343  
These concerns were, therefore, all linked to mandatory protections to limit 
manager/shareholder Costs. Indeed, the activities of directors were under general scrutiny at 
this time. Du Bois flags the personal advantage that directors took (ie, a direct manifestation 
of owner/manager Costs): 
The eighteenth century director, even by twentieth century standards, was adept in 
the art of using the mechanics of the company for his own best interest… then, as 
now, the only limitation of many seemed to be the avoidance of possible penalties 
inflicted by courts or legislature.344  
In addition, the 1844 Report noted that appointing directors for life was ‘probably a common 
characteristic of the worst kind of cases, and is always liable to the disadvantage of inducing 
a want of care and attention on the part of the persons in whose favour it is made’.345 This is 
a clear reference to a Cost arising between management and owners due to security of tenure 
for directors. There are two key proposals for our purposes in the 1844 Report. Firstly, 
that due provision be made for defining and declaring the duties of the several 
officers of the Company, to such extent at least as is usually provided by Acts of 
Parliament and Charters for the incorporation of Companies, that the remedies of 
shareholders against directors, for abuse and excess of their functions, be declared 
and facilitated; and that generally the legal and equitable remedies available to Joint 
Stock Companies, and their directors, officers and shareholders, inter se, be 
facilitate and improved.346 
The 1844 Report clearly considered that ‘defining and declaring’ the duties of the company's 
officers would be in the interests of shareholders as regards reducing owner/manager Costs. 
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It would allow delineation between shareholders and directors and clarify shareholders’ 
remedies against directors. Secondly, it was proposed that, 
[i]t is expedient that the accounts of every such Company be open to the inspection 
of the shareholders; and that the annual balance-sheet, together with the reports of 
the auditors thereon, be registered.347 
The purpose of this provision is clearly to provide shareholders with insight as to the nature 
of the business into which they have invested and its finances. This clarity is important to 
reduce Costs experienced by shareholders due to their increasingly passive investment in the 
business vehicle. It also provides a public point of reference for third parties, protecting them 
from externalities. We can therefore see further support in the 1844 Report for the 
proposition that high Costs should be mitigated by mandatory rules. These requirements 
were implemented and remained substantially unaltered until, following a governmental 
review,348 the Companies Act 1929 added the requirement of publishing profit and loss 
accounts. The substance has only since been altered by the requirement that consolidated 
group accounts349 and a cash flow statement also be published. This latter amendment was 
aimed at flagging risks of Enron-esque profitable businesses with net assets, becoming 
insolvent by running out of cash and so causing externalities.350 The 1844 Report's 
recommendations were incorporated in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844.351 The 1844 
Act for the first time permitted companies to be created by registration alone, and evidences 
that legislation has followed the theoretical proposition advanced. It required, at risk of a 
penalty, the registration of the joint stock company with the centralised register,352 complete 
deeds of settlement to be registered,353 and that six-monthly returns of changes and additions 
to members to be filed.354 The rights of shareholders were also suspended until they were 
reflected as shareholders in the return,355 and shareholders’ rights were restricted prior to 
signing the deed of settlement.356 In addition, transfer of shares had to be stamped and 
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transfers had to be undertaken using a specific form.357 These provisions made ‘stock-
jobbing’ more difficult as a shareholder actually had to sign the company's deed of settlement 
before selling her rights on, which complicated speculative investment in companies 
incorporated by registration. The 1844 Act also stated that the deed of settlement had to 
include what constituted a ‘majority’ for the purposes of shareholder votes,358 and provided 
protections against directors. It allowed the exclusion of directors from voting if they were 
interested or concerned in a contract with the company (the contract had to be ratified by 
general meeting), and provided the automatic removal of directors if they become bankrupt 
or insolvent or were declared ‘a lunatic’.359 The first limb of this test is the first statutory 
provision for the protection of shareholders from direct and indirect manifestations of 
owner/manager Costs. The 1844 Act also made acts or omissions by directors in breach of 
the Act misdemeanours,360 and provided for personal liability for directors if they allowed a 
dividend or loans to members when they knew that the company was insolvent.361 This 
mitigated externalities. The 1844 Act also required production of accounts362 and 
appointment of auditors.363 In order to meet the first of the 1844 Report's proposals, the 1844 
Act required a company to have bye-laws, and for those bye-laws to be registered.364  Certain 
items were required to be included in the deed of settlement: principally the mechanics for 
appointment and retirement of directors.365    
Overall, the 1844 Act and the reports on which it was based existed to protect shareholders 
from owner/manager Costs and (to a lesser degree) third parties from externalities, by 
publication of information about a company. However, there were no minimum capital 
requirements with externalities rather being resolved by mandatory publication. Further 
protection was unnecessary: the Act retained the unlimited liability of shareholders by 
providing that judgments against the company could be individually enforced against 
shareholders.366 However, it did flag that the bankruptcy of the company does not 
automatically result in bankruptcy of the members.367 Whilst this is clearly a logical result 
of separate legal personality created by registration under the 1844 Act, it also introduced 
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the separation of the company’s financial wellbeing from the financial wellbeing of its 
shareholders. Neither the Bellenden Ker report, nor the 1844 report, nor the 1844 Act 
contained protections for – or even reference to protections for – minority shareholders as 
regards majority/minority Costs. 
It was difficult to comply with the 1844 Act's filing requirements. Watson has stated that 
‘76% of companies were abandoned before completing registration in the period between 
1844 and 1856’.368 The 1844 Act was consolidated in 1845 into a more thematic approach. 
The 1845 Act also applied to companies incorporated by Act of Parliament as well as joint 
stock companies registered under the 1844 Act. The 1845 Act prescribed requirements for 
general meetings.  The concept of minority protection was included by way of scaled voting: 
At all general meetings of the company every shareholder shall be entitled to vote 
according to the prescribed scale of voting, and where no scale shall be prescribed 
every shareholder shall have one vote for every share up to ten, and he shall have 
an additional vote for every five shares beyond the first ten shares held by him up 
to one hundred, and an additional vote for every ten shares held by him beyond the 
first hundred shares; provided always, that no shareholder shall be entitled to vote 
at any meeting unless he shall have paid all the calls then due upon the shares held 
by him.369  
It also made majority rule statutory – in addition to the scaled voting element, decisions by 
the shareholders as a whole were taken by majority vote.370 This provision provided a clear 
solution to majority/minority Costs by restricting a dominant investor's number of votes. 
This, in turn, mitigated direct and indirect manifestations of such Costs. Other key Costs 
which were ignored in the 1844 Act were included in the 1845 Act – in particular, mandatory 
provisions in respect of directors, who were to be appointed by the body of shareholders, 
required a director to hold shares in the company and provided for mandatory rotation and 
re-election of directors.371  The 1845 Act, therefore, reduced Costs by mandatory legislation: 
verifying the theoretical proposition advanced in Chapters 2 and 3 above. 
The 1845 Act also changed the rules regarding a company's bye-laws.372 These bye-laws 
moved from being mandatory under the 1844 Act, to being optional under the 1845 Act. The 
bye-laws envisaged by the 1845 Act related to the carrying out of matters which had been 
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devolved to the board of directors. They thus were limited to the interaction between the 
board of directors and employees/officers of the company. Once again, the primary Cost 
under consideration under the 1845 Act was that between shareholders and managers. Courts 
were keen to hold contracts with a company in which a director was directly or indirectly 
interested, automatically void,373 which provided a non-statutory, mandatory rule to mitigate 
against direct and indirect manifestations of shareholder/director Costs.  The lack of limited 
liability meant that externalities were limited: a wronged third party could obtain a judgment 
against the company and then, if the company could not pay, against the shareholders 
directly. Minorities were protected by a staggered voting requirement which gave them a 
higher vote per share than the majority enjoyed. 
The legislative framework was complicated by the introduction of limited liability in 1855. 
The 1855 Act was ‘a significant building block in the formation of the legal framework of 
the modern company’.374 It marked a very significant change for a company: previously, 
limited liability required to be separately provided to a company by Act of Parliament or by 
charter, with not all charters conferring limited liability. Each of these routes was political 
and time consuming. The 1855 Act reframed the acquisition of limited liability – it moved 
from a privilege to an automatic right.375 At the time, companies had started to introduce 
‘limited liability’ clauses in contracts. Courts had held that a clause purporting to provide 
limited liability was valid against a voluntary creditor who had signed up to a contract with 
such a provision in it,376 and also that contractual limited liability between shareholders in 
their capacity as such was binding on shareholders who had voluntarily agreed to it.377 
However, such a provision could not have any affect vis-à-vis a third party who had not 
expressly agreed to a contract limiting the liability of shareholders.378 Indeed, it had been 
expressly stated that the rights of creditors were ‘wholly extrinsic to any’ limited liability 
agreements between the shareholders.379 Accordingly, legal engineering could provide 
limited liability for companies only if expressly agreed to by counterparties. In the absence 
of their express agreement, the courts would apply unlimited liability. A Royal Commission 
was established in 1854 to look into limited liability amongst other questions, such as 
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whether the law of separate legal personality and company law more generally should be 
unified within the UK.380 Of the eight members of the Royal Commission, it was decided 
five to three against introducing limited liability for companies.381 But the 1855 Act did so 
anyway, increasing externalities within the general company form. 
The 1855 Act was denounced as a ‘rogue’s charter’ by the Law Times on the ground that it 
would increase the use of the corporate vehicle as a way to defraud third parties.382 On the 
other side of the debate were arguments, such as those advanced by John Stuart Mill that 
limited liability would allow for middle- and lower-class investors to invest in companies. 
The argument ran that by creating limited liability for shares, they became divorced from 
the creditworthiness of their shareholders, and therefore fungible. In a world of unlimited 
liability poor shareholders were discouraged as they lowered the price of shares held by 
wealthier shareholders (on the ground that on the insolvency of the company, a wealthier 
shareholder was more likely to be called upon to make up the deficit).383 The latter appears 
to have won the day against a fertile political environment–particularly, unhappiness at the 
established social structures in the light of the Crimean war.384 The arguments in favour of 
limited liability became politically popular with the growing middle class as it would also 
allow diversification, competition between smaller and bigger investors, and an escalation 
in legal fees which benefitted middle-class professionals.385  The 1855 Act contained several 
conditions which had to be met in order for the shareholders of a company to obtain limited 
liability: the company needed at least 25 members;386 minimum paid up capital of £50; and 
each individual share had to have a minimum nominal value of £10.387 Such a company 
needed to have an approved auditor,388 had to include ‘limited’ in its name,389 and be publicly 
declared to enjoy limited liability.390 Accordingly, these provisions were designed to provide 
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some certainty for third parties when dealing with the company to ensure that it is a 
financially viable entity, and to publicise to third parties that the company enjoys limited 
liability. In other words, whilst granting limited liability to companies increased the risk of 
externalities, the effect was mitigated by higher mandatory capital requirements391 and 
mandatory disclosure of the risk to third parties that they are dealing with companies whose 
liability is limited.  Nevertheless, the introduction of limited liability complicated the 
analysis by introducing another Cost. In addition to the need to protect shareholders from 
agency costs (primarily from the actions of rogue managers and directors), it also became 
necessary to protect third parties from externalities arising from the actions of companies 
with limited liability.  
The 1844 Act and the 1855 Act did not speak to each other, and therefore the concepts of 
limited liability and separate legal personality by registration operated separately. This 
proved untenable, and the two were restated in 1856 in a single Act in which the two concepts 
were linked. This has been the approach ever since, leading to Gower describing the 1856 
Act as the first of the modern Companies Acts.392  
Many of the safeguards provided under the 1855 Act were removed in the 1856 Act – there 
was no longer a minimum paid-up capital requirement,393 the minimum number of 
shareholders was dropped to seven,394 and the appointment of auditors became voluntary. 
This meant that a lot of the mandatory protections against externalities were reduced or fell 
away. It has been stated that: 
Within a matter of a few months the official stance on the granting of limited 
liability changed and pre-conditions that were regarded as vital safeguards in 1855 
were abandoned. This change is probably reflective of the progress of laissez-faire 
in Victorian England.395 
This principle of laissez-faire also occurred elsewhere throughout the Act, in that various 
protections which were previously mandated by statute moved to become voluntary. Thus, 
the 1856 Act was the first Act to include reference to a company having ‘articles of 
association’.396 It was also the first to include a default set of articles of association which 
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were appended to the Act as ‘Table B’.397  After incorporation, articles could only be 
amended398 by the new invention – a ‘special resolution’, a new term which referred to a 
resolution passed by three quarters of the company’s shareholders in number and value.399 
The special resolution definition supplanted the concept of scaled voting, but also required 
a three quarters majority to approve it, meaning that it replaced one minority-protection 
device with another.  There was no definition of an ‘ordinary’ resolution this being left to 
the articles of association.  
 
This basic framework has been restated on several occasions. The Companies Act 1900 
introduced the concept of a certificate of incorporation as prima facie evidence that the 
company exists,400 the provisions in respect of the register of charges,401 and requirements 
as to prospectuses.402 The latter were implemented against the background of an 1890 Act 
which introduced personal liability for directors for damage suffered by shareholders as a 
result of inaccurate prospectuses.403 This is obviously less relevant for private companies, 
but nonetheless provides evidence of the protection of shareholders from agency costs 
arising from directors once more increasingly taking place on a mandatory basis. Subsequent 
amendments in 1929, 1948, and 1985 made changes to the specific terms governing 
company law404 but did not vary dramatically from the 1856 Act in their general approach 
to mitigating Costs (with the possible exception of changing to accounting aspects noted 
above). However, the protection of minority shareholders continued to shrink: the 
requirement that special resolutions be passed by 75 per cent of shareholders by number and 
value was replaced by the concept of their being passed by a 75 per cent majority, with a 
split analysis for 75 per cent by shareholders (voting on a show of hands) and 75 per cent by 
share votes (voting on a poll).405 This formula persists today.406 
In conclusion, in line with the theoretical analysis, since 1844 legislation in respect of 
companies has been a response to the Costs which are unmitigated at the time. This verifies 
and reinforces the theoretical analysis advanced in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus, the initial joint 
stock companies Acts and companies Acts provided protection for shareholders from agency 
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costs generated by management. Some protection for third parties was included but the bar 
was not set very high: shareholders could not hide behind the corporate form. Once limited 
liability was included in 1855, externalities became more of a consideration. Thus we see 
third-party protection against externalities arising from the use of the corporate form 
becoming the key element considered, to the exclusion of some forms of protection 
shareholders had previously enjoyed. There are two key outcomes to note from this analysis. 
First, Costs have developed over time and with them responses to Costs have developed. 
Second, those responses have, primarily, involved mandatory application under statute, 
unless the market itself has responded to the Cost in question. Against this backdrop, it is 
worth examining the historical development of the twin exacerbations – if company law has 
typically provided mandatory responses to Costs, how is it that we still have unresolved 
Costs in the form of the twin exacerbations? 
 
4.2. Division of Powers between the Majority and the Minority 
4.2.1. Introduction 
We have established that the history of company law has depended on the Costs that arose 
in respect of companies from time to time, and that the response to these agency costs and 
externalities has traditionally been mandatory intervention in the absence of action by the 
market. It is therefore necessary to review the history and development of the two 
exacerbations of indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs: specifically, the 
division of responsibility between shareholders and directors, and the ability of shareholders 
to remove directors. We first examine the history of the legal framework governing the 
division of responsibility between directors and shareholders. The issue underpinning this 
exacerbation is that directors may act in a manner which they perceive to reflect the wishes 
of the dominant shareholder to avoid shareholders exercising their right directly to usurp the 
powers of the board. 
4.2.2. The Initial Division: the 1844 Act 
In line with the 1844 Report, the 1844 Act provided expressly for the powers of directors: 
That with regard to the Powers and Duties of Directors it shall be lawful for the 
Directors of any Joint Stock Company registered under this Act, 
1. To conduct and manage the Affairs of the Company according to the 
Provisions and subject to the Restrictions of this Act, and of the Deed of 
Settlement, and of any Bye Law, and for that Purpose to enter into all such 
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Contracts and do and execute all such Acts and Deeds as the Circumstances 
may require; and also,  
2. To appoint the Secretary, if any; and also, 
3. To appoint the Clerks and Servants; and also from Time to Time, as they 
see fit, 
4. To remove such Secretary, Clerks, and Servants, and to appoint others, as 
the occasion shall require; and also, 
5. To appoint other Persons for special Services as the Concerns of the 
Company may from Time to Time require; and also, 
6. To hold Meetings periodically and from Time to Time as the Concerns of 
the Company shall require; and also, 
7. To appoint a Chairman to preside at all such Meetings, and in his Absence 
to appoint a Chairman at each such Meeting; Subject nevertheless to the 
Provisions and Restrictions of this Act, and to the Provisions of the Deed of 
Settlement of the Company or other special Authority, but not so as to 
enable the Shareholders to act in their own Behalf in the ordinary 
Management of the Concerns of the Company otherwise than by means of 
Directors:  
Provided always, that it shall not be lawful for the Directors to purchase any Shares 
of the Company, nor to sell any such Shares, except Shares forfeited on the Non-
payment of Calls or Instalments, nor to lend to any one of their Number, or to any 
Officer of the Company, any Money belonging to the Company, without the 
Authority and Sanction of a General Meeting of Shareholders duly convened.407  
This, therefore, shows that the first statute to provide for incorporation by registration 
included express mandatory powers for the directors. Power 1 was an express ability to 
conduct and manage the affairs of the company. Powers 2 to 7 provided for procedural 
powers to achieve this end and, therefore, should be seen as subservient to power 1. There 
were mandatory limitations on the powers of directors: they had to act in accordance with 
the terms of the 1844 Act itself, as well as in accordance with the provisions of the deed of 
settlement and any bye-law. This allowed the company’s constitutional documents to contain 
a restriction on what the directors were able to do, although the restriction was not obligatory. 
There were also further mandatory limitations – primarily, that the company could not lend 
to directors without shareholder approval. These mandatory limitations can be seen as 
mitigations of manifestations of director/shareholder agency costs.  
The 1845 Act retained the mandatory and statutory division of powers between directors and 
shareholders. Thus, section 90 provided for the powers of directors: 
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The directors shall have the management and superintendence of the affairs of the 
company, and they may lawfully exercise all the powers of the company, except as 
to such matters as are directed by this or the special Act to be transacted by a general 
meeting of the company; but all the powers so to be exercised shall be exercised in 
accordance with and subject to the provisions of this and the special Act [i.e. any act 
incorporating a specific company]; and the exercise of all such powers shall be 
subject also to the control and regulation of any general meeting specially convened 
for the purpose, but not so as to render invalid any act done by the directors  prior to 
any resolution passed by such general meeting.408 
This provision included a subtle shift from the version in the 1844 Act. Whilst the directors 
retained general power subject to the act, rather than to the bye-laws or deed of settlement, 
these powers were subject to two qualifications. First, anything which was ‘to be transacted’ 
by the general meeting could not be transacted by the board; and second, the directors' 
powers were subject to the ‘control and regulation’ of any general meeting. This appears to 
have given shareholders control over the exercise of directors' powers rather than themselves 
directly usurping any powers. Thus it would appear to enable the shareholders to restrain the 
directors from acting in a specific way, or instruct them to perform certain actions, but not 
to themselves undertake activity on behalf of the company.409 This analysis is supported by 
the reference to matters being subject to the ‘general meeting’ and the list of powers of the 
general meeting in a separate section: 
Except as otherwise provided by the special Act [i.e. any act incorporating a specific 
company], the following powers of the company, (that is to say,) the choice and 
removal of the directors, except as herein-before mentioned, and the increasing or 
reducing of their number, where authorized by the special Act, the choice of auditors, 
the determination as to the remuneration of the directors, auditors, treasurer, and 
secretary, the determination as to the amount of money to be borrowed on mortgage, 
the determination as to the augmentation of capital, and the declaration of dividends, 
shall be exercised only at a general meeting of the company.410 
This clause is non-exhaustive in that it provides a list of matters which may only be 
transacted at a general meeting, but not a definitive list of what could be transacted at a 
general meeting. Nonetheless, when coupled with section 90, the position is clear: the 
directors had the power to undertake all activities of the company save for those mandated 
to be transacted by the general meeting under section 91. In exercising those powers, the 
directors were subject to certain constraints that the general meeting could impose. The 
wording was perhaps slightly unclear in that section 90 purported that the general meeting 
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should ‘transact’ matters, rather than ‘decide’ matters in accordance with section 91. If 
‘transact’ were replaced with ‘decide’ then the statutory provision would be clear as to 
division between the board of directors and the shareholders, and this exacerbation would 
have been mitigated.  
The issue of the balance between the powers of the board and the shareholders under this 
statutory framework was tested in Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin.411 A railway 
company was not performing well, and certain shareholders requisitioned a general meeting 
to, firstly, appoint a committee to examine the working and general management of the 
company and authorise the directors to implement its recommendations; and secondly, to 
remove directors if necessary. The directors summoned a meeting only in respect of the first 
element. The relevant shareholders noted that this meeting did not cover all that they had 
asked, and so exercised their right to hold a meeting anyway.412  
The directors brought an action in the name of the company to restrain the shareholders' 
meeting.  In first instance, the court held that the appointment of a committee was an illegal 
transfer of power from the directors to the shareholders, and that the second limb was too 
vague. Accordingly, at first instance, Kay J granted the injunction. This was appealed. On 
appeal the decision was reversed. A lot of the discussion in the case is of relevance to the 
interaction between the board of directors and the general meeting. Cotton LJ began the 
judgment with: 
We are of opinion that this injunction ought not to have been granted. It is a very 
strong thing indeed to prevent shareholders from holding a meeting of the company, 
when such a meeting is the only way in which they can interfere, if the majority of 
them think that the course taken by the directors, in a matter which is intra vires of 
the directors, is not for the benefit of the company.413 
The second sentence contains two linked concepts. The first is that such a general meeting 
is ‘the only way’ in which the shareholders are able to ‘interfere’ in the management of the 
business. For this to be the case, it must be necessary for 'power to act' to sit exclusively with 
the directors. The second is that shareholders may only interfere through the general meeting 
if: 
1. a majority of those shareholders attending the meeting; 
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2. consider a course of action taken by directors; 
3. which the directors are able to do; 
4. is not for the benefit of the company. 
The second point implies that it is for directors to propose matters, and for the shareholders 
to attempt to restrain them from undertaking such action if they disagree with that course. 
Under this limited formulation, therefore, it may not be open to the shareholders to mandate 
the directors to use their powers to do certain things. The rest of the judgment carefully side-
stepped the issue by deciding that the precise wording of the first object of the meeting was 
only to authorise the directors to implement the terms of the committee's report, not to 
mandate that they do so, or delegate the power to the committee to run the company. On the 
latter point Cotton LJ stated: 
I do not mean to give any opinion upon the question whether it would be legal to 
give to a committee power to do the things mentioned in the notice, it is unnecessary 
in my opinion to decide that question, as I am clear that such is not the object of the 
notice, for a scheme which the committee were intended to carry into effect of their 
own authority would not have been spoken of as ‘recommendations of the 
committee.’414 
The fourth point is that shareholders are only able to exercise this right if they consider the 
directors’ proposed course of action not to be for the benefit of the company.  
Lindley LJ considered the case to be ‘very much more important than at first sight appears. 
It raises a question of the utmost possible consequence as to the management of railway and 
other companies.’415 Lindley LJ used the line of cases that shareholders may not sue directors 
in the name of the company (also known as the rule in Foss v Harbottle416) as evidence that 
the court has 
constantly and consistently refused to interfere on behalf of shareholders, until they 
have done the best they can to set right the matters of which they complain, by calling 
general meetings. Bearing in mind that line of decisions, what would be the position 
of the shareholders if there were to be another line of decisions prohibiting meetings 
of the shareholders to consider their own affairs? It appears to me that it must be a 
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very strong case indeed which would justify this Court in restraining a meeting of 
shareholders.417 
This echo's Cotton LJ's analysis: under the 1845 framework, the general meeting was the 
only way for shareholders to have their say in the activities of the company and, therefore, 
the court should be reticent to prevent such a meeting being held. No attention was paid to 
the ability of shareholders to bind the company after such meeting, or actively require 
directors to do anything. 
4.2.3. An Unexpected Change: the 1856 Act 
The 1856 Act did not replicate the position adopted under the 1845 Act. Instead, the Act was 
silent as to the division of powers between directors and shareholders. Such a division did, 
however, appear in the default articles of association provided as Table B to the 1845 Act. 
The relevant article of association in Table B was: 
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors, who may exercise 
all such powers of the company as are not by this Act or by the articles of association, 
if any, declared to be exercisable by the company in general meeting, subject 
nevertheless to any regulations of the articles of association, to the provisions of this 
Act, and to such regulations, being not inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or 
provisions, as may be prescribed by the company in general meeting; but no 
regulation made by the company in general meeting shall invalidate any prior act of 
the directors which would have been valid if such regulation had not been made.418 
This is framed in a very similar tone to section 90 of the 1844 Act, but with two very key 
differences. First, the emphasis is changed from the general meeting being able to provide 
‘control or regulations’ over the actions of directors, to the general meeting being able to 
prescribe regulations. This difference is more than semantic and creates an implication of 
increased passivity on the part of shareholders – under the 1844 formulation, the general 
meeting could exert control over the directors, whereas under the Table B formulation they 
could prescribe regulations for the directors to comply with when taking decisions.  
This moves the role of shareholders in decision making from being able to exert substantial 
direct control in respect of the management of the vehicle, to a position whereby they are 
able to set limits on what directors are able to do (and/or how they do it). The second change, 
however, was much more fundamental and negates this: the division of powers moved from 
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mandatory application (under the statute itself) to default application under Table B.419 
Watson states: 
The conferring of powers on boards through the articles of association rather than by 
means of the statutory instrument, which remains the position in the UK today, 
originated in the [1856 act]. Certainly the source of the powers of boards was original 
and undelegated in earlier forms of the corporation. Prior to the [1856 act], boards 
derived their powers from the statutory instrument or equivalent. Corporations 
created by charter have existing in the UK at least since medieval times. The source 
of the powers of chartered corporations was the Crown through the charter. Statutory 
power being bestowed on boards was once of the incidences of corporations given to 
companies by registration under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, the earliest 
UK act permitting incorporation by registration. Section 27 of the [1844 Act] stated 
that directors would have the powers to ‘conduct and manage the affairs of the 
company’. Shareholders could not take part in the management of companies 
‘otherwise than by means of directors’.420 
This is therefore a major change in that it became legally possible for this division of powers 
between shareholders and directors to be varied by special resolution. Moving this provision 
from statute to the articles of association, and allowing the shareholders of the company to 
vary the articles of association, created the ability for shareholders to assume the 
management power of the company themselves. There is limited evidence of shareholders 
having done so in the nineteenth century,421 but the threat of doing so forms the exacerbation 
of the extant indirect manifestation of the majority/minority agency cost – that directors may 
act in a way which they consider the dominant shareholder wishes to avoid their powers 
being usurped by the general meeting. Indeed, the historical lack of evidence that 
shareholders HAVE usurped such powers could be seen as evidence that boards have acted 
in such a manner. Such a change from powers being a matter of statute to being a matter of 
default application under the articles of association, was a major shift which has not altered 
since 1856. When drafting the 1856 Act, the drafters started with Table B: the usual terms 
of the deed of settlement for joint stock companies were converted into Table B, and the 
statute covered matters which were thought not covered in Table B. However, a pre-1844 
joint stock company and a company incorporated in 1856 were very different creatures: in 
the former, shareholders were settlers and beneficiaries of a trust managed by the 
directors.422 Ability to take control of the management of the vehicle was, therefore, 
effectively a method of unwinding the trust. However, by 1856, the company was its own 
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separate person, providing limited liability to shareholders and from which shareholders 
were unable to withdraw their capital. It is therefore a mistake to consider that matters 
normally considered in the deed of settlement of the former, would be automatically suitable 
to be left to the articles of association of the latter. The way in which the 1856 Act was 
drafted means that the mistake was not even deliberate – Watson has identified that the move 
of the powers of directors to a default position rather than a mandatory application, was 
accidental rather than philosophically driven.423 The move from powers being mandatory to 
default rules has been deemed an ‘accidental oversight’.424 Whether this was a mistake or 
accidental, it is this change that has created the potential for the one of the exacerbating 
factors in the indirect manifestation of majority/minority agency costs.  
4.2.4. Judicial Development 
Initially, courts presumed that companies would act through their directors, even though a 
private company was not obliged to have directors until 1948.425 Thus Cairns LJ stated in 
1866 that ‘[t]he company itself cannot act in its own person, for it has no person; it can only 
act through directors’.426 
At the start of the twentieth century the courts began taking an interest in the balance between 
shareholders and directors. Automatic Self Cleansing v Cuninghame427  was a case which 
involved a company with the standard article giving the directors the power to manage the 
company.  It had a dominant shareholder who, with his friends, held a majority of shares. 
That dominant shareholder negotiated and tabled a contract to sell the business and assets of 
the company to another company in which he was involved, and proposed a resolution to a 
general meeting which provided: 
That the company do sell the assets specified in the contract which has been produced 
to the meeting at the price and on the terms therein mentioned and contained and that 
the directors be and they are hereby directed to cause the common seal of the 
company to be affixed thereto within seven days and to carry the same into effect.428 
At the general meeting this resolution passed by 1,502 votes (consisting of the dominant 
shareholder and his friends) for and 1,198 votes against. The directors did not think that such 
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a sale would be in the interests of the company as a whole. The dominant shareholder sued 
the directors. At first instance, Warrington J summed up the issue as: 
The effect of this resolution, if acted upon, would be to compel the directors to sell 
the whole of the assets of the company, not on such terms and conditions as they 
think fit, but upon such terms and conditions as a simple majority of the shareholders 
think fit. But it does not rest there. Article 96 provides that the management of the 
business and control of the company are to be vested in the directors. Now that 
article, which is for the protection of a minority of the shareholders, can only be 
altered by a special resolution, that is to say, by a resolution passed by a three-fourths 
majority, at a meeting called for the purpose, and confirmed at a subsequent 
meeting429 (emphasis added). 
The italicised phrase illustrates that the strong powers held by directors are judicially 
recognised as existing for the protection of the minority. Warrington J found in favour of the 
directors. This was appealed. The Court of Appeal indicated that the matter before the court 
was not one of universal application, but rather depended on the articles of the company in 
question. The dominant shareholder attempted to argue that the directors were the servants 
of the shareholders and, therefore, had to do the bidding of the shareholders. The Master of 
the Rolls responded with: 
It has been suggested that this is a mere question of principal and agent, and that it 
would be an absurd thing if a principal in appointing an agent should in effect appoint 
a dictator who is to manage him instead of his managing the agent. I think that that 
analogy does not strictly apply to this case. No doubt for some purposes directors are 
agents. For whom are they agents? You have, no doubt, in theory and law one entity, 
the company, which might be a principal, but you have to go behind that when you 
look to the particular position of directors. It is by the consensus of all the individuals 
in the company that these directors become agents and hold their rights as agents. It 
is not fair to say that a majority at a meeting is for the purposes of this case the 
principal so as to alter the mandate of the agent. The minority also must be taken into 
account. There are provisions by which the minority may be over-borne, but that can 
only be done by special machinery in the shape of special resolutions. Short of that 
the mandate which must be obeyed is not that of the majority—it is that of the whole 
entity made up of all the shareholders. If the mandate of the directors is to be altered, 
it can only be under the machinery of the memorandum and articles themselves. I do 
not think I need say more.430 
This analysis develops Warrington J's analysis that provisions providing power to the board 
exist to protect minority shareholders. However, whilst the Master of the Rolls identified the 
issue, he did not adequately resolve it. If it is not fair for a majority to use its bare majority 
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in a general meeting to alter the mandate of the directors, why would it automatically become 
fair for a special resolution to alter such mandate? Consider a case where an 80 per cent 
shareholder was proposing a resolution to transfer all the assets of the company from the 
existing company to a new company wholly owned by her for £1 (considerably below the 
value of the assets). Under the Master of the Rolls' logic, this would clearly be an unfair use 
of the dominance of the majority shareholder, and a direct manifestation of a 
majority/minority agency cost. However, under his judgment, this outcome could be 
achieved if the shareholders proposed, by special resolution, to reserve the ability to conduct 
sales on behalf of the company to the general meeting. In such a situation it is arguable that 
a minority shareholder would be in even greater need of protection from dominant 
shareholders. This leads to the conclusion that the protections afforded by Automatic Self 
Cleansing are inadequate. Nevertheless, the minority were afforded some protection: for the 
majority to assume the powers of directors, they must use the mechanisms provided for in 
the relevant articles and Companies Act.   
The approach taken in Automatic Self Cleansing is, therefore, that directors are only powers 
delegated from the general meeting by the articles, with the implication being that in the 
absence of such delegation such powers sit with the general meeting. Marshall's Valve Gear 
Company, Limited v Manning, Wardle & Co Limited431 involved a company with the 
standard 1862 Table B articles. The company had four directors who were also shareholders. 
A held the majority but less than 75 per cent of the shares. The directors fell out, with A on 
one side and the other three directors on the other. The company had a patent, and the three 
directors were interested in a company which had a competing patent. A alleged that this 
other company infringed on the rights of their company, and attempted to raise an action to 
restrain the infringement through the board. The three objecting directors voted against the 
action, but A anyway commenced action in the name of the company. Neville J pointed out 
that the three directors were somewhat conflicted.432 Neville J stated: 
Prior to the decision in [Automatic Self Cleansing] the matter, I think, would have 
presented little difficulty, because I think in several cases…the principle has been 
acted upon that in the absence of any contract to the contrary the majority of the 
shareholders in a company have the ultimate control of its affairs.433 
Neville J, therefore, distinguished Automatic Self Cleansing on the ground that the 
shareholders had, under the articles in Automatic Self Cleansing, bound themselves to only 
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take direct action by way of extraordinary resolution, which there was not in the case of 
Marshall.  This is a logical extension of the Automatic Self Cleansing case – shareholders 
can, if they use whatever procedural hoops the articles may contain, take control of the affairs 
of the company. However, it is flawed for the same reasons as noted above. It is worth noting 
that the issues in Automatic Self Cleansing were that shareholders were trying to use their 
powers to further their own interests, whereas in Marshall it was directors who were abusing 
the corporate form to further their own interests. In other words, in both instances the court 
reached a decision which protected some shareholders against agency costs from putative 
wrongdoers: in Automatic Self Cleansing, this protected the minority from direct 
manifestations of agency costs from the majority, and in Marshall it protected the 
shareholders from indirect manifestations of agency costs from the directors. 
Defence of directors' powers only applies where the board of directors is working effectively 
but in a manner disapproved of by the shareholders. Another line of authority has developed 
to cover situations where the directors are unable, or unwilling, to act. The court has stated: 
If directors having certain powers are unable or unwilling to exercise them—are in 
fact a non-existent body for the purpose—there must be some power in the company 
to do itself that which under other circumstances would be otherwise done. The 
directors in the present case being unwilling to appoint additional directors under the 
power conferred on them by the articles, in my opinion, the company in general 
meeting has power to make the appointment.434 
This line of authority has been used where the board were in deadlock about which of two 
candidates should be appointed as the managing director of the company. The court held that 
this meant that the shareholders could choose, stating: 
From a business point of view it seems to me that there are only two persons who are 
possible managing directors, and the board has been reduced to the position that it is 
unable, owing to internal friction and faction, to appoint anybody as a managing 
director.435  
These two lines of authority appear to coexist neatly: there is strict deference to the 
constitutional split of powers between directors and shareholders unless the directors are 
unable to act, in which case the general meeting is entitled to assume the board's powers. 
However, the precise point at which this switch occurs is very unclear. If the directors keep 
having votes on the same subject matter which are increasingly entrenched in their deadlock 
then this is straightforward. However, does this right apply if the directors delay taking a 
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decision? Does the analysis change if the decision is one for which time is of the essence? 
Who should decide whether the directors are able to make a decision? In what circumstances 
does inaction count as exercising their powers, or does action alone count?  
The balance between the powers of directors and shareholders was unchanged in the 
Companies Act 1929,436 but it was under this Act that the Automatic Self Cleansing line of 
authority became entrenched. Shaw v Shaw437 involved a company with the standard article 
in respect of the division of powers between shareholders and the board of directors. It was 
managed by three brothers (the Shaws). The company was heavily indebted due to 
mismanagement by the Shaws. It was agreed that each of the brothers would acknowledge a 
debt to the company (to be established by an independent accountant), that two independent 
directors would be appointed as permanent directors, and the articles would be altered so 
that the Shaws could have no control over, or right to vote in respect of, the debts due by any 
of them. An accountant was appointed to establish their liability. The articles were amended 
and such an agreement drawn up, which provided that the debt would be payable in twenty 
years. The agreement was signed by the brothers in their personal capacities, with a clause 
stating that the company would be bound by it when the agreement was approved in a general 
meeting. The approval of the general meeting was considered a formality and so the 
accountant started working and drew up the balance sheet showing that the Shaw brothers 
owed a lot more than they had thought.  The general meeting passed the terms of the 
agreement but the brothers refused to sign it. 
The newly-appointed independent directors held a directors' meeting to sue the brothers for 
recovery of amounts they owed the company.  A meeting of shareholders was convened 
which passed a resolution to stop the company from suing the brothers. The resolution passed 
on the brothers’ votes. One of the issues before the court was whether the permanent 
directors were able to commence proceedings against the brothers in the name of the 
company on the ground that the decision had been taken at a board meeting which the 
brothers had not attended.  The Court of Appeal undertook a textual analysis of the bespoke 
articles allocating responsibility between the ‘ordinary’ directors and the ‘permanent’ 
directors. The court held that commencing such litigation was within the sole powers of the 
permanent directors and, therefore, that the commencement of the action was valid. It then 
turned its attention to the effect of the shareholders’ resolution to restrain the action, stating: 
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I think the judge was also right in refusing to give effect to the resolution of the 
meeting of the shareholders requiring the chairman to instruct the company's 
solicitors not to proceed further with the action. A company is an entity distinct alike 
from its shareholders and its directors. Some of its powers may, according to its 
articles, be exercised by directors, certain other powers may be reserved for the 
shareholders in general meeting. If powers of management are vested in the directors, 
they and they alone can exercise these powers. The only way in which the general 
body of the shareholders can control the exercise of the powers vested by the articles 
in the directors is by altering their articles, or, if opportunity arises under the articles, 
by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they disapprove. They cannot 
themselves usurp the powers which by the articles are vested in the directors any 
more than the directors can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general 
body of shareholders.438 
The argument advanced is very similar to that used by the Master of the Rolls in Automatic 
Self Cleansing. However, it is couched in even stronger language – whilst the Master of the 
Rolls in Automatic Self Cleansing described altering mandates given to the directors, the 
Court of Appeal in Shaw described shareholders usurping the rightful power of directors. 
Once more, however, the analysis appears inconsistent: why should it be anathema for 
shareholders to ‘usurp’ powers using certain techniques, but acceptable for them to ‘usurp’ 
powers using other techniques? In both Automatic Self Cleansing and in Shaw the judicial 
opinion identified a wrong – which in each case was a manifestation of majority/minority 
agency costs – and prevented that wrong from taking place. However, in each case they then 
stated that the wrong could be achieved by the shareholders merely attempting to undertake 
the same activity in a slightly different way. This approach clearly gives effect to the articles 
as a contract between the members,439 and is consistent with the legislative framework in 
which the courts were operating. However, it presents a clear method by which the policy 
concerns that the court had identified could be simply avoided by a majority.  
The interaction between shareholders and directors was further examined in in Salmon v 
Quin & Axtens, Limited.440 In this case, two similar articles were included in the company's 
articles of association. Firstly, the general article stated: 
75. The business of the company shall be managed by the board, who may pay all 
expenses of or incident to the formation, registration, and advertising of the company, 
and the issue of its capital. The board may exercise all the powers of the company, 
subject, nevertheless, to the provisions of any Acts of Parliament or of these articles, 
and to such regulations (being not inconsistent with any such provisions of these 
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articles) as may be prescribed by the company in general meeting, but no regulations 
made by the company in general meeting shall invalidate any prior act of the board 
which would have been valid if such regulations had not been made. 
The precise wording differs slightly from the then-default form. Article 76 supplemented 
this by further empowering the directors to sell, let, or otherwise dispose of any part of the 
property of the company. Article 80 was a more bespoke article: 
80. No resolution of a meeting of the directors having for its object the borrowing of 
money, the entering into any contract the subject-matter of which shall be of a value 
exceeding 10 00l, the acquisition by purchase, lease or otherwise, or the sale, leasing, 
letting, mortgaging or charging of any hereditaments or premises, the renewal or 
extension of any existing lease or tenancy or the acquisition of any reversionary 
lease, the opening of any additional shop or branch of the company's business, the 
carrying on of any business or class of business not then carried on by the company, 
the convening of an extraordinary general meeting of the company other than a 
meeting convened pursuant to a requisition of shareholders undersection 13 of the 
Companies Act, 1900 , or any matter affecting the rights of either of them, the said 
William Raymond Axtens and Joseph Salmon, as holders of ordinary shares of the 
company shall be valid or binding unless not less than twenty-four hours' notice in 
writing by letter or telegram of the meeting specifying the business proposed to be 
transacted thereat, shall have been given to each of the managing directors, the said 
William Raymond Axtens and Joseph Salmon, and neither of them shall have 
dissented therefrom in writing before or at the meeting at which such resolution is 
put to the vote. 
The articles were therefore slightly in conflict: articles 75 and 76 purported to give the 
directors wide powers, but article 80 limited the powers of a director in respect of certain 
transactions without prior approval of the general meeting and of specified individuals. The 
case involved the acquisition of a property in London for 20 00l (therefore above the 
threshold in article 80). A directors' meeting was held on 1 August to approve the acquisition 
of the property. Salmon dissented in writing to the proposal in accordance with article 80. A 
separate directors' meeting was held on 19 August to approve the letting of the company's 
existing offices and issue shares. Salmon again dissented in writing in accordance with 
article 80. The company requisitioned an extraordinary meeting of the company to consider 
the subject matter of the resolutions passed on 1 and 19 August by the directors. The matters 
passed the extraordinary general meeting due to Axtens' votes. Salmon sued to restrain the 
company from acting on the purchase and lease.  
At first instance, Warrington J rejected the injunction on the ground that article 80 only 
referred to a ‘meeting of the directors’, and therefore did not restrain the general meeting 
from approving the matters and directing the company to do so. The Court of Appeal pointed 
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out that Salmon had dissented to the matters to be transacted in accordance with article 80. 
Farwell LJ noted that article 75 was subject to any provisions of the articles, which was taken 
to be subject to article 80.441 It was also subject to any ‘regulations (being not inconsistent 
with any such provisions of these articles) as may be prescribed by the company in general 
meeting’. If the extraordinary meeting could be taken to prescribe regulations for the 
company, then these were not consistent with article 80.  The court also discussed the Isle of 
Wight Railway Company case. The court agreed with an observation in the eighth edition of 
Buckley on Companies442 that the Isle of Wight decision was based on the Companies 
Clauses Act of 1845 which provided a statutory footing for the division between the board 
and shareholders, providing that the power of directors to run the company was subject to 
‘the control and regulation of any general meeting’.443 As the division of powers was no 
longer mandatory, and no longer referred to ‘control’, the implicit logic of Isle of Wight 
Railway was no longer relevant, and the general meeting could no longer be held to exert 
implicit control over the board of directors, other than provided for in the articles of 
association.444 Once again, this matches the logic of the transfer of the division of power 
from statute to the articles of association. However, once more the policy aims outlined can 
be avoided: shareholders can amend the articles of association. This must mean that 
shareholders are able to alter the division of power from statute to the articles of association.  
This clearly provides shareholders with more implicit control over the powers of the board 
of directors rather than less.  
The House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal. Lord Loreburn stated, obiter, that: ‘I 
should require a great deal of argument to satisfy me that the word "regulations" in this 
article does not mean the same thing as articles, having regard to the language.’445 A similar 
issue arose in a tax case, The Gramophone and Typewriter, Limited v Stanley.446 This case 
involved an English company which owned all of the shares in a German company. The 
issue was whether the German company's profits were liable to UK tax. Buckley LJ stated: 
[I]t is urged that the English company, as owning all the shares, can control the 
German company in the sense that the German company must do all that the English 
company directs. In my opinion this again is a misapprehension. This Court decided 
not long since, in Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co. Ld. v. Cunninghame, 
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that even a resolution of a numerical majority at a general meeting of the company 
cannot impose its will upon the directors when the articles have confided to them the 
control of the company's affairs. The directors are not servants to obey directions 
given by the shareholders as individuals; they are not agents appointed by and bound 
to serve the shareholders as their principals. They are persons who may by the 
regulations be entrusted with the control of the business, and if so entrusted they can 
be dispossessed from that control only by the statutory majority which can alter the 
articles. Directors are not, I think, bound to comply with the directions even of all 
the corporators acting as individuals. Of course the corporators have it in their power 
by proper resolutions, which would generally be special resolutions, to remove 
directors who do not act as they desire, but this in no way answers the question here 
to be considered, which is whether the corporators are engaged in carrying on the 
business of the corporation. In my opinion they are not. To say that they are involves 
a complete confusion of ideas.447 
This was quoted in Salmon v Quin with approval, with Farley LJ stating: 
Any other construction might, I think, be disastrous, because it might lead to an 
interference by a bare majority very inimical to the interests of the minority who had 
come into a company on the footing that the business should be managed by the 
board of directors.448 
This therefore shows a further development of the analysis – if directors are entrusted with 
the powers of the company, there are limited ways of dispossessing them, even if all 
shareholders agree that a certain course of action be taken to do so. Yet again, this analysis 
acknowledges the issue underpinning this exacerbation of the indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs in private companies: shareholders may not have the best 
interests of all shareholders in mind when purporting to direct the company.449 Buckley LJ 
appears to go further and acknowledge that even all shareholders acting unanimously may 
raise such an issue. However, his analysis has the same flaw evident in all the other 
judgments reviewed – whilst it clearly gives effect to the articles of association as a contract, 
what is the point in defending the board of directors' power to act against shareholders, and 
thus such contract, when the majority shareholders are able to amend the contract and alter 
the articles to assume such power themselves? 
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This position was unchanged in 1929 and 1948 and judicial deference to the split between 
directors and shareholders was retained when courts interpreted these provisions, including 
making the definitive statement that: 
It is established that directors, within their management powers, may take decisions 
against the wishes of the majority of shareholders, and indeed that the majority of 
shareholders cannot control them in the exercise of these powers while they remain 
in office.450  
This statement is only true if it is accepted that ‘within their management powers’ should be 
taken to mean the powers that the shareholders delegate to the directors under the articles. 
Whilst this clarification renders the statement correct, it recasts the meaning to be that 
directors are able to take decisions that shareholders allow directors to take. This differs 
considerable from the apparent meaning of the text, which appears to embody restraint on 
shareholders interfering in powers of directors. 
A version of the 1856 provision was retained in the Companies Act 1985. Table A gave 
directors power ‘subject to the articles and any directions given by special resolution’.451 
The express reference to a special resolution was only introduced in 1985. Practically, this 
makes no difference to the analysis – shareholders could anyway change articles by special 
resolution. However, the change introduced a clear shift in tone: no longer did limitations 
on directors’ power need to be formally included in the articles, instead, directors’ power 
could be limited a resolution by the members. This re-opened the possibility for a short term, 
one-off resolution to be adopted by the shareholders, rather than structural change to the 
governance rules of the company. Under the formulations since 1856, directors’ power has 
been limited only by the articles themselves and by regulations made under the articles 
(which Lord Loreburn held obiter to be synonymous with the articles themselves). The 
addition of the special resolution changed the analysis considerably. The formulation change 
in 1985 made this first exacerbation of the agency cost even worse, as it expressly opened 
the possibility for one-off resolutions to interfere with the powers of directors. The effect is 
that the directors would arguably have to act on notice of a special resolution providing that 
the company must act in a certain way. This change, therefore, altered the role of 
shareholders – as well as being able to veto a decision by the directors as to activity of the 
company ex poste, they also became able to initiate a decision to be taken by the company 
ex ante.452 All the cases reviewed have flagged that their decisions were based entirely on 
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the legal framework that existed when they were delivered. Accordingly, given the addition 
of the ‘special resolution’ in the 1985 Table A, the line of authority may not need to be 
followed if faced with such an article, and it may have become easier (if Table A is widely 
adopted) for shareholders to usurp the power of the directors and take control of the active 
management of the company.453  
4.2.5. Conclusion 
The first exacerbation of the indirect manifestations of the majority/minority agency cost in 
private companies emerged in 1856. Until this point, divisions of responsibility between the 
board and shareholders were set out in statutory provisions. The power of the shareholders 
to use the general meeting negatively to vote against decisions of directors, was clear. 
However, the Isle of Wight Railway case avoided deciding definitively whether the general 
meeting under that regime was capable of dictating that the board of directors take any 
specified course of action, however against the interests of the company it might be. The 
1856 Act changed this regime entirely, and made the division of responsibility between 
directors and the general meeting a matter of default application. This happened either 
accidentally or mistakenly. The logic of Isle of Wight Railway was held to be irrelevant under 
the new regime. Courts under the 1856 (and subsequent) regimes have left holes in their 
analysis: they have more stridently defended the rights of directors to control the company, 
ostensibly mitigating the exacerbation of indirect manifestations of majority/minority 
agency costs in private companies. However, this analysis has developed alongside the 
shareholders' ability to change the articles to, it appears, assume the power of the company. 
The courts in Automatic Self Cleansing, Shaw, Gramophone, and Salmon have used 
increasingly strong language to describe the ills of shareholders ‘usurping’ the rightful power 
of directors (i.e. exacerbating such agency costs). Whilst all decisions clearly follow the 
legislative framework set out by statute, all such analysis is undermined as shareholders are, 
by law, entitled to amend the articles of association in a manner which allows them to do 
precisely the evil that the courts have identified. The response that shareholders should be 
entitled to do so if their actions are in accordance with the articles of association, rings 
hollow. 
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4.3. Removal of Directors by Shareholders 
4.3.1. Introduction 
Having examined the first exacerbation of the indirect manifestations of majority/minority 
agency costs in private companies, and identified that it arose by historical accident and has 
unfortunate outcomes, it is necessary to examine the second exacerbation: the risk that 
directors will act in a way calculated to please the dominant shareholder to the exclusion of 
the minority shareholder, to avoid being removed from office by the dominant shareholder. 
4.3.2. Initial Rules 
The 1844 Report stated strongly that appointing a director for life had the potential to cause 
great ill to the company.454 As a result, the 1844 Act mandated triennial retirement for 
directors, which was retained in the 1845 Act.455 The 1845 Act also provided for automatic 
vacation of the office as director in certain circumstances, particularly if the director profited 
from the company or ceased to hold the relevant number of shares for a shareholding 
qualification.456 As with large swathes of legislation, the provisions relating to director 
removal were moved to the articles of association under the 1856 Act. Under Table B, 
triennial retirement was retained (with a clarification that directors could be re-elected on 
their retirement),457 and provided for automatic vacation of office if the director profited 
from the company or became bankrupt/insolvent.458 Accordingly, whilst the move from a 
mandatory scheme to a default scheme also occurred in respect of the removal of directors, 
the terms on which the default regime proceeded were the same as those on which the 
mandatory regime operated – there was no option to remove directors under the default 
regime, merely automatic vacation from office if a prescribed event occurred.459 The main 
purpose of these provisions was to protect against owner/manager agency costs – a director 
profiting, directly or indirectly, from the company resulted in automatic removal from 
position. 
This remained the case until 1900, when a mandatory removal for failing to comply with 
any shareholding requirement in the company's articles within prescribed periods, resulted 
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in the director automatically vacating her office.460 This was the start of a return of removal 
of directors to the statutory sphere. The Companies Act 1929 did not expand on this and 
retained other aspects of director removal in the articles of association. However, the list of 
events which automatically resulted in vacation of office under the default articles of 
association was expanded: directors would be automatically removed for making profit from 
the company other than that approved by shareholders; if the director became bankrupt or 
subject to any of the mandatory provisions under the Companies Act; if they were declared 
to be a lunatic; if they resigned; or if they had a conflict of interest.461 
4.3.3. The Statutory Test 
The Companies Act 1948 made several provisions regarding the removal of directors 
mandatory. It introduced a mandatory retirement for directors at 70 years of age,462 together 
with a linked obligation on them to disclose their ages to the company.463  The Act retained 
statutory prohibitions on bankrupts serving as directors,464 and empowered the court to 
prevent fraudulent persons from being directors.465 However, a variety of protections 
remained in the articles. Thus, under the default regime, a director was automatically 
removed if she became bankrupt, or if she was subject to an order prohibiting her being 
involved in management, or if she resigned.466 Table A retained the same provisions in 
respect of triennial resignation.467 Table A also included a new provision which removed a 
director if she ‘shall for more than six months have been absent without permission of the 
directors from meetings of the directors held during that period’.468 Such an article could 
have been included in the articles at any time under the previous regime. However, it was a 
new addition to the default regime, and meant that the 1948 default regime created the 
possibility of directors removing directors: adding optionality to an otherwise automatic set 
of removal criteria within the default regime.  
In addition, the 1948 Act introduced the second exacerbation: a statutory right for the 
shareholders to remove a director prior to expiry of her term by ordinary resolution.469 A 
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new concept of the ‘special notice’ was introduced as part of this process to provide directors 
with advanced notice of an intention to remove them.470 Directors also had the right to make 
certain representations in their defence prior to the vote on their removal.471 The aim of the 
introduction of this new right was to provide shareholders with ‘greater powers to remove 
directors with whom they are dissatisfied’.472 It was, therefore, designed to lower 
owner/manager agency costs.  
The ambit of this new right was discussed in Bushell v Faith,473 which involved a company 
with three shareholders, two of whom were directors. The company had 300 shares of £1 
each issued, and each shareholder held 100 shares of £1 each. Article 9 of the company's 
articles of association provided that on any resolution of the shareholders to remove a 
director, each share held by the director counted as three votes. That meant that, on a motion 
to remove any director, that director would have a veto (as she would have 300 votes 
compared to 200 votes in total for the other two). A motion was introduced to remove a 
director – the challenged director voted against the motion whereas the other two 
shareholders voted in favour of it. The question before the court was, therefore, simple: had 
the director been removed (as on an unweighted vote, 200 of the 300 shares had voted in 
favour of his removal), or not (as, on a weighted vote, 300 of 500 votes had voted against 
his removal)? This turned on whether or not article 9 was a valid article.  
At first instance, article 9 was held to be invalid as section 184 clearly referred to an ordinary 
resolution, which implied a simple majority of votes. The Court of Appeal overturned the 
first instance decision 
on the simple grounds that the Act of 1948 did not prevent certain shares or classes 
of shares having special voting rights attached to them and on certain occasions.474 
The House of Lords upheld the validity of article 9. Lord Reid with ‘some reluctance’ agreed 
with the majority, despite noting that the effect of 
the extra voting power given by that article to a director, whose removal from office 
is proposed, makes it impossible in the circumstances of this case for any resolution 
for the removal of any director to be passed if that director votes against it.475 
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Lord Upton said: 
When construing an Act of Parliament it is a canon of construction that its provisions 
must be construed in the light of the mischief which the Act was designed to meet. 
In this case the mischief was well known; it was a common practice, especially in 
the case of private companies, to provide in the articles that a director should be 
irremovable or only removable by an extraordinary resolution; in the former case the 
articles would have to be altered by special resolution before a director could be 
removed and of course in either case a three-quarters majority would be required. In 
many cases this would be impossible, so the act provided that notwithstanding 
anything in the articles an ordinary resolution would suffice to remove a director. 
That was the mischief which the section set out to remedy; to make a director 
removable by virtue of an ordinary resolution instead of an extraordinary resolution 
or making it necessary to alter the articles.476 
Nonetheless, Lord Upton held that any such votes can have weightings attached to them 
under the company's articles. This is contradictory, and does not remedy the evil highlighted 
by Prentice. His evil which required to be remedied,  was the shareholders (via the articles) 
requiring more than 50 per cent of shares voted to approve the removal of the director, but 
the outcome of the judgment enabled precisely that. Lord Upton attempted to square this 
circle by stating: 
Parliament has never sought to fetter the right of the company to issue a share with 
such rights or restrictions as it may think fit. There is no fetter which compels the 
company to make the voting rights or restrictions of general application and it seems 
to me clear that such rights or restrictions can be attached to special circumstances 
and to particular types of resolution. This makes no mockery of section 184; all that 
Parliament was seeking to do thereby was to make an ordinary resolution sufficient 
to remove a director. Had Parliament desired to go further and enact that every share 
entitled to vote should be deprived of its special rights under the articles it should 
have said so in plain terms by making the vote on a poll one vote one share. Then, 
what about shares which had no voting rights under the articles? Should not 
Parliament give them a vote when considering this completely artificial form of 
ordinary resolution?... I only raise this purely hypothetical case to show the great 
difficulty of trying to do justice by legislation in a matter which has always been left 
to the corporators themselves to decide.477  
However, this does not clarify matters. If the evil was that companies were agreeing to 
include higher than 50 per cent requirements in voting to remove directors, then surely 
fettering a company's rights freely to choose this matter is precisely what Parliament was 
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trying to do. To avoid falling into such confusion, Lord Donovan took a different approach. 
He stated that, 
the issue here is the true construction of s184 of the Companies Act, 1948: and I 
approach it with no conception of what the legislature wanted to achieve by the 
section other than such as can reasonably be deduced from its language.478  
This is, clearly, a tacit repudiation of Upton’s reasoning. Lord Donovan continued: 
Those who drafted it and enacted it certainly would have included among their 
numbers many who were familiar with the phenomenon of articles of association 
carrying ‘weighted votes’. It must therefore have been plain at the outset that unless 
some special provision were made, the mere direction that an ordinary resolution 
would do in order to remove a director would leave the section at risk of being made 
inoperative in the way that has been done here. Yet no such provision was made, and 
in this Parliament followed its practice of leaving to companies and their 
shareholders liberty to allocate voting rights as they pleased. When, therefore, it is 
said that a decision in favour of the respondent in this case would defeat the purpose 
of the section and make a mockery of it, it is being assumed that Parliament intended 
to cover every possible case and block up every loophole. I see no warrant for any 
such assumption. A very large part of the relevant field is in fact covered and covered 
effectively. And there may be good reasons why Parliament should leave some 
companies with freedom of manoeuvre in this particular matter. There are many 
small companies which are conducted in practice as though they were little more than 
partnerships, particularly family companies running a family business; and it is, 
unfortunately, sometimes necessary to provide some safeguard against family 
quarrels having their repercussions in the boardroom.479  
Lord Donovan's reasoning too, is not persuasive. His argument is that, effectively, section 
184 did not exist to close off all loopholes, but instead to cover ‘a large part’ of the problem. 
If Parliament has identified a genuine evil (as Lord Upton appears to accept), it does not 
seem to follow automatically that they would have, without clarification or explanation, left 
such large loopholes which allowed the evil to be continued despite a mandatory protection 
to the contrary. However, it is of note that Lord Donovan highlights that requiring more than 
a bare majority for a vote in favour of a specific resolution to pass, it can be an important 
part of safeguarding the efficient running of the company. This line of analysis hints at the 
concept that the interests of the bare majority may not necessarily automatically align to the 
interests of the company, and their powers may at times have to be fettered in the interest of 
the company and/or the minority. However, Lord Donovan does not state this explicitly. 
Instead, despite his attempts to avoid the pitfalls in logic that he identified in Lord Upton’s 
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judgment, his analysis also falls for different but similar reasons. Prentice is highly critical 
of the decision, stating: 
By giving mandatory effect to this type of provision the Court of Appeal has reduced 
section 184 to an empty rhetorical gesture as the draftsman can entrench against 
alteration the article conferring the special rights with respect to section 184 
resolutions.480 
Indeed, the formulation set out by the House of Lords does not protect shareholders against 
what it is purportedly designed to do. Worse than this, they have confused the situation by 
allowing the conflation of different capacities within the company: rather than weighted 
voting attaching only to shares, different weighted voting could apply to the same shares 
held by different shareholders, depending on the non-shareholder roles they held within the 
company. 
When reviewing the decision, Scott J stated: 
There were shareholders who were not for the time being directors, and shareholders 
who were for the time being directors: the former had rights against the latter which 
the latter did not enjoy against the former. The two classes were identifiable not by 
reference to their respective ownership of particular shares, but by reference to the 
office held by the latter. But the rights of the former, and the obligations of the latter, 
required their respective ownership of shares in the company.481 
The only coherently reasoned speech provided in the House of Lords was that of Lord Morris 
of Borth-y-Gest objecting to the decision. His view was clear: the wording of the Act referred 
to an ‘ordinary’ resolution and overrode any provision to the contrary in the articles. 
Accordingly, any article of association purporting to require a special resolution would 
violate the 1948 Act. The main problem with the article, he opined, was that, 
its unconcealed effect is to make a director irremovable. If the question is posed 
whether the shares of the respondent possess any added voting weight the answer 
must be that they possess none whatsoever beyond, if valid, an ad hoc weight for the 
special purpose of circumventing section 184.  If article 9 were writ large it would 
set out that a director is not to be removed against his will and that in order to achieve 
this and to thwart the express provision of s184 the voting power of any director 
threatened with removal is to be deemed to be greater than it actually is. The learned 
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judge thought that to sanction this would be to make a mockery of the law. I think so 
also.482  
Lord Morris's formulation would undoubtedly resolve the ill that each member of the House 
of Lords highlighted, as only this way can the shareholders (or the majority of them) remove 
directors who they wish to. By rejecting this analysis, the House of Lords neutralised the 
value of the statutory regime in protecting against owner/manager agency costs, as managers 
are able to use weighted voting, together with otherwise miniscule shareholdings, to avoid 
the policy aim of the statutory regime. 
This regime, therefore, does not protect against the ill it was designed to protect against – 
owner/manager agency cost – and, in addition, actively exacerbates the concern of this 
thesis: majority/minority agency costs. It therefore not only fails to provide the intended 
benefit, it is actively harmful. 
The ability of shareholders to remove directors by way of ordinary resolution was retained 
in the Companies Act 1985.483 The 1985 Act went further, and provided increased protection 
for shareholders by the mandatory disqualification of directors,484 limitations on eligibility 
of directors,485 increased protections against directors taking financial advantage of their 
roles,486 including protection in respect of share dealings by directors,487 and mandatory 
shareholder involvement in granting loans to directors.488 The 1985 Act was implemented 
fifteen years after Bushell v Faith was decided. If legislators had disagreed with the House 
of Lords' interpretation of the statutory regime, they would, therefore, have had ample 
opportunity to remedy the provisions in the 1985 Act. They decided not to. Such a decision 
must have been a blessing stemming from the Bushell v Faith decision and its reasoning. 
The same can be said of the statutory restatement of substantially the same formulation in 
the Companies Act 2006.489 The restatement of the statutory test reflected agreement that 
shareholders could include weighted voting in their articles to remove directors. 
Accordingly, policy makers have twice rejected the option to reformulate the statutory 
provision to meet the policy aims assumed by Prentice. 
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This protection can be supplemented by provisions in the articles of association of the 
company entitling others to remove directors. Thus courts have upheld the ability in articles 
of association for certain categories of directors to remove certain other categories of 
directors,490 and to enable a requirement for the majority of directors to require the 
resignation of others.491 As these requirements come from the articles of association they are 
further evidence of the courts' approach that matters are for shareholders to include in their 
articles as they see fit.  
4.3.4. Conclusion 
The contradictory outcome of the judicial reasoning in Bushell v Faith, together with the 
retention of the statutory test in the 1985 and 2006 Acts, provides key insights into the 
statutory ability of shareholders to remove directors. The outcome of Bushell v Faith means 
that the regime does not achieve its goal of mitigating owner/manager agency costs – and in 
fact exacerbates minority/majority agency costs. There have been two opportunities to 
remedy the operation of this provision, and each has been avoided. As laudable as the aims 
of such a provision are for mitigation of owner/manager agency costs, its accepted operation 
does not match these aims and causes harm to the minority under the second exacerbation 
of indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in private companies. 
 
4.4. Overall Conclusion 
Our first exacerbation happened by accident: lawmakers shifted the division of powers 
between shareholders and directors to articles of association for misguided reasons. Courts 
have struggled ever since to square that circle: over time, their rhetoric has become even 
stronger against shareholders using this power, whilst ultimately deferring to the statutory 
position and allowing them to do so should they abide by the prescribed formalities.  
Our second exacerbation exists to solve a valid concern, but by its judicial operation does 
not do so. In other words, there is little historical reason why the first exacerbation proceeds 
on a default footing rather than a mandatory footing. The second exacerbation does not 
resolve the ill of owner/manager agency costs it intended to, but causes harm to the minority. 
In the next chapter we review the concept of majority rule generally, followed by the current 
rules and regimes in respect of our twin exacerbations to establish how they fit into the 
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current framework for private companies, and how the issue is approached elsewhere. 
Having identified them as comparative anomalies, Chapter 6 reviews whether the twin 
exacerbations are mitigated by other areas of company law, particularly directors' duties, 
shareholder voting limitations, or other minority protections. Having identified that they do 
not, Chapter 7 reviews a market response to the twin exacerbations, to establish whether they 
have been sufficiently mitigated by the market.   
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CHAPTER 5 
5. MAJORITY RULE AND THE CURRENT LAW OF THE TWIN 
EXACERBATIONS 
5.1. Introduction 
We have reviewed the historical development of company law generally (which reinforces 
our theoretical proposition that mandatory rules have been used when necessary to mitigate 
Costs) and the development of the twin exacerbations (which points to weaknesses in the 
historical development of both exacerbations). There is, however, one concept which 
underpins the twin exacerbations: the concept of majority rule. In the absence of majority 
rule there are limited circumstances in which the majority are able to exert sufficient pressure 
to create majority/minority agency costs. The twin exacerbations exist solely because 
majority decisions matter, and the interests of the majority may not align to the interests of 
other key corporate constituencies.  This chapter, therefore, reviews the theoretical 
justification for majority rule and the current framework in which it operates, compared to 
the Delaware and Australian positions. This chapter provides a review of the current regime 
governing each of the twin exacerbations. It also considers how such issues are dealt with in 
other jurisdictions. Having identified that the exacerbations are, to some extent, mitigated in 
other jurisdictions, we then explore whether different areas of company law provide 
adequate mitigation in the UK. 
5.2. Majority Rule 
5.2.1. Theory behind Majority Rule 
The foregoing analysis arises because company law enables majority rule.492 We have seen 
that historically, majority rule arose primarily as a result of necessity in larger companies 
such as the East India Company. Is there, however, a more theoretical justification for 
majority rule? It is noted above that Arrow states that decisions must be made by consensus 
or by the imposition of authority.493 However, he also conceded that: 
There are deep paradoxes connected with any form of consensus mechanism, such 
as majority rule, short of the situation where unanimity obtains,494 
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and even goes on to state: 
Majority rule is no model for organizations with functionally differentiated elements 
among its membership, such as firms or universities.495 
Why, then, do we allow majority rule to take place within companies? For Eisenberg, 
following the East India Company approach, majority rule is based on a practical 
consideration. He explains that unanimity may work in partnerships where it is possible to 
terminate the partnership and withdraw capital at any time, giving a natural limitation to the 
permanency of any failure to reach unanimous decision. However, the permanent nature of 
companies means that they go on forever. This means that a requirement for unanimity 
provides each shareholder with a veto that lasts forever, which is unhelpful when funds are 
trapped in the vehicle.496 Easterbrook and Fishel go further, describing any requirement for 
unanimity as creating the risk of ‘deadlock’ and ‘paralyzing the firm’.497 Berle & Means 
state: 
The disadvantages of the ‘liberum veto’ are too great to make unanimous actions 
practicable. The granting of control to a majority of stockholders has therefore been 
a natural and generally acceptable step.498 
The use of the phrase ‘liberum veto’ is particularly value laden – this was the term used to 
describe the ability of any member of the Sejm (or parliament) of the medieval state of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to veto legislation, which is alleged to have been the 
subject of capture by foreign powers (by way of bribery), and is held to be responsible for 
bringing down the state by forcing the country into paralysis.499 The use of this phrase, 
therefore, goes beyond the practicality arguments advanced by history, Eisenberg, 
Easterbrook, and Fishel, and hints at any requirement of unanimity enabling, ultimately, each 
minority shareholder to extract benefits for her agreement in return for her cooperation. This 
is a phenomenon known as the ‘hold out’, a typical example of which is a run-down 
apartment block which can be profitably developed if every apartment is bought. The owner 
of the last apartment is able to ‘hold out’ for more than her apartment is independently and 
objectively worth on the ground that it is worth more to the developer. Hold outs are 
economically inefficient, and are usually seen as rent-seeking behaviour.500 Accordingly, we 
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can develop the analysis from the ‘liberum veto’ to state that requiring unanimity in 
corporate action would ultimately enable each shareholder (even a shareholder who holds 
one of a million shares) to act as a hold out, which would be inefficient for the company as 
a whole. This is removed by allowing majority decision making, as then, if faced with a 
potential hold out, the majority can simply make up the numbers by obtaining the consent 
of the holder of another, fungible share. Cheffins agrees, stating: 
Furthermore, under a unanimity rule a shareholder who is otherwise indifferent to a 
change might well act in a strategic manner and withhold his consent so as to extract 
some extra benefit for himself.  Such an individual, by acting in this sort of 
opportunistic fashion, would potentially have considerable bargaining leverage and 
thus could make matters highly inconvenient for the investors who wanted to carry 
out changes that would benefit the company's members. Use of the voting 
mechanism alleviates such problems substantially.501 
In other words, majority decision making removes the potential for opportunism (ie, hold-
out behaviour) from the minority. Berle & Means go further, to state: 
A large group of individuals cannot combine their capital effectively in a single 
enterprise without a loss of control by some members of the group. Clearly it would 
not be possible for each member to exercise the major elements of control over the 
enterprise.502 
This provides a further rationale for majority rule. If the shareholders of the company require 
unanimity to act, it becomes more difficult for the shareholders to act effectively. In the 
context of agency costs, this would mean that it would be more difficult for the shareholders 
to act collectively to hold delinquent managers to account. By making it easier for 
shareholders as a constituency to act, majority rule makes it easier for shareholders to act to 
hold managers to account, which has the effect of reducing owner/manager agency costs. An 
analogy can be borrowed from labour law theory – the traditional rationale for trade 
unionism is that capital is automatically collectivised, whereas labour is disbursed, so 
enabling collectivisation of labour-enabled labour to centralise their power and so equalise 
the bargaining position between labour and capital.503  This analogy applies to shareholders 
and directors: directors are naturally more collectivised as the circumstances in which they 
are able to act are clearer and, generally, they hold more regular meetings.504 Allowing 
majority rule enables potentially disparate shareholders to collectivise and thus re-balance 
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power relations between shareholders and directors. Accordingly, in addition to majority 
rule preventing oppression by the minority, it enables shareholders as a whole to act to 
further reduce owner/manager agency costs. 
For all the benefits (including to the shareholders as a whole) of majority power, majority 
rule does expose the minority to opportunistic activity by the majority. Berle and Means do 
not consider this important, however, and argue: 
Presumably too many if not most of the interests of a minority owner run parallel to 
those of the controlling majority and are in the main protected by the self-interest of 
the latter. So far as such interests of the minority are concerned, the loss of control is 
not serious. Only when the interests of majority and minority are in a measure 
opposed and the interests of the latter are not protected by enforceable law are the 
minority holders likely to suffer. This, however, is a risk which the minority must 
run; and since it is an inevitable counterpart of group exercise, the problems growing 
out of it, though they may be the most acute in isolated cases, have not taken on 
major social significance.505 
Accordingly, Berle and Means consider that issues for the minority arising from majority 
rule are rare as the interests of the majority and the minority are in the main aligned, and if 
they are not, then the minority will be protected by law. If they are not, then this is just a side 
effect of being a minority shareholder. Easterbrook and Fishel disagree, stating that 
the issue is difficult because any constraint on the minority's veto power increases 
the probability that the majority will be able to exploit the minority notwithstanding 
the minority's bargained-for protection. One guide is whether the decision at issue 
might have a disproportionate effect on the minority.506 
In other words, Easterbrook and Fishel argue in favour of legal protection for the minority. 
Cheffins agrees, stating that 
the voting mechanism  [ie, majority voting] has defects and these might provide a 
justification for legal regulation concerning the matters on which shareholders 
vote.507 
In conclusion, majority voting is a method of protecting against minority hold out and 
enabling shareholders to exercise self-help remedies to protect against owner/manager 
agency costs. However, like a number of features that we have seen, attempts to remedy 
some agency costs/externalities can displace those costs to others rather than fully resolve 
                                                     
505 Berle and Means, Corporation and Private Property 67. 
506 Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure 248. 
507 Cheffins, Theory, Structure and Operations  68–69. 
118 
 
them.  The use of majority rule generally does this and enables the twin exacerbations to 
occur. It is noteworthy that Cheffins and Easterbrook and Fischel agree that the excesses of 
majority rule should be mitigated by law. So, in a less direct way, do Berle and Means, with 
the proviso that the issue to be mitigated must be significant. 
5.2.2. Majority Rule in action 
The majority rule is enshrined in UK company law. There are no mandatory or default rules 
requiring unanimity. The Companies Act provides for ordinary resolutions (passed on a 
50%+1 majority) and special resolutions (passed on a 75% majority).508 Whilst some 
provisions of the Companies Act mandate special resolutions,509 the general position is that 
unless otherwise stipulated, an ordinary resolution of shareholders will suffice.510 The 
Companies Act 2006 includes provisions which enable certain articles of association to be 
‘entrenched’.511 This means that they require more than 75 per cent of shareholders to agree 
to the amendment of such an article. In theory, this would enable the protection of minority 
shareholders from the potential abuses of majority power. Unfortunately, however, 
entrenchment does not provide the automatic comfort that potentially can. This is because 
its use is nowhere mandated – entrenchment of articles only occurs on incorporation or by 
unanimous agreement of the shareholders.512 In other words, protections can only be 
provided by way of entrenchment if the entrenchment is agreed to by all shareholders. In 
order to provide protection by this route, it is necessary for the majority to agree, in effect, 
to alienate their rights. This is a structural flaw in the ability for this route automatically to 
provide minority protection. However, it does open the possibility of market participants 
voluntarily utilising the technique to resolve the twin exacerbations. This is explored in 
Chapter 7. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether it is advantageous to make mandatory entrenchment easier 
or more widespread as to do so would risk increasing the costs which theorists have 
identified as justification for the existence of majority rule. It therefore may be advantageous 
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to maintain entrenchment with its current limitations. But how is this topic approached in 
other jurisdictions? 
Australian law has a system similar to that of the UK, in that decisions are made by either 
majority or super-majority by way of the ordinary and special resolution, respectively.513 
Australian law allows private companies to pass resolutions without the need for a 
shareholder meeting if all members of the company agree to the resolution.514 However, this 
is a permissive regime which allows the formalities of meetings required for majority 
decision making to be circumvented. Unanimity is, therefore, not required in any given 
situation. This leaves the minority in substantially the same position as under UK law – it is 
possible for them to be included in decision making, but it is not required unless the majority 
agree to it. Under UK law, majority approval for mandated minority inclusion in decision 
making can be formalised in the articles of association if unanimously agreed, whereas in 
Australia this is not possible. 
In Delaware, the general position is that for everything other than appointment of directors, 
a majority of shareholders will decide every act on behalf of the stockholders, and subject to 
the bye-laws.515  Directors are elected by a plurality of votes,516 which means that a director 
is appointed if she receives only one vote from the stockholders517– again subject to the bye-
laws. The bye-laws of a company can be amended in line with the previous provisions, 
meaning that it is possible for a majority to amend the bye-laws to introduce higher 
thresholds. Whilst this is more helpful to a minority than the UK's requirement of unanimity 
for entrenchment, this mechanism is also of limited use to the minority as, by definition, it 
requires the majority to vote in favour of it. However, Delaware does provide a further 
benefit to the minority – controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the minority.518 
This provides a method for Delaware law to more adequately mitigate the twin 
exacerbations. However, two issues arise: First, there are questions of degree. This duty only 
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applies to action, as opposed to inaction, by shareholders.519 Further, the majority are not 
excluded from voting in their own self-interest.520 As a result, there has been significant case 
law to determine the precise extent of this fiduciary duty. If the UK currently lacks such an 
obligation (see Chapter 6 for further discussion) its introduction would result in a potentially 
uncertain, and therefore litigious, situation until the courts established its parameters. 
Second, whilst this may resolve direct manifestations of majority/minority agency costs, it 
does not resolve indirect manifestations: controlling shareholders are limited from harming 
the minority directly, but the triangulation of the twin exacerbations is not fully resolved as 
directors may act in a certain way to avoid the majority exercising their rights.   
Accordingly the issues identified with majority rule remain valid in the UK, which means 
that the principles underlying the twin exacerbations remain valid as well. Neither Australia 
nor Delaware adequately remedies these issues for the minority. 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, evidence that the theoretical principles underpinning 
the twin exacerbations are valid, does not automatically equate to the twin exacerbations 
themselves being relevant. We therefore review the law of the twin exacerbations to establish 
whether they remain a concern under the current framework. 
 
5.3. The Division between Shareholders and Directors under UK law 
5.3.1. Current Legal Framework for the Division between 
Shareholders and Directors 
We have seen that the Companies Act 1985 retained the concept of the division between 
shareholders and directors as a matter for the articles, and in its default articles introduced 
the concept of special resolutions directing the actions of directors. The precise formulation 
was: 
Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any 
directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company.521 
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The framework under the Companies Act 2006 for the division between shareholders and 
directors remains substantially as it was under the Companies Act 1985. Thus the division 
is not referred to in the Act itself at all, but is left to the company's articles of association. 
The White Paper which introduced the Model Articles stated that, ‘the Government believes 
that it is worth setting out in the articles the breadth of directors' general authority as agents 
of the company’.522 This 'general' authority, however, remains a default rule. Article 3 of the 
Model Articles provides a clear statement that: 
Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the 
company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the 
company.523 
However, article 4 of the Model Articles provides that, ‘the shareholders may, by special 
resolution, direct the directors to take, or refrain from taking, specified action’.524 
The current default formulation therefore substantively follows the formulation in the 1985 
Act: the directors manage the business unless the articles or a shareholder resolution provides 
otherwise. However, there are three areas in which the modern default formulation has 
changed from default formulation in the 1985 Act.525 First, the modern default formulation 
provides that directors bear responsibility for the management of the company. This clearly 
means that the directors bear blame in respect of a failure of the company’s management. 
This is no more than a restatement of the legal position and its only function in the default 
articles of association appears to be to provide a link to the second reason: that the exercise 
of the powers of the company is necessarily linked to responsibility for the management of 
the company's business. It is helpful to set out the link between the powers and duties that 
directors have. However, it exposes the issues with the regime. We have seen that, in the 
form of joint stock companies before to 1844, directors were viewed as the trustees of the 
company.526 Trustees owe certain duties to their beneficiaries. It has been held that directors 
have a dual role in respect of the company – as agents and as trustees. In each capacity they 
owe duties to the company.527 Lindley MR has stated: 
Although directors are not properly speaking trustees, yet they have always been 
considered and treated as trustees of money which comes to their hands or which is 
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actually under their control; and ever since joint stock companies were invented 
directors have been held liable to make good moneys which they have misapplied 
upon the same footing as if they were trustees . . .528 
Since the early twentieth century it has been acknowledged that directors are not trustees, 
but are directly analogous to trustees.529 As a result, directors owe duties to the company. 
These duties are discussed further in the next chapter but apply automatically to directors by 
virtue of their positions as directors of the company, not because they are directors who also 
manage the company.530 Indeed, directors have been held liable for breaches even when they 
were not responsible for the relevant action.531 The formulation in the model articles links 
powers to responsibility. But this is only correct if the powers sit with the directors. 
Theoretically, the link between powers and responsibilities is very strong, but that advances 
the argument that there is a problem with the regime. Within the category of ‘directors’ it is 
acknowledged that there is a difference in the extent of responsibility borne by executive 
directors and non-executive directors.532 However, this only applies within the corporate 
constituency of ‘directors’ – the extent of directors' duties is fundamentally linked to their 
roles and powers.533 There is no scope for this to switch between ‘directors’ and 
‘shareholders’ such that a shareholder (who is not a shadow director534) assumes 
responsibility for being active in the business. Consequently, linking directors' duties to the 
level of their individual responsibility is logical, but linking the powers of the directors as a 
constituency to the responsibilities of the directors as a constituency, does not appear to be 
– if directors are able to exercise the powers of the company because they as a constituency 
have duties, why should the shareholders be able to exercise the powers of the company 
when they do not have corresponding duties? In other words, we see a strong argument for 
a fixed link between power and responsibility. In the UK, responsibilities between corporate 
constituents are fixed (only directors owe duties – this is discussed more fully in Chapter 6). 
Whilst the flexibility of responsibilities intra-constituency means that duties can be open-
textured and mapped onto specific circumstances,535 this does not apply inter-constituency: 
this would only be logical if such duties could be owed by different constituencies in 
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appropriate circumstances.  If responsibilities are fixed, and the link between powers and 
responsibilities should be fixed, it is unclear why powers should be variable. 
The third element in the modern test is the clarification that shareholders can direct action to 
be taken or not taken by directors. This raises the same issues we saw under the Companies 
Act 1985 – it is possible for the shareholders to mandate a transaction which is not in the 
interests of the company. The division of powers between the shareholders and directors was 
not within the scope of the UK review which preceded the Companies Act 2006.536 
This framework does not interact comfortably with other areas of company law. We have 
seen that third parties are protected when transacting with the company through its directors, 
but it is unclear how a third party would contract (or be deemed to contract) with a company 
acting through its shareholders. 
5.3.2. Comparative Approaches to the Division between 
Shareholders and Directors 
How does this position compare with other key jurisdictions? We consider the positions 
taken in the US, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia. Every US state other than Missouri, 
provides by statute that powers sit with the board of directors.537 Delaware is the state most 
commonly used for incorporation.538 Its relevant statutory provision states that: 
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.539 
This position has enabled a US court (admittedly a New York court) to state unequivocally 
that: 
In corporate bodies, the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important 
sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke 
those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being received by the state in 
the act of incorporation.540 
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Accordingly, the US position generally avoids this exacerbation of the agency cost. This 
enables Bainbridge to state: 
Corporation law virtually carves the separation of ownership and control into stone. 
Under all corporation statutes, the key players in the formal decision-making 
structure are the members of the board of directors who are empowered to make or 
delegate to employees most decisions affecting the business and affairs of the 
corporation. Shareholders have essentially no power to initiate corporation action 
and, indeed, are entitled to approve or disapprove only a very few board actions.541 
Separation of ownership and control has, generally, been seen in corporate law theory as 
unfortunate.542 However, the analysis underpinning this is that the separation occurs with 
centralised management on one ‘side’ and diverse, small, un-coordinated shareholders on 
the other.543 Thus, the issue with separation of ownership and control becomes one of 
shareholders' lack of ability to act on the (limited) remedies available to them, in that it is 
more difficult for them to act collectively– the same issue which underpins majority decision 
making. Bainbridge's argument is simple but compelling – so long as the ‘ends’ of corporate 
governance remain shareholder primacy and there are adequate remedies against rogue 
directors, there can be no disadvantage to leaving the ‘means’ of corporate governance 
exclusively to the directors.544 This is why so much of corporate law restricts and regulates 
the activities of management. We can gain an additional gloss on the analysis by factoring 
in the agency cost analysis above. As in private companies, there is a greater risk of majority 
interests generating agency costs than director  interests. In the case of private companies, a 
distance between ownership and control can in fact act to mitigate agency costs rather than, 
as per conventional wisdom, exacerbate them. This explains the reference to the powers of 
directors being beneficial for the minority in Salmon v Quin and Automatic Self Cleansing. 
Delaware law does, however, allow for opting out of this framework. If a corporation is a 
‘close corporation’,545 the shareholders are able to pass a resolution to restrict the powers of 
directors: 
The effect of any such agreement shall be to relieve the directors and impose upon 
the stockholders who are parties to the agreement the liability for managerial acts or 
omissions which is imposed on directors to the extent and so long as the discretion 
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or powers of the board in its management of corporate affairs is controlled by such 
agreement.546 
In other words, stockholders are entitled to exercise management of the corporation, but if 
they do, 
…the stockholders of the corporation shall be deemed to be directors for purposes of 
applying provisions of this chapter; and 
the stockholders of the corporation shall be subject to all liabilities of directors.547 
It is possible, therefore, under Delaware law, for the shareholders of a close company to 
allocate management powers in respect of their company to themselves rather than to the 
directors. Should they do so, however, they will have the same duties as directors would 
have had if the right had not been exercised. It should be noted that this differs from fiduciary 
duties which already apply to controlling shareholders in their capacity as shareholders – 
instead, in such circumstances, the duties which directors owe ‘switch’ to be owed by 
shareholders. This is a more logical linkage of responsibility to duties across corporate 
constituencies than we find under UK law, but it remains flawed. Is the transformation 
between the two an automatic switch if stockholders undertake any activity, or is it assessed 
on a sliding scale? Does only the formal passing of the resolution trigger the duties 
switching, or would a threat to pass a resolution (and thus require directors to act in a certain 
way) also result in the switch? This lack of clarity can be avoided by abolishing shareholders’ 
rights to make such switch. 
Australia also provides for the statutory provision of powers.548 For private companies, this 
rule is termed a ‘replaceable rule’549 or a default rule.550 This means that, in substance, the 
position is very similar to the UK and for Delaware close corporations: the shareholders can 
opt out of the default position. It is merely that the default position in Australia and Delaware 
is statutory, whereas the default position in the UK is contained in the Model Articles. 
Directors' duties apply in Australia even if this rule is replaced,551 which does not seem to 
improve on the UK position. Why not either adopt the Delaware position or bar shareholders 
from exercising such rights? 
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It is tempting to consider the above analysis irrelevant on the ground that in these 
jurisdictions the source directors’ power differs from the UK source, and they, therefore, are 
of limited value to the UK framework. However, there are two jurisdictions which have 
moved away from the ‘UK-style’ constitutional-style powers: Malaysia and New Zealand.  
In 2016 the new Malaysian statute replaced the UK-style statutory default rules – the 
Malaysian equivalent of the Model Articles were placed in statute as default rules rather than 
stand-alone default rules.552 No reasons were given for the shift, but Salim and Leonard 
suggest three key potential reasons for such a move. 
1. Firstly, the incorporation procedure is simplified: ‘especially for private 
companies without a need for detailed tailor-made internal rules to govern the 
relationship among the company and its internal participants, i.e. the 
shareholders and directors’;553 
2. Secondly, the default rules apply but give sufficient flexibility for those who 
value an alternative approach to modify the rules for their specific needs; and 
3. Thirdly, any changes to the law will automatically update the articles of a 
company which adopts this approach.554 
This approach does not, however, prevent the exacerbation of the indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs, as the shareholders could simply resolve to opt out of the 
provision. A similar position arises in New Zealand, which enacted a new company law 
regime in 1993 following a New Zealand Law Commission report in 1989. The New Zealand 
Law Commission was highly critical of the existing UK-style framework, stating that: 
As the statutory platform for identification of allocation of responsibility and duties 
within the company, it is entirely unsatisfactory. It does not assist in making the 
obligations in a particular context easy to understand. It creates the fiction of a 
contractual regime which is then overlaid by statutory provisions which impose 
obligations and powers outside the ‘contract’, including the power to alter the 
contract without the consent of all.555 
For the New Zealand Law Commission, the problem was that the corporate contract can be 
changed without the consent of all. It is conceivable that the ‘all’ the Commission had in 
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mind was all corporate participants – all directors and all shareholders. However, for our 
purposes, it could also be read as a risk that the majority is able amend the contract (in the 
UK, by way of special resolution) without the minority agreeing. The New Zealand Law 
Commission went on to state: 
[The relevant section] descends directly from the United Kingdom Act of 1856. It 
marked the transition between the old deed of settlement constitution and the modern 
constitution based on memorandum and articles. In its present form, [the relevant 
section] is an anachronism which is misleading. Through the popularity of Table A 
articles (the standard articles contained in the 1955 Act), powers of management are 
usually conferred upon directors. The Law Commission believes that the 
intelligibility of company law would be greatly assisted by the adoption of the Table 
A standard provision as a statutory presumption. Director management would 
therefore be conferred by statute directly, except where the constitution makes 
express provision for another arrangement.556 
This approach is, however, unclear: why should the shareholders be authorised to rebut this 
presumption? This is especially unclear when we examine the Law Commission's approach 
to whether shareholders should, unanimously, be entitled to exercise all powers of the 
company regardless of its constitution: 
We have concluded that an explicit power in these terms is generally undesirable as 
cutting across the allocation of power in the constitution. The interests of 
shareholders and the company do not entirely coincide. The system of the draft Act 
for protection of creditors by imposing duties on directors could be undermined by a 
general power in the shareholders to exercise the directors' powers.557 
The New Zealand Law Commission resolved this slight tension in the same manner as 
Delaware close corporations –its Draft Act provided that if the shareholders took on 
management of the company, directors' duties would be imposed upon them.558 Indeed, it 
expanded its analysis to be more nuanced than the Delaware position: 
The greater the role for the general meeting in management of the company, the 
greater the need to develop a concept of a fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the 
minority. This is a developing area of law which, carried too far, may undermine the 
concept of the share as property and may make company decision-making and 
enforcement of obligation procedurally complex. (As L S Sealy has pointed out, 
assessing the good faith of a board of directors is one thing; assessing the good faith 
of a majority of shareholders, perhaps running into the hundreds, is quite another 
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thing. (LS Sealy ‘Directors' “Wider” Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, 
Practical and Procedural’ (1987) 13 MULR 164.)559 
The Law Commission's approach was adopted in 1993,560 without discussion as to why such 
flexibility was needed. It would be better to avoid the need to introduce the concepts of 
shareholder responsibility and fiduciary duties, and use the division of power between 
shareholders and directors as mandatory. 
Different jurisdictions adopt different approaches to the division of power between 
shareholders and directors. Delaware holds firmly to the concept of statute allocating 
responsibility between the shareholders and the directors, although this can be rebutted in 
close companies. Australia and Malaysia have adopted a position which is an improvement 
in form on the UK position, in that the division is in statute rather than the company’s 
constitution, but in substance it remains subject to the same weaknesses as the UK provision. 
New Zealand has the same issues, but (as with Delaware close companies) provides for the 
equivalent of directors' duties to apply to shareholders if shareholders opt out of the default 
position. However, the ambit of this is unclear and potentially difficult, and open to academic 
questioning. It is easy to envisage issues caused by the unnecessary complication arising 
from duties being owed by shareholders rather than by directors, if part of management is 
undertaken by shareholders. Especially in the triangulated case of an indirect manifestation 
of majority/minority agency costs, there is a risk of a lacuna being created in terms of which 
liability is disputed by both the majority (on the ground that they took no direct action) and 
directors (on the ground that their discretion was removed). It seems that (unlike the 
Australian or the Malaysian positions) the US position, for all but close companies, resolves 
concerns arising in respect of the UK position. Indeed, it reverts to a pre-1856 UK position, 
without introducing the conceptual difficulties which have been introduced by the New 
Zealand and Delaware close company positions. 
5.4. The Ability of Shareholders to Remove Directors 
5.4.1. Current Legal Framework for the Ability for Shareholders to 
Remove Directors 
The second exacerbation remains on a statutory footing. Section 168(1) of the Companies 
Act 2006 states that:  
                                                     
559 ibid para 210. 
560 Companies Act 1993 (New Zealand) s 128. 
129 
 
A company may by ordinary resolution at a meeting remove a director before the 
expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in any agreement 
between it and him.561 
The previous statutory formulation has been held to be a mandatory rule, and so cannot be 
opted-out of in the company's constitution,562 although we have seen that it can be watered 
down to a point at which it becomes virtually meaningless. Keay shows that the statutory 
procedure was used to remove Maurice Saatchi as a director of Saatchi and Saatchi plc.563 
Nonetheless, he concludes that this is a cumbersome process564: special notice needs to be 
given to directors,565 any such resolution must be passed by meeting rather than written 
resolution,566 and the director has a right to protest against her removal at the meeting.567 In 
private companies, this is a bespoke formulation which varies from the usual resolution 
mechanic, although it is used if the shareholders propose to remove auditors.568 A larger 
issue, however, is that exercise of the right to remove a director does not extinguish the 
director’s right to compensation for termination.569 This could be a significant amount570 but 
for the statutory restrictions that have developed in this area. Thus, long-term contracts need 
to be approved by the shareholders,571 as do payments in respect of loss of office (other than 
for breach of contract).572 In addition to the possibility of weighted voted neutralising this 
right, additional procedural and economic hurdles further reduce the utility of the provision 
in lowering owner/manager agency costs, whilst the threat of initiating such action 
exacerbates indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs. Removal of a director 
in a close company by the statutory method may, in addition, be a ground for the removed 
director to petition the court to wind up the company.573 
We have seen that the statutory regime can be supplemented by additional powers in the 
company’s articles of association to remove directors. Interestingly, when proposing the 
model articles, the government stated that it ‘has decided to include the notion of failure to 
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attend meetings in the more general provision under which appointment terminates when all 
the other directors decide that a director should be removed from office.’574 However, no 
such provision was actually included in the Model Articles. 
The statutory position, therefore, perpetuates the flaws existing since Bushell v Faith: its 
utility in providing shareholders its efficacy in resolving owner/manager costs is limited, but 
it exacerbates indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in private 
companies. 
5.4.2. Comparative Approaches to Shareholders' Ability to Remove 
Directors 
The general rule in the US is that shareholders are entitled to remove directors; however 
there are limitations to this in most states.575 Delaware provides that, on initial incorporation 
or at any time thereafter by bye-law, the directors can be constituted as a ‘staggered 
board’.576 This splits the directors into three categories and requires each category of director 
to retire (but remain eligible for re-election) every three years on a staggered basis. If the 
board is so staggered, directors can only be removed at the end of their term of office or ‘for 
cause’.577 Staggered boards are commonly used as a defence against an hostile takeover, and 
so are popular.578 The courts have clarified that, in the absence of a staggered board, it is not 
open to a company to opt out of the ability to remove directors without cause.579 Nonetheless, 
under US law it is open to a company to prevent the removal of directors without reason 
through the staggered board. This, coupled with fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders 
and a switch of directors' duties to shareholders should they act on behalf of the company, 
provide mitigation for this exacerbation. 
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In Australia, the Corporations Act provides that a non-public company has a replaceable rule 
that its shareholders may remove a director from office.580 Two years after the adoption of 
the Act it was stated that: 
Surprisingly, there is a paucity of discussion as to the mechanics in place under the 
Corporations Act 2001… to remove a director of a company before the expiration of 
his or her term of office.581 
For public companies, this changed with a high profile case in 2004 which allowed the use 
of the statutory regime to remove Catherine Walter, a director of the National Australia 
Bank.582 The regime for public and private companies differs in Australia, and the literature 
generated by the case generally is limited to the public framework. However, the case has 
generated more current discussion of the theoretical basis for shareholders' right to remove 
directors than exists under UK law generally.583 Thus it was stated: 
Day-to-day affairs are the responsibility of the company's management who are 
guided and monitored by the board of directors. Shareholders can only make 
decisions by resolution in a general meeting on a limited range of issues, such as: 
appointment or removal of directors.584 
For Darvis, the ability to remove directors is important because shareholders are excluded 
from management. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development also 
includes the ability to remove directors as a fundamental right that the shareholders should 
have.585 Conversely, it has been argued that whilst shareholders should have the right to 
change the board as a whole when faced with the company underperforming, this does not 
mean that they are the best placed to deal with individual underperformance. Indeed, it may 
be that the reasons for that underperformance should not be made public, and shareholders 
‘can't see inside the boardroom and they can't judge the performance of individual 
directors.’586  
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New Zealand used to only allow shareholders of public companies to remove directors. 
However, the Law Commission Report stated of the carve-out of private companies from 
this regime: 
That seems an undesirable exemption and the Law Commission does not propose to 
continue it. It will, of course, be open to all companies to structure their voting 
arrangements to achieve director entrenchment, where that is appropriate to the 
circumstances of a closely held company.587 
This has now been placed on a statutory footing in New Zealand.588 The right of shareholders 
to remove underperforming directors would appear to be a more important right for 
shareholders than their ability to assume the management functions of the company. It 
should be possible for this right, in some form, to exist in a manner which does not generate 
the second exacerbation of majority/minority agency costs. However, no jurisdiction, other 
than Delaware, has managed to achieve this. 
5.5. Conclusion 
Majority rule provides a means for mitigating owner/manager agency costs. However, its 
operation can displace these costs to majority/minority agency costs. The principles 
underpinning the twin exacerbations remain relevant under both the current UK framework 
and Australian law. Delaware provides some mitigation by requiring shareholder fiduciary 
duties, but establishing the scope of these duties took considerable litigation. 
In this chapter we have reviewed the current UK approach to the twin exacerbations. We 
have also examined comparative approaches. When it comes to the division of 
responsibilities, Delaware resolves the exacerbation but Australia, New Zealand, and 
Malaysia do not. When it comes to removal of directors, New Zealand and Australia have 
default rules which can be displaced, whereas Delaware has a more advanced structure 
which has the effect of resolving the exacerbation. However, this is a more difficult 
exacerbation to resolve as it does itself exist to resolve a key risk to shareholders. 
As the exacerbations remain prima facie unresolved, we need to establish whether they have 
not perhaps been resolved by other means. Is it possible that there are other provisions of 
UK company law which mitigate the exacerbations? Thus, in Chapter 6 we review four 
potential mitigants: directors' duties; obligations on shareholders when voting; other 
minority remedies; and potential soft-law remedies. Even if there are no legal mitigants, it 
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is possible that market practice has had the effect of mitigating the twin exacerbations. This 
is explored in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. POTENTIAL LEGAL MITIGATIONS TO THE TWIN EXACERBATIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
We have seen that both the twin exacerbations remain an active risk for the minority in the 
UK. It may be, however, that other areas of company law provide adequate mitigations of 
the twin exacerbations. If another area of law adequately mitigates them, there is no problem. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to establish whether other areas of UK company 
law can be said adequately to mitigate the twin exacerbations. 
Underpinning our analysis so far, and the presence of both twin exacerbations, is that 
shareholder interests are not uniform: the interests of majority shareholders may diverge 
from the interests of the minority, and directors may act only to satisfy the majority. Without 
such a risk there would be no potential for either of the exacerbations, which only exist 
because the majority's interest does not always align to the interests of the minority, and the 
directors can be obliged to further only such majority interests or risk losing their powers or 
position. If the directors are able to ignore what they perceive as the wish of the majority, 
the problem is resolved. No agency cost is generated if the majority has to exercise all and 
any of their rights in a manner which is consistent with the interests of the minority (each as 
is the case in Delaware). Similarly, if the majority must consider the interests of the minority 
when deciding whether to remove directors, the indirect manifestation is mitigated. In such 
situations, directors would either be obliged to act in a manner which takes the interests of 
the minority into account, or to know that an element of objectivity would be required of 
majority shareholders in exercising their rights. This means that the directors would be less 
able or likely to feel the need to exercise their discretion in a manner which they regard as 
meeting the subjective needs of the majority shareholder to the exclusion of the minority. In 
other words, if the directors are required to consider the interests of the minority, or if the 
majority shareholders in their capacity as such, are obliged to consider the minority when 
making decisions, the exacerbations are mitigated.  The latter issue can be divided into two 
questions. First, what obligations rest on shareholders when exercising their votes in such 
capacity? Second, what protections exist for the minority in respect of the abuse of power 
by the majority? Accordingly, in this chapter we explore possible mitigants to the twin 
exacerbations under UK company law. These are: duties of directors; voting obligations of 
shareholders; other protections that the minority enjoy; and whether there are any other ‘soft-
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law’ tools which may potentially resolve the twin exacerbations. If any of these mitigate the 
twin exacerbations under UK law, then the matter can be considered resolved. 
6.2. Possible Legal Mitigant: Directors' Duties 
6.2.1. Introduction 
If directors are required or permitted to ignore the wishes of the majority which do not align 
to the interests of the minority, part of our exacerbations of indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs will be mitigated. We therefore consider whether any 
protection exists in the face of directors’ duties. We have seen that directors' duties originated 
in the law of trusts. Directors' duties have been codified in the Companies Act 2006,589 but 
with the caveat that they be interpreted with reference to existing case law.590 We therefore 
examine to whom these duties are owed, the details of such duties, and the nature of such 
duties, in order to establish whether they adequately mitigate the twin exacerbations. If 
directors duties' enable them to ignore the majority, this would act to mitigate indirect 
manifestations of majority/minority agency costs. 
6.2.2. To Whom Owed 
As we have seen, the general position under UK company law has long been that the duties 
owed by directors are owed to the company as a whole rather than any individual or specific 
shareholder. The case of Percival v Wright591 involved directors who were approached by 
shareholders to purchase their shares at a time when the directors knew that an offer for the 
company was imminent which valued the shares at considerably more than the shareholders 
were asking. It was held that the directors owed no duties to any individual shareholder. This 
has been held to be the case even where the company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
another company, despite the shareholder in question holding all the shares in the 
company.592 In addition, courts have held that (outside insolvency) directors owe no specific 
duties to individual creditors.593 This is now provided for by statute: a director owes duties 
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to the company.594  If ‘the company’ is interpreted in a manner which protects the minority, 
then the twin exacerbations could be said to have been mitigated. 
Historically, the interests of the company have been interpreted as the interests of the 
shareholders, present and future, with actions of directors only being valid if they purported 
to advance the long-term shareholder value of the company.595 The Company Law Review 
decided that, whilst there was limited demand to move to a full ‘stakeholder’ approach in 
company law, there was sufficient demand to adopt an ‘enlightened shareholder value 
approach’.596 Thus the current formulation provides that the success of the company is the 
success for the members as a whole, having regard to certain third parties (such as 
employees, suppliers, the environment, and the community) and the need to act fairly as 
between members of the company.597 This formulation is not clear: it has been argued that 
reference to ‘have regard to’ means that the list of considerations in section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006, are actually a sub-set of the general approach of the members as a 
whole – they are means to create shareholder value rather than objectives in their own 
right.598 In addition, stakeholders have no rights under the formulation; there is merely a 
duty on the directors to consider these interests.599 Indeed, if directors fail to consider the 
interests of these stakeholders then the only parties with any recourse would be the other 
directors (on behalf of the company) or the members (by way of derivative action).600 This 
means that the directors as a whole are incentivised to ensure that the shareholders as a whole 
are provided with the best possible outcome to avoid them feeling dissatisfied and launching 
an action.601  By referring to all shareholders, the ‘minority’ is ostensibly included in the 
formulation. The only constituency able to ratify a breach of duties by the directors, is the 
shareholders at any given time by ordinary resolution.602 This provision excludes the vote of 
the affected director.603 It therefore resolves a direct director/shareholder agency cost: the 
former are excluded from casting their votes as shareholders to correct their own wrongs. 
However, it undermines this concept's ability to resolve any indirect manifestation and so 
does not mitigate the twin exacerbations: majority shareholders in whose interests directors 
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have acted are still able to vote to ratify decisions made by the directors against the interests 
of the minority. Indeed, it further empowers the majority, who may be able to use a 
requirement (or an alleged requirement) to ratify, against a director to require their interests 
to be furthered. As a result, the operation of directors' duties being owed to the company is 
subject to majority capture, neutralising its ability to resolve the twin exacerbations. 
6.2.3. Duties 
The Companies Act 2006 places several duties on directors. Noting the general issue of to 
whom the duties are owed, we review the detail of the duties to establish whether they may 
provide any mitigation against the twin exacerbations. It may be that, notwithstanding this 
general issue, the substance of duties provides some protection for the minority. The key 
duties of directors are to act within their powers, to promote the success of the company, to 
exercise independent judgement, to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence, and the 
duty to avoid conflicts of interest.604 We consider these in turn. 
(a) Duty to Act Within Powers 
It has long been a rule of UK company law that directors have duties to 
ensure that the company acts within its powers, and to ensure that its 
actions are intra vires.605 Consequently, directors who paid dividends when 
not able to do so under the company's articles, where held to have breached 
their duty to the company and found personally liable to the company for 
the value of such dividends.606  This duty has been extended – in addition 
to acting within the powers of the company, the directors are under a duty 
to use their powers for a proper purpose. The definition of ‘proper purpose’ 
has been widely drawn,607 such that issuing shares to a minority 
shareholder to flood out a majority has not been held to be an improper 
purpose.608 These duties have been put on a statutory footing in the 
Companies Act 2006.609 Now, directors have a duty to act within the 
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company's constitution610 and to exercise their powers only for the 
purposes for which they are conferred under the constitution.611 Generally, 
what constitutes an improper purpose is defined by reference to the articles 
of association of the company.612 This raises an issue for the twin 
exacerbations when coupled with the framework in which the division of 
power between shareholders and directors operates. Thus, if the majority 
have amended the articles of association to divert power to themselves, or 
have given a direction to the directors by way of special resolution under 
the Model Articles to mandate a certain course of action,613 the directors 
are bound to perform that transaction at risk of breach of this duty (which 
could, in turn, only be ratified by the majority). In other words, rather than 
mitigating the exacerbations, the duty on directors to act within the 
company's constitution (when coupled with the legal framework) further 
exacerbates them: it ties the hands of directors to act within the 
constitution, which is, in turn, controlled by the majority. 
(b) Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
We have seen the definition of the success of the company as a whole 
provides no comfort for the relevant stakeholders or the minority but in fact 
empowers the majority. Nevertheless, there is a statutory duty to act in the 
best interests of be company under this formulation.614 This duty has been 
described as ‘the most basic of the duties of good faith or fidelity owed by 
directors. It is the core duty to which directors are subject.’615 This duty is 
one in which the court will not be keen to interfere – as Green MR stated 
the duty was for directors' actions to be ‘bona fide in what they consider – 
not what a court may consider – is in the interests of the company.’616 This 
approach further exacerbates the twin exacerbations: courts are unlikely to 
interfere in a breach of duty arising as a result of the directors acting in a 
manner designed to satisfy the majority in accordance with the company's 
constitution, and if any such action were ever to be threatened, the majority 
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would be able to ratify the breach (rendering commencing any action 
pointless).  
(c) Duty to Exercise Independent Judgement 
Section 173 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that each director has a 
duty to exercise her independent judgement.617 At first glance, this would 
seem a protection against the twin exacerbations as it requires 
independence of directors, which must include independence from the 
majority. However, the section goes on to state expressly that the duty 
cannot be infringed by a director acting in a way authorised under the 
company's constitution.618 In other words, should the majority use their 
power to change the constitution to require the company to do something, 
the director, acting in accordance with such a requirement, will not breach 
this duty.619 Gower and Davies have described this provision as meaning 
that ‘the articles may authorise restrictions on the exercise of independent 
judgement, which might be a useful facility in private companies’.620 
However, this utility carries with it a double-edged sword: it provides an 
ex ante ability for the majority to demand that action be undertaken, in 
addition to their ex poste right of ratification. So long as majority are able 
to capture the management of the company, the value of this duty in 
mitigating the twin exacerbations is neutralised.  
(d) Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, Skill, and Diligence 
Directors are under a longstanding statutory duty exercise their 
responsibilities with reasonable care, skill, and diligence.621 This is, once 
again, now codified in a statutory test.622 There are two elements to this 
test: the objective and the subjective. This means that directors are obliged 
to undertake their duties to the higher of either the skill that a reasonable 
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director should have,623 or the skill that such director does, in fact, have.624 
This imposes a higher burden and is designed to increase professionalism 
among directors.625 It is, however, difficult to establish how this would 
interact with the twin exacerbations, which do not arise because of 
carelessness, but rather from deliberate action on behalf of the directors 
either on the instruction of, or to appease, the majority. In addition, any 
breach can be ratified by the majority pre-insolvency.626 
(e) Duties to Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
Duties to avoid a conflict of interests for directors also have a long pedigree 
under UK company law. Thus, a contract between a railway company and 
a chair provider of which the chairman of the railway company was a 
partner, was held to be void. The court stated: 
So strict was the principle, that no investigation could be allowed 
as to the fairness or unfairness of the contract. Blaikie was, at the 
time of the contract, bound to make the best bargain possible for 
the Company of which he was chairman of the court of directors. 
His personal interest, as a member of the firm contracting with the 
Company, would lead him in an entirely opposite direction. The 
directors of a company had duties which were of a fiduciary nature 
to discharge, and any contract in which a director was interested 
entered into with the Company must be void. It makes no 
difference whether the case was that of a sole trustee or manager, 
or one of a body of directors. The rule was imperative, as well by 
the law of Scotland as England.627 
This rule against conflicts of interest between directors and their company 
has been seen as fundamental when it comes to ensuring that directors are not 
‘swayed by interest rather than driven by duty’.628 In its widest sense, this 
would appear to have potential to mitigate the twin exacerbations. There are 
three statutory provisions which deal with this wide topic. 
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First, there is a duty to avoid situations in which the director may have a 
conflict of interest.629 This expressly excludes transactions with the 
company.630 Accordingly, the duty is to avoid non-transactional situations: 
for example situations in which an individual is a director of two competing 
companies. Any such conflict can, however, be approved/ratified, depending 
on the date of incorporation of the company. The directors of a company 
(excluding the conflicted director) incorporated under the Companies Act 
2006, are able to authorise a conflict arising for one of them provided that the 
articles do not prohibit the other directors from so authorising the ‘conflicted 
one’ of their number.631 The Model Articles are silent on this matter, and thus 
would allow the directors to approve a conflict arising for one of them.632 On 
the other hand, the other directors of a company incorporated before 1 
October 2009 (and therefore incorporated under the Companies Act 1985) 
are only able to exercise such a right if the shareholders of the company have 
passed an ordinary resolution to approve such a conflict.633 Each of these 
empowers shareholders to prevent the directors from authorising one of their 
number having a situational conflict. This helps mitigate direct 
manifestations of owner/manager agency costs. However, it does nothing to 
mitigate indirect majority/minority agency costs and so provides no 
protection from the twin exacerbations: the issue is not that directors may act 
in a manner in which they are conflicted, but rather they may, as directors, 
act in a manner intended to appease the majority to the detriment of the 
minority. This triangulation, therefore, is not mitigated by limiting situational 
conflicts of directors. 
A similar framework applies in respect of the duty of directors to avoid 
transactional conflicts. This framework obliges directors to disclose their 
interests in proposed634 or current transactions635 to the company. The former 
can be disclosed in any manner including, amongst other methods, disclosure 
at a board meeting, written notice to the directors, or a general notice to the 
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directors.636 Conversely, disclosure of interests in an existing transaction may 
only be made in one of these three ways.637 Once again, this mandatory 
disclosure provides no protection against the twin exacerbations. In fact, as 
breach of this duty can only be cured by ratification by ordinary resolution 
(ie, by the majority), the operation of such duties could be seen to further 
exacerbate the twin exacerbations as it risks causing breach by directors 
which can only be resolved by the agreement of the majority, making the 
directors further captive to the majority. 
In addition to the protections against conflicts, there are mandatory 
provisions against self-dealing. Consequently, members' approval is required 
before a director can enter into a substantial transaction with the company,638 
before a director borrows money from the company,639 before approval of 
payments for loss of office,640 and prior to directors entering into long-term 
service contracts.641 These provisions are mandatory, but protect only against 
direct director/shareholder agency costs by preventing directors from 
enriching their positions. Accordingly, despite the promise of the dictum cited 
above, they provide no protection against the twin exacerbations. 
6.2.4. Conclusion 
Directors owe fiduciary duties to the company. It therefore appears as if the regime 
governing these duties may mitigate the twin exacerbations. However, the current regime of 
directors' duties does not do this. Certain duties themselves defer to the constitution of the 
company, which the majority are able to amend. Accordingly, these duties are liable to be 
captured by the majority. Even those that do not, in their terms fail to provide any protection 
against the twin exacerbations. 
Even if they did, the duties are owed to the company. The formulation of the interests of the 
company, whilst ostensibly promoting enlightened shareholder value, provides no rights for 
stakeholders, and so appear to be purely shareholder-centric. In addition, any breach of these 
duties can be ratified by the majority. As a result, whilst directors are obliged to act in a 
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fiduciary manner, the way in which their duties are formulated leaves them either captive to 
the majority, or not required to address the twin exacerbations. The way in which breach of 
duties can be ratified provides further opportunity for capture of the directors by the majority. 
This leads to the conclusion that the current formulation of directors' duties does not offer 
protection against the twin exacerbations of majority/minority agency costs.  Accordingly, 
this category does not provide sufficient mitigation to resolve the twin exacerbations. 
 
6.3. Possible Legal Mitigant: Shareholder Voting Obligations 
6.3.1. The Base Position 
The duties of directors, as we have seen, cannot be said to act as a mitigant of the twin 
exacerbations of indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs. The next 
question is whether there are any obligations on shareholders when deciding how to make 
decisions in their capacity as shareholders, as we see in Delaware for controlling 
shareholders and shareholders who have assumed the powers of the directors of the 
company. If there are such obligations on shareholders in the UK, they could include 
obligations on the majority to not abuse the powers entrusted to them under the twin 
exacerbations to the detriment of the minority. This would mitigate both exacerbations.  
The classic formulation of the answer to this question642 is that delivered by the Privy 
Council in the Canadian case of North-West Transportation v Beatty.643 The case involved 
a majority shareholder and director agreeing to sell a steamer, The United Empire, which he 
owned in his personal capacity, to the company of which he was majority shareholder and 
director. The company was a Canadian company which applied a mandatory division of 
powers between the directors and the shareholders. It was agreed by all parties that the 
company needed a new steamer to carry out its business, and that the United Empire was 
‘well adapted for that purposes…and that the price to be paid for the steamer was not 
excessive or unreasonable’.644 Nonetheless, the vote to purchase the United Empire was 
close, with 306 for and 289 against. The 306 consisted of shares that the seller of the United 
Empire owned or controlled. The 289, therefore, commenced action to restrain the purchase 
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on the ground that: ‘Beatty was in such a fiduciary relation to the company’ that no contract 
with him should stand.645  
The first instance court ordered that the transaction be set aside on the ground that Beatty 
had a conflict of interest and so should not be permitted to exercise the power he held to the 
possible prejudice of the minority shareholders. This was appealed, with the Canadian Court 
of Appeal agreeing with the first instance judge on the ground of Beatty's role as a director 
transacting with the company. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed. The Privy Council 
agreed that, because the contract was with a director, it was voidable and that the general 
meeting was able to ratify or repudiate the contract. However, Beatty had acquired shares in 
accordance with the bye-laws of the company and to exercise the voting rights of the shares 
as he saw fit. Accordingly, it overturned the Supreme Court of Canada decision. The ratio 
was provided by Sir Richard Baggallay in delivering the Privy Council's judgment: 
[T]he resolution of a majority of the shareholders, duly convened, upon any question 
with which the company is legally competent to deal, is binding upon the minority 
and consequently upon the company, and every shareholder has a perfect right to 
vote upon any such question, although he may have a personal interest in the subject-
matter opposed to, or different from, the general or particular interests of the 
company.646  
The judge contrasted the position of shareholders with directors – who do have such a 
fiduciary duty when making decisions in their capacity as such. It is interesting, however, 
that he felt it necessary to re-affirm that the company needed a steamer; the United Empire 
was a steamer which met the company's needs; and that the price was an accurate 
valuation.647 But, in terms of Sir Richard's analysis, these factors are surely irrelevant? If, 
when it comes to ratifying a contract with a director, the shareholders are entitled to decide 
whether to do so with utmost freedom, the acceptability of the transaction should not be an 
issue. Nonetheless, Sir Richard's formulation would appear to place UK law on a 
fundamentally different footing to Delaware, and to deny any ability for shareholder voting 
obligations to provide any mitigation of the twin exacerbations. 
This case has been used as authority for the proposition that ‘in general, members are entirely 
free to exercise their own judgement as to how to vote’.648 In reaching this decision, the 
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Privy Council no doubt followed the existing judicial approach that shares are seen as the 
property of the shareholder. Jessop MR stated ten years prior to North-West v Beatty: 
In all cases of this kind, where men exercise their rights of property, they exercise 
their rights from some motive adequate or inadequate, and I have always considered 
the law to be that those who have the rights of property are entitled to exercise them, 
whatever their motives may be for such exercise—that is as regards a Court of Law 
as distinguished from a court of morality or conscience, if such a court exists…I 
cannot deprive him of his property, although he may not make use of that right of 
property in a way I might altogether approve. That is really the question, because if 
these shareholders have a right of property, then I think all the arguments which have 
been addressed to me as to the motives which induced them to exercise it are entirely 
beside the question.649 
If shares are the property of the shareholders, then, as with all property, the owner's motive 
when making decisions is irrelevant and the shareholder is entitled to exercise her rights in 
respect of such shares as she sees fit. This approach has been held to mean that shareholders 
are able to ignore court orders which bind the company. Walton J, faced with such 
circumstances, stated: 
I think that, in a nutshell, the distinction is this: when a director votes as a director 
for or against any particular resolution in a director's meeting, he is voting as a person 
under a fiduciary duty to the company for the proposition that the company should 
take a certain course of action. When a shareholder is voting for or against a particular 
resolution he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to the company and who 
is exercising his own right of property, to vote as he thinks fit. The fact that the result 
of the voting at the meeting (or at a subsequent poll) will bind the company cannot 
affect the position that, in voting, he is voting simply in exercise of his own property 
rights. 
Perhaps another (and simpler) way of putting the matter is that a director is an agent, 
who casts his vote to decide in what manner his principal shall act through the 
collective agency of the board of directors; a shareholder who casts his vote in 
general meeting is not casting it as an agent of the company in any shape or form. 
His act therefore, in voting as he pleases, cannot in any way be regarded as an act of 
the company.  This means that they have no duties to consider the minority when 
exercising that decision.650 
That no duties are owed to the minority in voting has been stated as: 
The starting point is the proposition that in general the right of a shareholder to vote 
his shares is a right of property which the shareholder is free to exercise in what he 
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regards as his own best interests. He is not obliged to cast his vote in what others 
may regard as the best interests of the general body of shareholders, or in the best 
interests of the company as an entity in its own right.651 
This ability to act in your own interests and not the interests of others, has been held to be a 
strong right – it is possible to cast your vote deliberately to harm another shareholder. As 
Harman J stated: 
Shareholders are entitled to sell their shares, to vote their shares, to take any course 
they like in general meeting without regard to any other person's rights or position. 
In my judgment the law is that a shareholder may act with malice in voting his shares 
against a particular resolution and there can be no objection to that.652 
Coupled with this freedom to vote shares, is a general judicial unwillingness to interfere in 
the decisions made by companies. When considering North-West v Beatty, Lord Davey 
stated: 
[I]t is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that the 
Court will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting within 
their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so.653 
Thus, the default position is that shareholders are entitled to vote their shares in whatever 
manner that they see fit.654 This places majorities in the UK in a different position to 
majorities in Delaware, and it therefore appears that shareholder voting obligations would 
provide no comfort for minority shareholders in removing the twin exacerbations. 
6.3.2. Shareholder Voting Obligations: Deviations 
However, this rule is subject to a significant number of exceptions. Even in Northwest v 
Beatty, it was held that a majority was not able to procure the votes of their fellow 
shareholders in favour of a matter which benefitted the majority by unfair or improper 
means.655 Palmer's Company Law states that there are three key areas in which the courts 
have been keen to hold that the majority's rights to vote in their own interests are curtailed:656 
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to agree transactions at under value; attempts to damage the minority economically; and 
where class rights are affected by a transfer. These may appear to be neat categories, but, as 
we shall see, many more complications arise in each purported category. 
(a) Undervalue 
Menier v Hooper's Telegraph Works657 involved a majority using their votes to divert 
company property to themselves. James LJ described the case as: 
The minority of the shareholders say in effect that the majority has divided the assets 
of the company, more or less, between themselves, to the exclusion of the minority. 
I think it would be a shocking thing if that could be done, because if so the majority 
might divide the whole assets of the company, and pass a resolution that everything 
must be given to them, and that the minority should have nothing to do with it. 
Assuming the case to be as alleged by the bill, then the majority have put something 
into their pockets at the expense of the minority. If so, it appears to me that the 
minority have a right to have their share of the benefits ascertained for them in the 
best way in which the Court can do it, and given to them.658  
Mellish LJ agreed, stating: 
I am of opinion that although it may be quite true that the shareholders of a company 
may vote as they please, and for the purpose of their own interests, yet that the 
majority of shareholders cannot sell the assets of the company and keep the 
consideration, but must allow the minority to have their share of any consideration 
which may come to them.659 
Palmer uses this case as authority that when it comes to a transaction with the company at a 
price under value, the majority cannot cast their votes in a manner designed to benefit 
themselves.660 The Lord Justices framed their judgments in a manner designed to avoid a 
conflict with the general position in North-West v Beatty. Both effectively deemed the 
amount by which the value was undervalued as a distribution to the shareholders,661 and in 
so characterising the transaction, the matter became a simple one of the majority receiving a 
distribution to which they were not entitled. Seen in this light, approving this transaction at 
under value becomes something that conflicts with legislative provisions in respect of 
dividends: the default rules applicable to company decision making breached mandatory 
rules directly applicable to the subject matter. Despite the rhetoric, protection against 
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unlawful distributions apply to protect creditors rather than the minority.  This result, 
therefore, cannot be extended to cover the matter at hand: the majority tried to make a 
company do something which statute forbade. That they were unable to agree to do so, was 
not because the minority objected or would suffer harm – indeed had the assets been 
transferred under value to all shareholders, the result (failure of the activity in question) 
would have been the same.  
The facts of Automatic Self Cleansing were, of course, similar to issues above: the majority 
proposed a wrong which the directors considered would harm the company. It would have 
been possible for Automatic Self Cleansing to be framed as a case concerned with misuse of 
majority power by shareholders following the Menier v Hooper decision. However it was 
not so framed and instead focused on the balance of powers between the directors and 
shareholders. This conscious decision to correct an obvious wrong on the minority by the 
majority by reference to the powers of directors, provides a key insight that restraints on the 
majority are not as pervasive as is generally believed. Accordingly, it may be that restrictions 
on under-value transfers provide less of a restraint on the majority qua majority than Palmer 
states. 
Precisely the opposite issue arose in Atwool v Merryweather.662 There, one of the promotors 
of a company owned an interest in a mine which two promoters (Merryweather and 
Whitworth) of the company knew was worth £4,000. They, however, circulated a prospectus 
which contained statements that the mine was worth £7,000. The intention was for the mine 
to be sold to the company for £7,000 (to be shared between the promoters). Both the 
promoters also received shares in the company sufficient to retain control over the company. 
Once this came to the attention of the other shareholders, they summoned a meeting to 
consider whether to sue the promoters. If the votes of the promoters were included, then the 
vote was a majority of 58 against pursuing litigation, whereas if the promoters were 
excluded, the vote was a majority of 86 in favour of pursuing litigation. The matter before 
the court was whether litigation could be commenced. Wood VC stated: 
Upon such a transaction the Court will hold that the whole contract is a complete 
fraud. I do not in the least say that where persons with their eyes open know that the 
agent who secures them the bargain is going to take money for it, that would not be 
all right enough. If the company knew this gentleman was to have this amount as 
promotion-money, well and good. There might have been some difficulty, Mr. 
Whitworth being a director, if it had been a sale by Merryweather and Whitworth eo 
nomine, both of them together. If that had been the case more might have been said 
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about the frame of the suit. But here it is a simple fraud, and nothing else. 
Merryweather knowing Whitworth's position with regard to the company, and that 
as an honest man Whitworth was bound to tell the company what price he bought the 
mines for, agreed that the mine should be sold to the company for £7000, and that 
the real price, £4000, should not be disclosed to the company.663 
Wood VC clearly viewed the matter simply as one of fraud. He therefore considered that the 
entire life of the company, from formation to completion of the transaction, was also a matter 
of fraud. Against so fraudulent a background, it was wrong to consider that any of the 
minority had genuinely subscribed for shares in the company. They were, accordingly, 
entitled to the return of their investment. This achieved a just end by side-stepping the 
formalities: the presence of fraud meant that the company was void from its inception, and 
so the issue of whether Merryweather and Whitworth were entitled to vote their own shares 
never arose. The company had to be entirely unwound to the position before the fraud was 
perpetrated. In other words, this case provides no limitations on shareholders' ability to vote 
their shares in whatever way they wish, and likewise no potential mitigation of the twin 
exacerbations. 
Accordingly, in the absence of fraud or a breach of some other mandatory rule, it appears 
that there is no duty on the majority to consider the interests of the minority when voting 
their shares for an under-value transaction. Consequently, this line of authority provides no 
comfort for indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs.  
(b) Economic Harm to the Minority 
It is stated that the majority cannot use their powers to undermine the economic interests of 
the minority.664 The classic case is frequently cited665 as Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa, 
Limited.666 This case involved a company with articles of association which provided for a 
lien over shares which were not fully paid. All shareholders had only partially-paid shares, 
apart from one shareholder, Zuccani, who had a mixture of fully-paid and partially-paid 
shares. Zuccani died, and his estate did not have sufficient assets to pay the unpaid amounts 
on his shares. The other shareholders proposed an amendment to the articles to extend the 
lien to shares even if fully paid. This was against Zuccani's estate's interests but in the 
interests of the majority. Once the resolution passed, the directors issued a call on unpaid 
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shares which all other shareholders paid but Zuccani's estate could not, meaning that the 
company had a lien on all of Zuccani's shares. The directors moved to forfeit the partially-
paid shares and freeze the rights of the fully-paid shares. The effect, therefore, of the small 
change in the articles was to exclude Zuccani's shares from their rights, although prior to the 
call he was the only holder of any fully-paid shares. 
Zuccani's estate petitioned for a restraint on the lien. At first instance, this was granted due 
to technical defects in the service of notice of meetings. The Court of Appeal, however, held 
that the amendment to the articles was valid. Lindley MR's famous dictum667 is that, in 
respect of the ability to amend articles, 
the power conferred by it must, like all other powers, be exercised subject to those 
general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on 
majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in the 
manner required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, 
and it must not be exceeded. These conditions are always implied, and are seldom, if 
ever, expressed.668 
This purports to require shareholders to cast their votes in good faith and in the interests of 
the company, similar to the requirements for controlling shareholders in Delaware. The value 
of this dictum in the UK, however, is actually limited. It was clear that the majority had 
amended the articles to deprive Zuccani's fully-paid shares of their enjoyment, and to 
manufacture a way to appropriate rights that should sit with Zuccani or his executors from 
such shares. The majority therefore did not exercise their rights ‘bona fide for the benefit of 
the company as a whole’.669 Nonetheless, the court held that the amendment of the articles 
was valid. Lindley MR stated that the court was not duty bound to restrict the statutory 
freedom to amend the articles.670 However, he could have avoided the need to do so had he 
implied the limitation he flagged to the operation of such a freedom. He then moved on to 
consider whether there was anything inherent in the corporate agreement between Zuccani 
and the company which would in some way estop a subsequent lien over fully-paid shares. 
He concluded: 
After carefully considering the whole case, and endeavouring in vain to discover 
grounds for holding that there was some special bargain differentiating Zuccani's 
shares from others, I have come to the conclusion that the appeal from the decision 
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of the learned judge, so far as it relates to the lien created by the altered articles, must 
be allowed.671 
It is surprising that Lindley MR had been ‘endeavouring in vain’ to find a way to hold there 
had been such a special bargain between Zuccani and the other corporate constituents. 
However, he would not have needed to do so had he followed his own dictum and overturned 
the amendment on the ground that it was not a bona fide use of the powers of the majority. 
His analysis moved seamlessly from ‘each shareholder always has a duty’ to ‘there was no 
special agreement which created a duty’. If his initial dictum was correct, then there was no 
need to attempt to explore ‘special agreements’. The result of this case was, therefore, that a 
clear attempt by the majority to amend articles in a manner which they knew was favourable 
to them and detrimental to the minority, was upheld as valid. It is against this result that 
Lindley MR's dictum should be tested, and it can be seen that it is found wanting. If the law 
were as per Lindley MR's dictum then the case would have been decided in favour of the 
minority. That the case was decided in favour of the majority shows that, despite dicta to the 
contrary, there can have been no such bona fide requirement on the votes of the majority. As 
a result, this heading also provides no mitigation of the twin exacerbations. The dictum that 
the votes of shareholders must be exercised ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company as the 
whole’ has been described as: 
[A] statement which, read casually, might suggest that shareholders are subject at 
common law to precisely the same basic principle as directors. This would be highly 
misleading, however, and the decisions do not support any such parallel.672 
Nevertheless, this dictum has been acted upon. Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese and Company, 
Limited673 involved the introduction of an article which dispossessed a minority of their 
rights on the ground that they were in competition with the company. This was upheld as 
valid by the court on the ground that the article had been introduced in the bona fide best 
interests of the company. In Dafen Tinplate Company, Limited v Llanelly Steel Company 
(1907) Limited674 there was a falling-out between shareholders, and the majority proposed 
resolutions which allowed them, without restriction, to resolve that any number of shares of 
any member (other than the majority) should be offered by the directors to persons (including 
members) which the directors considered fit at the price fixed from time to time by the 
directors. Peterson J applied the Allen v Gold dictum, but concluded that the outcome 
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differed from that in Sidebottom: in Dafen the article was not proposed for bona fide reasons 
in the interests of the company. It was put to Peterson J that the test for compliance with 
Lindley MR's dictum was subjective, but he considered that the matter should rather be tested 
objectively.675 However, it was a mistake to consider such a matter as linked to any duty on 
the majority to vote in a certain way. Instead, we can differentiate the property of the 
company from the property of the shareholders (ie, the shares themselves). Seen in this light, 
the issue was the forfeiture of the minority's property in a way to which they had not 
consented. By becoming members and therefore agreeing to the articles of association of the 
company, it could be argued that they had agreed to the procedure for amendment of the 
articles as set out in the articles. However, when the difference between the personal property 
of the shareholder and the activities of the company is acknowledged, we can see why it 
would be a higher bar to amend articles so as forcibly to remove the property owned by the 
minority shareholders, than it would be to amend matters in respect of the company in which 
the shareholder holds shares. In other words, this line of authority can be limited to 
preventing forfeiture of the minority's shares, or rights attaching to them, at the instigation 
of the majority shareholders in a manner to which the minority has not agreed, rather than 
being of wider application in respect of considerations that the majority have when voting. 
A prohibition on the majority from directly appropriating the assets of the minority (other 
than by pre-agreed mechanisms) can be seen as a lower bar than a general protection that the 
majority has to vote its shares in the bona fide interests of the company as a whole. Once 
again, Lindley MR's dictum is undermined, as is the ability for this heading of shareholder 
interaction to mitigate the twin exacerbations.  
This analysis is reinforced by the attitude the courts have taken when such an article has 
been adopted by agreement between members prior to the underlying dispute. Philips v 
Manufacturers' Securities Ltd676 involved a company set up in parallel with a federation of 
bedstead manufacturers. The company was set up by the members of the federation, but was 
separate and distinct from it. The articles contained a provision that a special resolution could 
determine that any shares in the company be sold at any price determined by such special 
resolution, but not less than 1s per share, and if no price was fixed then the price would be 
1s per share. One of the shareholders left the federation but continued to be involved in the 
company. The other shareholders passed a resolution in accordance with the pre-agreed 
article to transfer the federation-leaver's shares for 1s per share. It was acknowledged that 
this represented a gross undervaluation of the asset, and was undertaken by the majority to 
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punish the federation-leaver for leaving the federation. Therefore, the majority acted for 
purposes which were at most indirectly and vaguely connected to the company and were, in 
reality, entirely irrelevant to the company. The purpose was directly to harm a minority 
shareholder for matters relating to a separate entity, and so were not an exercise of the 
majority's right in the bona fide exercise of the best interests of the company. Indeed, the 
only purpose of this amendment was, as per Palmer's ostensible test, to cause economic 
damage to the minority. Although the article had been agreed to by all parties, if there was a 
genuine duty to act in the interests of any other party, or not to cause economic harm to the 
minority, then the operation of the article should have been blocked. However, the court held 
the operation of the article to be valid. This confirms the analysis above. If there is truly an 
obligation to vote shares in the bona fide interests of the company, or not to cause economic 
harm to the minority, then Philips should have succeeded as it was common cause that the 
sole purpose in passing the resolution was to punish him. However, he did not as he had 
signed up to the adoption of the article. Effectively, this meant that the forfeiture of his shares 
– as capricious and vindictive as it may have been – was acceptable.  The exercise of such a 
right is not purely historic either; it is common in private companies to provide that those 
leaving businesses are obliged to transfer their shares, sometimes below their actual 
values.677 This is reconciled by acknowledging that such exit requirements were agreed to 
by the minority prior to the act in question – the exit conditions are therefore part of the 
corporate contract which the minority enter into. This can be contrasted with an ex post 
attempt by the majority to use their power to change this contract to remove rights the 
minority had. However, it is not linked to any duty the majority has to the minority or the 
majority when it comes to voting shares generally. Accordingly, this right may operate to 
mitigate direct manifestations of majority/minority agency costs (the majority cannot take 
from the minority), but it does nothing to mitigate the indirect manifestations. 
We can, therefore, deduce that there is no duty on the majority to vote in the interests of the 
minority or the company as a whole, or to ensure, when casting their vote, that they avoid 
causing economic harm to the minority. All that they cannot require is that the minority 
alienate their assets other than where they have agreed the process in advance.  This means 
that the twin exacerbations cannot be said to be mitigated by any such duty. 
The issue has clarified over time. Thus in Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers678 the court disagreed 
strongly with Peterson J's dicta in Dafen. Shuttleworth involved a company whose articles 
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purported to appoint four directors for life. After accounting irregularities, the shareholders 
amended the articles to disqualify one of the directors. The issue was whether the variation 
of the articles was valid or not, as the removed director argued that vindictiveness lay at the 
heart of the amendment. Bankes LJ examined the criteria a court can use when deciding 
whether an amendment is for the benefit of the company, and concluded that the test should 
be whether no reasonable person could consider the amendment to be in the interests of the 
company.679 The court also rejected Peterson J's objectivity of the test as outlined in Dafen 
– to follow Peterson J's ruling would be ‘to make the court the manager of the affairs of 
innumerable companies instead of the shareholders themselves’.680 In the result, the court 
held that the decision as to whether the amendment by the shareholders was in the interests 
of the company was ultimately a decision for the shareholders. This somewhat neutralised 
Lindley MR's dicta by replacing for these purposes the ‘interests of the company’ (itself a 
flawed formulation for our purposes as it is open to majority capture) with the ‘interests of 
the shareholders’ (a formulation even more open to majority capture). This inflection on the 
dicta rendered it tautologous: shareholders must act in what they consider to be their interests 
as a whole – enabling the majority to conflate their interests with the interests of shareholders 
as a whole. Matters became less clear in Greenhalgh v Arderne.681 This case involved a 
company with pre-emption rights on transfer in its articles. The articles were amended to 
provide that the general meeting could approve any transfer by ordinary resolution. Evershed 
MR reviewed the authorities, upheld the amendment, and concluded: 
that a special resolution of this kind would be liable to be impeached if the effect of 
it were to discriminate between the majority shareholders and the minority 
shareholders, so as to give to the former an advantage of which the latter were 
deprived.682 
In this case, however, the majority had received an offer from a third party which they 
wanted to accept. This offer had only been made to the majority. The amendment purported 
to provide the same rights to all shareholders, but in practice the offer was intended to benefit 
the majority only. Accordingly, the effect of the amendment was, in practice, to discriminate 
between the majority and the minority on the ground that the majority were free to enter into 
a transaction which the minority were not able to access despite the corporate contract 
initially excluding such a possibility. We therefore see that Greenhalgh represents another 
case whereby the ostensible dicta emanating from the case purport to provide a clear 
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statements of law which has the potential to mitigate the twin exacerbations, but which the 
results of the case themselves undermine, steering towards a clear conclusion that the 
ostensible protections provided to the minority by restrictions on shareholder voting (and so 
providing potential to mitigate the twin exacerbations) are purely illusory. 
Clemens v Clemens683 was a case involving two shareholders in a company – a niece (who 
held 45%) and an aunt (who held 55%). The company was very successful. The aunt and 
four others were directors, but the niece was not. A proposal was made under which the 
directors other than the aunt would subscribe for shares. The niece objected because the 
issues would reduce her shareholding to under 25 per cent of the shares in the company. 
Foster J reviewed the dicta quoted above and decided that, although the aunt was acting in 
what she genuinely believed to be in the interests of the company, she nevertheless was 
acting in a manner designed to ensure that the niece lost her negative control in blocking 
special resolutions. He therefore held that the allotment of shares was invalid. This decision 
has been described as ‘remarkable’ and ‘much criticised’.684  Indeed, Joffe described the 
decision as one which ‘warms the heart’,685 but stated that its reasoning, if correct, would 
effectively destroy the shareholder's right to take account of her own interests.686 Going 
further, he argues that the result  
subverts the present basis of the law by displacing the principle of majority rule. The 
majority would have to satisfy the court that it acted in what the court, not the 
majority, thinks is in the best interests of the company–a notion elsewhere expressly 
rejected by the Court of Appeal.687  
It is curious why the outcome of this case has received so much academic criticism when the 
outcome of Dafen has not (clearly, the dictum in Dafen has been judicially criticised). It is 
submitted that the difference between the two would more accurately have centred on 
whether the majority removed the ownership rights of the minority. In Dafens, it was clear 
that property of the minority was sold under value without their consent. In Clemens, this 
would only be the case if the negative right to block a resolution of the company could be 
classified as property of the minority, or whether the important right was the number of 
shares that she owned. The latter seems more correct,688 and would lead to a difference in 
the levels of academic criticism of the outcome: in Dafens the court ultimately decided 
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correctly as it prevented expropriation of minority's assets. But on that test, it is doubtful 
whether the same can be said of the court in Clemens. In other words, the exception of 
Clemens shows that the proposition advanced in this chapter is correct – the twin 
exacerbations are not resolved by this area of law. 
Gibson J attempted to reconcile the cases by deferring to shareholders' right to vote against 
the concept of a ‘bona fide interest of the company’. He formulated the questions as: 
All resolutions must be passed bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole, 
but that requirement does not have the same content for a board of directors, all of 
whom are fiduciaries, as it does for a general meeting of the company. The law is not 
so foolish as to prevent a shareholder from voting in his own private interests 
provided that the resolution is not discriminatory.689  
Whilst this is an accurate summary of the confused position resulting from the case law, it 
is not helpful: it would seem to position the bona fide requirement as somehow subsidiary 
to the general proprietary right, despite that never having been expressly articulated 
elsewhere (and not reasoned by Gibson J). As the case law developed, the judicial analysis 
shifted from a general discussion of whether a shareholder has a duty to vote her shares a 
certain way, to a discussion of whether the majority do.690 To an extent, this is a semantic 
change driven by the realities that the matter is only relevant when there is a majority (as a 
minority acting in their own interests would be overruled and, therefore, not require litigation 
to resolve the issue). However, it also shows an underlying weakness in the analysis 
advanced in the cases. Gower and Davies stated that, in respect of these cases, 
if the courts, instead of having to ask themselves whether…the resolution had been 
passed ‘bona fide in the interests of the company’, had simply had to consider 
whether the members of some of them were being unfairly prejudiced, it can scarcely 
be doubted that they would have found that an easier question to answer.691 
However, as we have seen, even this is not entirely inaccurate. The issue in these cases is 
not that there is a general duty to vote shares with any particular considerations in mind, nor 
the generally unfairly prejudicial conduct of the majority. Instead, the legal principle which 
is highlighted by this line of authority is an inability of a majority to use their personal 
property to directly appropriate the personal property of the minority other than in limited 
circumstances. This changes the issue considerably. The issue is no longer whether 
shareholders are constrained generally when they exercise their rights, but is instead whether 
                                                     
689 Re Ringtower Holdings plc (1989) 5 BCC 82, 101. 
690 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2. 
691 Gower and Davies, (6th edn), 717. 
157 
 
they have any right to appropriate assets of the minority in the first place,. This formulation 
may mitigate direct manifestations of majority/minority agency costs, but does not resolve 
the indirect manifestations of the twin exacerbations. 
Therefore, the absence of an obligation on shareholders to cast their votes in any way other 
than their own interests, means that there is no protection against the twin exacerbations: the 
majority are able to act in their own interests provided they do not actively remove property 
from the minority. Accordingly, this limb provides no mitigation against the twin 
exacerbations. 
(c) Class Rights 
The analysis above is embodied in the principle underpinning the concept of ‘class rights’: 
each class of share enjoys some rights with which other classes are not entitled to interfere.692 
If a company issues different shares to which different rights attach, the rights attaching to 
those shares can only be varied with the consent of the majority of that class of share.693  
The key case on this matter is In re Holders Investment Trust Ltd.694 In this case, it was 
proposed that five per cent cumulative, redeemable, preference shares due in 1971, be 
exchanged for six per cent unsecured loan stock due in 1985 or 1990. The majority holders 
of the preference shares were also the majority ordinary shareholders. At the vote of the 
preference shareholders, those who did not also hold ordinary shares objected to the motion. 
Megarry J held that the votes of those in favour were to be set aside on the ground that they 
had not acted in a way which they considered to be in the best interests of their class as a 
whole.695 This creates problems: objectively, on any corporate decision, it will be possible 
to isolate whether certain matters are in the interests of a certain class or not. This approach 
would mean that if there was the same individuals were ordinary shareholders and preference 
shareholders, and they held their shares in each class in the same proportion, they could not 
make the exchange even if it was agreed and acknowledged that any reduction in value of 
their rights in their capacity as preference shareholders, increased the value of their rights as 
ordinary shareholders exponentially. This cannot be the correct legal analysis. 
It is submitted that this judgment should be see to truncate some analytical steps. The issue 
was that the majority of the class were actually using their power as a majority to deprive 
                                                     
692 Morse and others (eds),  Palmer’s Company Law para 6.029. 
693 Companies Act 2006, ss 630–640. 
694 In re Holders Investment Trust Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 583. 
695 ibid 589E. 
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the minority of their rights – in this case, the right to redeem their preference shares in 1971. 
In other words, the issue at stake in Holders Investment Trust was exactly the same as in all 
other cases reviewed above: a narrower issue than the dicta state. If this submission is 
correct, then there is no duty on those casting their votes in favour of the class as a whole, 
but there is a duty on the majority to not deprive the minority of their positive rights. In this 
case, the majority/minority division was obscured by the presence of two share classes. But 
the same parties constituted the ‘majority’ in both classes, which enables us to analyse the 
case as a majority/minority issue rather than a discrete issue of class rights. If this is the case, 
then once again, the level of importance of the decision diminishes. Instead of providing 
general qualifications on a shareholders' ability to vote in a class-rights issue, it provides that 
a shareholder cannot use her votes in a class-right variation to remove rights from that class 
with the aim of benefitting them in a different capacity. In other words, the duty is not to 
consider the issues of the class, but rather to ensure that your other shareholding interests do 
not deprive others of their positive rights. Once again, this formulation aids direct 
manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in that it prevents the majority from 
appropriating the rights of the minority. However, it does not mitigate the indirect 
manifestations with which we are concerned. 
6.3.3. Conclusion 
We have seen the general position in North-West Transportation v Beatty that a shareholder 
is entitled to vote her shares (as her personal property) in any way she sees fit.696 We have 
also reviewed the apparent deviations from this general rule and found them lacking. It 
appears that a more accurate rule is that whilst shareholders may use rights attaching to their 
personal property to further their own interests, they cannot use these rights to reduce 
positive rights already attaching to the personal property of others without their prior 
approval. In this light, there are numerous personal or irrelevant considerations that a 
shareholder could have when deciding how to vote, so long as they do not reduce the 
property of the minority. This is the approach advocated by Gower and Davies in their 
summation of this line of authority: 
[I]t has been also repeatedly laid down that votes are proprietary rights, like other 
incidents of shares, which the holder may exercise in his or her own selfish interests 
                                                     
696 Of course, as with all personal property, there can be other limitations on how shares are voted. For 
example, it is possible for a shareholder to hold legal title to the shares and yet have passed any economic 
benefit of the shares to a third party (eg, a secured creditor on enforcement – Standard Charter v Walker 
[1992] 1 WLR 561), in which case the shareholder’s rights to deal with the property unfettered may not 
apply. However, this is a matter of property law rather than of company law restrictions. 
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even if they are opposed to those of the company….Thus it is wrong to see the voting 
powers of shareholders as being of a fiduciary character. Unlike directors' powers, 
shareholders' voting rights are not conferred upon them in order that they shall be 
exercised in the way which prefers the interests of others over the interests of the 
voting shareholder where the two are in conflict… however, to deny the fiduciary 
character of shareholders' voting rights and to assert their proprietary nature is not to 
say that the exercise of shareholders' voting powers is, or should be, unconstrained 
by the law.697 
This means that the analysis of shareholder voting is simpler than generally considered – 
shareholders have a right to vote their shares how they wish. The limitations on how a 
shareholder votes are therefore narrower than first thought. This means that the rules in 
respect of shareholder voting only protect the minority from direct appropriation of their 
assets. This means, further, that to be a shareholder in the UK (with minimal duties when it 
comes to exercising rights) it is conceptually different than in Delaware (where controlling 
majorities receive automatic duties). The UK rules do not protect the majority from giving 
themselves a benefit. Consequently as these rules currently sit, they provide no protection 
for the minority to mitigate the twin exacerbations. Gower and Davies highlight that the case 
law hints at three options for development of the law of judicial review of shareholder 
decision making: 
(A) A subjective view of decision making – where all that is required 
is rationality in shareholder decision making and, when it comes 
to infringing on the proprietary rights of the minority, a 
requirement for shareholders to have acted fairly; 
(B) An objective view of decision making – where the courts must 
establish whether a certain decision was in the best interests of the 
company when the interests of the minority are infringed;698 or 
(C) A hybrid view – where the courts are able to consider both of the 
above.699 
A allows the majority the greatest discretion, and C allows the least. It currently appears as 
if none of these statements provides a neat, descriptive view of the current law of shareholder 
                                                     
697 Gower and Davies, para 19-4. 
698 This is the approach taken when creditors consider casting their votes in a decision of the class of 
creditors of which they form part. See British American Nickel Corporation, Limited v M J O'Brien [1927] 
AC 369.  
699 Gower and Davies, para 19-11. 
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voting. Indeed, the answer is likely to differ in different contexts.700  However, whichever 
option is most appropriate, whilst it may provide some mitigation of direct manifestations 
of majority/minority agency costs in private companies, that is the limit of this line of 
authority. The lack of a general obligation to vote shares in any way but in the holders' own 
interests, means that nothing is done to mitigate indirect manifestations of majority/minority 
agency costs. It is possible that the majority may be constrained from actually reducing the 
minority's rights – although here, too, the ambit is unclear. Any such protection, however, 
only acts to mitigate direct manifestations of majority/minority agency costs. It does nothing 
to protect against the triangulation which occurs in respect of indirect manifestations. The 
concern of the twin exacerbations of indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency 
costs is that either directors will act in a way to appease the majority, or the majority will 
assume control of the powers of the company and run the business in their own interests. 
Accordingly, the concern extends beyond appropriation of assets, to a structural flaw in the 
operations of private companies which can allow majority interests to dominate the operation 
of the company. The duties of majorities when voting shares do not mitigate the indirect 
manifestations evidenced by the twin exacerbations. 
 
6.4. Other Minority Protections 
6.4.1. Introduction  
The minority are unable to rely on the fiduciary duties owed by directors or any obligations 
that the majority may have towards them to mitigate the twin exacerbations of indirect 
majority/minority agency costs in private companies. However, are they able to rely on other 
protection they may have? In establishing this we review the statutory derivative claim and 
the remedy of unfair prejudice. 
6.4.2. Derivative Claim 
The derivative claim exists because directors may not be best placed to take action arising 
from the wrongs of one of their own. This has led to a tendency for directors not to pursue 
action against a miscreant director, and, in turn, has resulted in shareholders themselves 
attempting to take direct action in respect of the wrongs of directors.701 If the minority are 
                                                     
700 ibid. 
701 ibid ch 17 for a full discussion of the derivative action. 
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able to raise a derivate claim, it may be possible to argue that such a mechanism could 
mitigate the twin exacerbations. Judicial reticence to such action created a line of authority 
which became known as ‘the rule in Foss v Harbottle’,702 which prevented an individual 
shareholder raising actions on behalf of the company in all but limited circumstances. This 
ability for the shareholders to act, on occasion, has now been put on a statutory footing. The 
derivative claim allows a member of the company to commence action on behalf of the 
company against a director of the company703 in certain circumstances. Before doing so, 
however, the member must seek the court's permission704 and the court must be satisfied that 
there is a prima facie case against the director.705 The court must refuse the claim if it 
considers that someone acting in the interests of the company would not continue with the 
claim,706 or if the act was authorised or has subsequently been ratified.707 The effect of a 
successful derivative action is that the amounts recovered from the director become part of 
the assets of the company.708 The derivative claim has been called an ‘outmoded 
superfluousness’.709 For our purposes there are several reasons why it provides no protection 
to the minority. First, the claims can only be brought against a director qua director: they 
therefore cannot be brought in respect of the indirect manifestations with which we are 
dealing. Second, a claim must be refused if it relates to something which was approved or 
ratified – an avenue open to the majority to defeat the claim. Third, the effect of a successful 
derivative action would be receipt of damages by the company: there is therefore little 
incentive for the minority to undertake action  which, even if successful, would secure them 
only an indirect proportional benefit. 
The derivative claim, therefore, offers no mitigation of either of the twin exacerbations. 
6.4.3. Unfair Prejudice 
Under the Companies Act 2006, any shareholder may petition the court for relief on the 
grounds: 
                                                     
702 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
703 Companies Act 2006, s 260(1). 
704 ibid s 261. 
705 ibid s 261(2). 
706 ibid s 263(2)(a). 
707 ibid s 263(2)(c). 
708 ibid s 260(1)(b). 
709 AM Gray, ‘The statutory derivative claim: An outmoded superflousness?’ [2012] Company Lawyer 295. 
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(a) that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is 
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its 
members (including at least himself), or 
(b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or 
omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.710 
At first reading, it appears as if this protection would be perfectly placed to mitigate the twin 
exacerbations.  Gower and Davies note that the broad scope of the formulation gives rise to 
two primary questions. Firstly, does the action need to be limited to conduct which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the member qua member, or can it cover other capacities? Initially, this was 
cast very narrowly, and only protected conduct prejudicial qua member and, therefore, not 
qua director.711 Over time, it has extended to conduct which affects the members in their 
non-member capacities.712 Secondly, should the scope of the conduct only cover unlawful 
acts, or should it be wider? Gower and Davies state that ‘the important steps taken by the 
courts can be characterised as saying that s 994 protects expectations and not just rights’.713 
Thus, public law terminology has been borrowed so that a breach of the minority 
shareholder's ‘legitimate expectation’ will also trigger the unfair-prejudice regime.714 In the 
case in which this was introduced, it was explained that it: 
[A]rises out of a fundamental understanding between the shareholders which 
formed the basis of their association but was not put into contractual form.715 
This can arise on formation of the company or subsequently.716 It is, however, a high burden: 
the court's presumption will be that ‘it can safely be said that the basis for association is 
adequately and exhaustively laid down in the articles’.717 In other words, courts will not 
readily provide this protection to minorities in the absence of clear evidence of agreement 
between the majority and the minority. There has been a change in description from 
‘legitimate expectations’ to ‘equitable considerations’.718 The House of Lords stated that this 
was so that the court could ask whether there was any equitable requirement to constrain the 
majority's rights based on the bargain that the majority had struck with the minority.719 This 
                                                     
710 Companies Act 2006, s 994. 
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has been held to extend to non-contractual understandings,720 but under this line of authority 
must be the result of an understanding by the minority. Thus, to trigger unfair prejudice in 
this category, it is not enough that the company is simply run in a way which ignores the 
interests of the minority (the primary concern of the twin exacerbations). Instead, it must be 
equitable to uphold an informally-struck bargain which has now been breached by the 
majority. This will only provide a remedy to the minority in respect of discrete ills that the 
minority has considered in advance, rather than providing a general protection. Thus, whilst 
this category provides mitigation if there is a pre-existing informal agreement to the contrary, 
it does not arise in the absence of such pre-existing informal agreement. It therefore cannot 
be said to remedy the twin exacerbations on a general basis. This provides limited comfort, 
as it requires a putative wrongdoer to agree in advance to do no wrong. 
Gower and Davies state that there are other categories of unfair prejudice which do not rely 
on ‘legitimate expectations’/’equitable considerations’.721 The courts have considered 
whether there was a breach of actual duties by the majority,  or breaches of standards or 
guides which do not apply but are seen as analogous – for example, compliance with the 
Takeover Code (which, as we have seen, only applies to public companies) in the run up to 
a takeover of a private company,722 and a consideration of model articles to establish whether 
there was a delay in requisitioning a general meeting which could be deemed prejudicial, 
even though the model articles were not part of the constitution of the company in 
question.723 The issue arises if there is no equivalent provision, and therefore nothing to 
breach. Gower and Davies summarise the position as: 
Then the court may have to face the task of developing its own criteria of fairness. 
For example, the company may have adopted a policy of paying only low dividends, 
although financial able to do better and even though the controllers have been able 
to obtain an income from the company by way of directors' fees. Is that unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of the non-director shareholders, even in the absence of 
any informal understanding as to the level of dividend pay-outs or as to the 
participation of the petitioner in the management of the company as a directors (and 
thus entitling him to fees)?724 
This is unknown. In addition, unfair prejudice requires some form of unfairness in addition 
to the prejudice.725 This has been stated to be simply a reformulation of a requirement for 
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some form of expectation on behalf of the minority.726 Certainly, consent727 or 
acquiescence728 on behalf of the minority will preclude a claim, as will a claim arising when 
some blame for the situation can be ascribed to the minority.729 It therefore appears that the 
remedy offers little mitigation for the twin exacerbations of agency costs. The established 
line of authority on ‘equitable considerations’ relies on the breach of some expectation of 
the minority, whether formal or informal. In the absence of such a breach, there will be no 
remedy. Other potential routes for unfair prejudice are undeveloped, and even if they were 
to be developed, would be subject to the argument that the conduct was somehow consented 
to or acquiesced in.  
6.4.4. Conclusions 
These minority protections do not, in fact, provide any protection against the twin 
exacerbations. The derivative claim is only available for breach by directors, can be stopped 
by ratification by the majority, and even if successful, would result in the company 
benefitting (which would proportionately benefit the majority). The derivative claim, 
therefore, does not mitigate the twin exacerbations. The same is true of an unfair prejudice 
petition, which requires either a breach of an expectation, or a test case for a minority. Even 
then, the ability of the majority to argue that the minority somehow acquiesced in the course 
of action resulting in the prejudice, means that unfair prejudice also provides no mitigation 
for the twin exacerbations. 
6.5. Soft Law 
If none of the ‘hard law’ mechanisms considered above adequately mitigates the twin 
exacerbations, is it possible that there are soft-law mechanisms to do so? 
As the twin exacerbations arise primarily as a result of decisions being made for incorrect 
reasons, it seems that the UK Corporate Governance Code would have the greatest potential 
to act as a mitigator, as it provides guidance on the best way to make decisions.730 As we 
have seen, this Code operates on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. The Code applies to those 
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companies listed on the main market,731 and it is through the listing rules that enforcement 
of the code actually takes place.  
On 30 January 2018, James Wates was appointed to review standards of corporate 
governance,732 in response to a regulation requiring all private companies with more than 
2,000 employees or turnover of more than £200m and a balance sheet of more than £2b, to 
provide a statement of corporate governance arrangements or explain why they have not 
done so.733 Wates attempts to justify this as ‘apply-and-explain’, rather than ‘comply-or- 
explain’.734 These principles have now been published.735 The proposal to extend the 
‘comply-or-explain’ concept to private companies has not yet been subject to major 
academic comment. The approach appears to aim at preventing a future collapse of a large 
private company, so avoiding another BHS.736 However, it appears misplaced. ‘Comply-or-
explain’ works by requiring disclosure of the reason for opting out of rules. This can only be 
effective in achieving policy goals if the act of disclosure has an effect on the business entity 
in question. In any untraded company the most important effect of such a disclosure – that 
on the price of issued shares in the company and thus the market capitalisation of the business 
vehicle – is entirely removed. The other effect of failing to either comply or explain with a 
provision of the Code is that the traded company breaches the listing rules, which in turn 
brings sanctions on the company. Thus, when faced with no market to react to negative 
disclosure, and no regulator to force compliance or disclosure, it seems that imposing a 
‘comply-or-explain’ regime on a private company will provide no benefit. Without a 
centralised body providing sanctions for the breach of the Wates proposals (of which there 
will be none), there is no primary incentive for a private company to comply. The only 
possible advantage in the use in private companies would be as a Pascalian Wager by the 
government in the hope of ensuring better corporate governance. 
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There are other, industry-specific, soft-law codes which apply to private companies. Thus, 
the Walker Guidelines737 apply to private equity companies. These require ‘private equity 
firms’ to undertake enhanced disclosure obligations in their annual reports. Compliance with 
the Walker Guidelines is measured by the Private Equity Reporting Group (PERG). The 
PERG is independent, however its members are appointed by the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA).738 PERG delivers an annual report. Larger portfolio companies of 
private equity houses also need to provide enhanced disclosure in their annual reports.739 
Whilst this may provide better governance for such companies, it is specific to private equity 
companies and therefore has no wider application. The Walker Report is clear that the 
concerns it seeks to address are specific to the private equity market. The monitoring body 
is also subject to capture by the industry as a whole: as the BVCA appoints members of the 
PERG, the PERG is likely to reflect the views of the BVCA. Accordingly, any wholesale 
practices which become acceptable to members of the BVCA are likely to be reflected in the 
PERG. The possibility of industry capture in such a soft code highlights the risks of relying 
on these sources. The analysis ultimately is the same as that reached for the Wates Report: 
without a centralised enforcement mechanism, or a market to react to disclosure of failure to 
comply, soft codes are not effective in resolving issues. Accordingly, not only do current 
soft-law tools not act to resolve the twin exacerbations, the concept of soft law doing so is 
flawed. For the same reasons that the ‘comply-or-explain’ concept cannot be used to resolve 
issues in private companies, other soft-law codes and related voluntary measures can also 
not be said to do so effectively. 
 
6.6. Overall Conclusion 
We can therefore see that other potential legal mitigants available under corporate law are 
lacking when it comes to mitigating the twin exacerbations. Duties of directors provide no 
protection. Breaches can be ratified by the majority, and they also include a requirement to 
act in accordance with the company’s constitution, which could mean following the 
requirements set by the majority. Similarly, there is no comfort to be gleaned from general 
obligations on shareholders to exercise their votes in a certain way. Despite some promising 
dicta which suggested that there may be obligations on the majority, these are likely to be 
incorrectly characterised to provide a narrower framework than intended. Similarly, other 
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minority remedies do not, in fact, provide adequate mitigation to the twin exacerbations. 
Doctrinally, the twin exacerbations therefore remain unmitigated by UK company law. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that they are unmitigated. It possible that the twin 
exacerbations are not unmitigated at all, but are instead mitigated by market practice rather 
than by legal regulation. If so, then there is no need to propose reform to mitigate them. The 
next chapter therefore examines whether this is the case. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. POTENTIAL MARKET MITIGANTS TO THE TWIN EXACERBATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
Thus far this thesis has identified an exception under the theoretical approach adopted to 
agency costs and externalities: indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in 
private companies are high and unmitigated. Historical analysis of legal rules has revealed 
that this has long been the case. Doctrinal analysis of current legal rules emphasises that this 
exception remains relevant, and that it is not mitigated by other areas of UK corporate law. 
The implication, therefore, is that the legal rules should be remedied to remove this 
exception. However, before we can conclude that such reform is necessary we need to 
establish whether the market has not adequately resolved this exception: if the market has 
already resolved it, there is no need to amend the legal framework. Economically, this is 
based on the Coasean conception that market actors will internalise matters wherever 
possible740– and this includes inefficient legal rules.741 Accordingly, the market will contract 
around inefficient rules to create efficient solutions. Accordingly, legal resolution of any 
such inefficient rules is only necessary when the market cannot resolve the situation.742 
Accordingly this chapter examines a theoretical and historical basis for looking to such a 
market to resolve failures in the legal regime. Having established that such resolution is 
possible, this chapter undertakes empirical leximetric research to establish whether the twin 
exacerbations are, in fact, mitigated. 
How, then, could the ‘market’ mitigate the exacerbations? One market discussed in Chapter 
2 was the geographical market for incorporations.743 This demonstrates the ability of 
shareholders to divert the jurisdiction of incorporation of their firm to a jurisdiction which 
more accurately reflects their wishes when establishing corporate vehicles. It is debatable 
whether or not jurisdictions actively compete for such inflow of incorporations.744  
Nonetheless, it is evident that, however unintended, a geographical market for incorporation 
can be said to exist – ‘buyers’ are those looking to incorporate companies, and ‘sellers’ are 
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jurisdictions in which companies can be incorporated. Buyers in this circumstance are able 
to ‘shop around’ for the jurisdiction which best suits their needs, and sellers are able to set 
the terms and conditions on which they are willing to allow incorporation: be it payment of 
fees, residency requirements, or other restrictions. However, this analysis does not apply to 
a market within a single jurisdiction, as in such a case there is only one ‘seller’ which has a 
monopoly on incorporation.  
Is there perhaps another ‘market’ that we can seek to apply to the twin exacerbations? We 
have seen that both twin exacerbations rely heavily on default rules. Our ‘market’ in this 
situation, therefore, is the ability for these default rules to be changed – if shareholders are 
routinely eschewing the default rules and replacing them with alternative, voluntary 
arrangements which mitigate the twin exacerbations, then the issue with the exception is 
resolved by alternative means. In such situations, we could analogise the shareholders as the 
buyers and these terms which apply as the products: the buyers will select the product that 
best suits their needs, in much the same way as a buyer does in a supermarket. Given that 
the twin exacerbations relate to decision making within companies, these terms will therefore 
apply to the core constitutional documents of the company. Thus, the products become 
different techniques which could be used in the company’s articles of association  
Our examination in this chapter then becomes whether there are any commonly used 
'products' available in the market which could be said to mitigate the twin exacerbations.  
 
7.2. History 
The theoretical proposition is that options available for the amendment of the articles of 
association of companies can be viewed as a marketplace from which shareholders, as 
buyers, are able to select their preferred product to best meet their needs. Is there any 
historical evidence of the use of such a market to resolve Costs in the way proposed? 
Freeman, Pearson and Taylor have identified three ‘controversies’ in pre-Bubble Act 
companies: firstly, in respect of votes per share; secondly, in respect of control over 
directors; and thirdly, in respect of access to information.745 Each of these evidence support 
for the ‘market’ approach and map directly to the analysis of Costs. 
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The first controversy linked to the number of votes per share cast by (what we would now 
consider to be) shareholders in the general court (the precursor to the general meeting). 
Freeman and others, identify that various different shareholding voting franchises were 
adopted.  At one end of the spectrum, Saltpetre Company provided shareholders with one 
vote per share, whereas at the other end, Million Bank provided shareholders with one vote 
per shareholder, regardless of the number of shares held by the shareholder.746 Along this 
spectrum various other approaches were taken: Bank of Scotland provided that no 
shareholder could own more shares than the shares which could be subscribed for with Scots 
£20,000. Each £1,000 of shareholding provided the shareholder with one vote per share, 
which limited the number of votes to twenty per shareholder.747 This approach capped the 
size of shareholding any investor could have as part of its shareholding. This prevented the 
formation of majorities. Although it was still possible for majorities to form by way of a 
coalition of shareholders, at the core of this concept was an attempt to limit any individual 
shareholder becoming too powerful and so to lower majority/minority agency costs. In other 
words, they acted to provide different products from which shareholders could chose to meet 
their requirements to lower Costs.  The Land Bank provided for ‘stepped’ shareholder 
voting: subscription for a £300 shareholding gave a shareholder two votes, a £500 
subscription gave a shareholder three votes, and a £1000 subscription gave a shareholder 
five votes, with a cap at a £1000 subscription.748 The Land Bank approach therefore also 
favoured minority investors: an investor who subscribed for £300 of stock paid £150 per 
vote, an investor who subscribed for £500 of stock paid £166.67 per vote, and an investor 
who subscribed for £1000 of stock paid £200 per vote. In other words, the smaller the stake 
the investor held in the company, the more proportional votes per pound subscribed they 
received. The cap of £1000, whilst risking coalitions, aimed to protect minorities from 
decision making by an oppressive majority – a response to an agency cost recognisable in 
modern analysis. Cooke has noted that adopting the approach of one vote per shareholder 
caused issues, as: 
 The unit of stock was commonly large, not usually less than £100, and the holder 
could split his holding and assign part of it. Such a division among his friends would 
increase his voting power in the company and in an age when Richard Roe and John 
Doe were continually flitting through the courts a temporary division of stock for 
immediate voting purposes was an easy expedient.749  
                                                     
746 WR Scott, ‘The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720’ 
vol 1 (Cambridge University Press 1911) 340. 
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In other words, regulations limiting votes on anything other than a one vote per share was 
open to abuse: someone could nominally split their shares amongst their friends and 
artificially increased the number of votes they control. This resulted in the introduction of 
restrictions by a 1767 Act which required shareholders to hold shares for at least six months 
before they received a vote on the basis of such shares.750  This response was primarily 
provided by the market rather than by law, with some legal provisions necessary to provide 
mandatory protection to the operation of this market response. Accordingly, this 
‘controversy’ reflects the theoretical proposition made in this chapter.  
Such caps were often controversial. For example, the government proposed a cap of £10,000 
per shareholder for subscribing in the East India Company which the directors objected to 
on the grounds that larger shareholdings more closely aligned their interests to those of the 
shareholders.751 This is an insight into our two exacerbations of indirect manifestations of 
the majority/minority agency cost: directors preferred to deal with larger shareholders in 
order more closely to align their interests. The response in the market varied from sliding 
scales of voting, to a cap on the number of votes any shareholder could cast.752 The market 
responded because the legal framework did not adequately protect against agency costs, with 
some legal constraints included on the operation of those market provisions.   
The second controversy was linked to the length of directors’ terms of office. Early charters 
provided for life appointment for directors, and the Bank of England directors complained 
when Parliament attempted to compel eight of its 24 directors to retire or stand for re-election 
each year.753 Eventually, after much debate, Parliament was successful in respect of the Bank 
of England as per its charter, but left matters open to the charters of individual companies.  
The third controversy was over the degree of access to books and accounts of the company 
to which shareholders were entitled. In the market, this ranged from shareholders enjoying 
a right to fully attend all meetings of directors and to receive all information supplied to 
directors in respect of such meetings, to not being allowed access to any information in the 
case of the Darien Company.754 This also clearly maps to agency costs between management 
and shareholders. 
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Freeman and others, trace 492 constitutions from 1720 (the passage of the Bubble Act) to 
1844 (the year of the introduced incorporation by registration) to review the trends regarding 
these controversies.  As regards the first controversy, they identify that caps were abandoned 
over the course of their study. As we have seen, the weighting of votes between shareholders 
remains a matter for the articles of association: the market forces provide preferred products 
so that we do not need mandatory rules to resolve them. In respect of the second controversy, 
in every company shareholders appointed directors, and 90 per cent of constitutions included 
some form of rotation for directors.  Within the study, only three companies allowed for 
terms of office for directors of ten years or more. Freeman and others, point out that there 
were no real changes in trends on this subject and no real clarity as to the legal framework 
on the subject within the timescale reviewed.755 Nevertheless, the market provided for an 
adequate response to manifestations of this agency cost, meaning that intervention by 
mandatory rule was not required. The third controversy tended towards increased restrictions 
on access to accounts by members. Over time, more and more companies restricted members' 
access to their accounts. This issue was resolved by the 1845 Act which created mandatory 
disclosure of accounts to public bodies and to shareholders. It is difficult to identify whether 
this mandatory rule was deliberately introduced to remedy this ‘controversy’, but the end 
result was that a mandatory rule was used to resolve an agency costs when the market failed 
to do so. In other words, in the pre-history of company law, two of the three controversies 
were resolved by market pressure to reduce agency costs, whereas the third was resolved by 
legislative action. Externalities were not as relevant as limited liability was not yet 
ubiquitous, which meant that (in line with the foregoing analysis) externalities were 
generally lower. 
Such market analysis depends on the ability for shareholders to decide the contractual norms. 
An earlier empirical study identified that, throughout the 1800s and 1900s deviations from 
the default rules were common, showing that markets can use deviations from default rules 
to remedy ills they perceive.756 This, therefore, appears to undermine the purpose of a legal 
analysis entirely: either shareholders will care about the twin exacerbations, and therefore 
remedy them (meaning that law has no role); or they will not care about the twin 
exacerbations, and therefore not remedy them (meaning that law does not need to have a 
role). However, factoring our Costs back into the analysis may alter this outcome. If the 
manifestation of Costs affects the ability of shareholders to use the market to remedy such 
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Costs, then it becomes necessary to consider judicial intervention. Thus, the first controversy 
identifies majority/minority Costs and posits that they were resolved by market action. 
However, we will not know whether all Costs were in fact remedied, or whether only those 
Costs that the majority allowed to be remedied were in fact remedied. Similarly, the second 
controversy as to the length of a director’s term, inevitably allowed for their re-election: 
clearly linked to owner/manager agency costs. Over time with the removal of control over 
limits to directors’ terms of office in the default rules, it may well be that in the post-Bubble 
Act this Cost reasserted itself. The third controversy evidences owner/manager agency costs 
and, to a lesser extent, given the framework in which such costs operated, externalities. This 
was not resolved by the market, and required mandatory intervention. Given the trajectory 
of increased disclosure over time,757 it is evident that market forces were not unhappy with 
the increased requirement for information. Yet the market did not resolve this controversy 
on its own. 
Accordingly, we can refine our use of the market analogy – if the market resolves the twin 
exacerbations, then they care about the twin exacerbations sufficiently to provide a market 
remedy, and if such remedy is provided there is no need for intervention. However, if the 
market does not provide a remedy, then it is necessary to examine whether the Costs 
themselves act to retard the operation of market mechanics. 
 
7.3. Empirical Study: Background 
How, then, to apply the ‘market’ analogy to the twin exacerbations. As Freeman and others, 
did with pre-Bubble Act companies, we shall establish whether the constitutional documents 
of companies were amended to mitigate the twin exacerbations. To do so, we adopt a 
quantitative, or leximetric, methodology. The term ‘leximetrics’ was coined in 2003 by 
Cooter and Ginsburg758 to describe a quantitative analytical style that developed in the late 
1990s. Leximetrics is a ‘quantitative form of empirical methodology’.759 Lele and Siems 
state that: ‘"Leximetrics" can be understood as every quantitative measurement of law.’760 
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The pioneers of this approach were La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, who 
in two articles in the late 1990s began the methodological school.761 La Porta and others, 
applied scores to laws within various jurisdictions. When comparing these to various 
financial metrics applicable to that jurisdiction, they were able to draw lines of correlation 
between aggregate scores for certain legal norms and financial metrics. They therefore 
selected a series of variables in legal norms and applied coding to allow them to establish 
correlations between different scores and financial metrics. It is important to note that such 
correlation does not imply causation.762 
The approach of La Porta and others, ‘has been and is still cited frequently and usually 
uncritically, in legal as well as economic journals’.763 Two key strands of criticism emerge: 
those of variable selection; and those of coding. On the selection of variables, Lele and Siems 
have stated:  
[T]he selection of variables must be intelligible and wide enough to function as a 
proxy for shareholder protection in general, which is not the case with La Porta et 
al’s eight variables. They do not fully capture the most significant aspects of the 
law.764 
It is therefore important to select the variables used within a leximetric data set correctly. 
Sometimes more variables are required in order to provide a more complete understanding 
of the issue.765 Lele and Siems emphasise the importance of ‘functionality’ within variables 
– that legal rules may achieve the same function in ways which appear very different. It is 
therefore important to ensure that variables are tested functionally rather than by formal 
appearance. Similarly, there have been issues raised with how La Porta and others coded 
their scores within variables. Spamman has found that re-coded data varies greatly from the 
official La Porta data set.766 Similarly, Cools found that the coding ignored various other 
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legal devices to achieve the same ends.767 It is therefore important to ensure that the coding 
is consistently and accurately performed when undertaking leximetric research. 
Leximetrics began as a method by which to analyse different legal approaches to shareholder 
protection and their effects, but has developed considerably. It is widely used in comparative 
law from testing whether corporate laws converge over time,768 to comparisons of collateral 
and bankruptcy law,769 to comparing labour law between jurisdictions.770 Such studies have 
also become more sophisticated in their analysis. Thus, studies have commenced comparing 
jurisdictions over time771 and phenomena within a single jurisdiction over time.772 This 
approach shows the flexibility of a leximetric model: rather than a traditional qualitative 
analysis, any laws can be subject to a leximetric, quantitative analysis provided that the 
variables and the coding are correct. 
For application to this thesis, the most important development of leximetric methodology 
occurred in the context of strategic reporting. Esser, MacNeil and Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna  
applied a leximetric approach to establish whether companies were complying with strategic 
reporting requirements.773 Rather than variables as to 'law' being coded, variables as to 
'compliance' were coded. This approach shows that leximetrics can be extended beyond 
coding laws to establish whether market participants are complying with statutory 
requirements of non-financial reporting. In other words, we can use the leximetric approach 
to measure what is actually taking place in the market. Esser et al used leximetrics to test 
compliance, which shows its flexibility in measuring other features of the market as well. 
We therefore test for market mitigation of the twin exacerbations utilising a leximetric 
approach to establish whether market participants are diverging from the default position in 
order to remedy the twin exacerbations – simply stated: have techniques developed within 
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the market to resolve the issues? Other empirical studies have reviewed whether market 
participants use default rules in corporate governance.774  Using leximetric techniques, we 
therefore establish whether market participants conform to the default regime, which does 
not mitigate the twin exacerbations, or diverge from the default regime and, if they do, 
whether they resolve the twin exacerbations.  
We therefore need to find a way to establish whether market participants are doing anything 
to mitigate the twin exacerbations. This we do this using public filing systems. A company's 
constitution, together with any changes to it, must be publicly filed.775 Given that our test of 
market resolution is a test as to whether the constitution of the company remedies the twin 
exacerbations, any action that market participants take to remedy the twin exacerbations 
must be publicly filed. There have been recent reforms to the public register which increases 
its utility for empirical research.776 Whilst this register has always been publicly searchable, 
the search methods have been very cumbersome. A searcher was able to review data on 
‘microfiche’,777 but this was particularly time consuming. This prevented the primary 
gathering of data, but more importantly, prevented the verification of any data collected 
which undermined the value of the quantitative research. This data was eventually uploaded 
online, and was accessible in exchange for payment for each document reviewed. On 22 
June 2015 information became easier to access with the launch of a new website which offers 
a free ‘beta’ search of the Companies House data.778 The free data enables easier data 
gathering and verification, however, it does not contain all (especially historical) records of 
companies, and accordingly when faced with the two options the paid service is more 
reliable. Nonetheless, the beta service is especially useful for research, enabling free access 
to data for the primary data gatherer and any subsequent verification of that dataset by third 
parties. This is key to ensuring that the often stark results of leximetric analysis are, in fact, 
accurate.779 Between January 2018 and March 2018 there were 167,717 companies 
incorporated in the UK.780 If the rate of incorporation was constant then this implies over 
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6,000,000 companies have been incorporated since 1 October 2009. Reviewing all of these 
articles to establish whether they converge to or diverge from the Model Articles is 
impractical. Accordingly, we need to select a sample of these companies. 
We narrow our focus to companies incorporated in Scotland for a sample period: all those 
companies incorporated in Scotland within the first month of the new Model Articles: 
October 2009. We use the term ‘Sample’ for this group. As the Companies Act 2006’s 
provisions with regard to company incorporation were introduced on 1 October 2009, the 
Sample represents the oldest group of companies incorporated under this regime. It therefore 
provides us with the longest possible period in which to evaluate what market participants 
have changed from the default regime for which specific companies. Upon registration, 
companies are each given an eight digit sequential number by Companies House which 
remains their unique identifying number.781 This is important as the names of companies can 
change,782 which may mean that tracking companies becomes difficult in the event of name 
‘swapping’ between companies or frequent changes. All companies incorporated in Scotland 
have a unique six number digit code prefaced by ‘SC’ (in contradistinction to companies 
incorporated in England which have a unique eight number digit code).783 All companies 
also have a date of incorporation which is publicly available. Accordingly, to identify our 
sample groups, we begin with the lowest six number digit code prefaced by SC on the first 
date of the sample period, and include all sequentially numbered companies up to and 
including the highest six number digit code prefaced by SC on the last date of the sample 
period.  
Companies are incorporated by filling in the correct form and submitting it to Companies 
House. The company is formed on the date that Companies House processes the form.784 
Since 1 October 2009, all companies have had to be incorporated using a form IN01, which 
means that the companies are incorporated under the 2006 Act regime.785 However, to ease 
transition from the Companies Act 1985 regime to the Companies Act 2006 regime, 
Companies House continued to process applications submitted under the Companies Act 
1985 regime, provided that they were received by Companies House (albeit not yet 
processed) prior to 1 October 2009.786 Any such applicant is subject to the regime under the 
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Companies Act 1985. Accordingly, we need to exclude any applications which fall under 
the Companies Act 1985 regime from our sample group. The twin exacerbations only occur 
in private companies, and so we exclude any other form of company from our consideration, 
including entities incorporated as public limited companies,787 private companies limited by 
guarantee,788 or unlimited companies.789 Accordingly, there are some elements of the Sample 
which must be excluded from this group before undertaking the relevant leximetric analysis. 
We have seen that leximetrics relies on the identification of variables. Having identified the 
variables to be tested, it is important to establish how they are tested. We have further seen 
that functionality is a key element of leximetrics. This concept is generally applied to legal 
systems in comparative leximetrics when it comes to identifying the correct variables,790 but 
the principles can equally be applied to the concept of coding when testing deviation.  
Initial leximetric studies used a ‘binary’ coding system (ie, assigning laws with either 0 or 
1).791 More recent leximetric studies have introduced a system of ‘non-binary’ coding to 
encapsulate more of the complicated nature of the issues being discussed.792 It has been 
stated that ‘non-binary coding can lead to more meaningful results’.793 However, it can also 
lead to confusion as it increases complexity. If multiple numbers or fractions are used, then 
avoidable value judgements are introduced as to the differences between the variables – 
when averaging over larger datasets, using fractions implies set distances between the 
fractions. For example, it is tempting to measure full compliance with a default regime at 
‘0’, full deviation from the default regime as a ‘1’, and a ‘partial’ deviation at a ‘0.5’. 
However, this approach risks misleading results as not every partial deviation would be 
exactly halfway between full convergence and full deviation. A more qualitative figure 
allocated to the degree of deviation could allow the coder to ascribe a value to partial 
deviation in 0.1 increments which would reduce this problem. However, it would add an 
unnecessary level of subjectivity (and therefore make the results less verifiable) and should 
be avoided.  
Similarly, it is tempting to create added complexity by ascribing positive and negative 
numbers. For example, it is easy to imagine coding compliance with a default rule as ‘0’, 
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deviation in a ‘shareholder friendly’ way as ‘+1’ and deviation in a ‘director friendly’ way 
as ‘-1’. However, this results in the figures cancelling each other out on aggregation: a 
sample of 100 companies in which 50 diverged in a ‘shareholder friendly’ way, and 50 in a 
‘director friendly’ way, would produce an average score of 0, which implies pure 
convergence to the default rule instead of the full deviation that is actually seen. 
Accordingly, such an approach complicates a simple overview of the Sample. 
In order to avoid these complications, we use leximetrics merely to establish whether the 
market have moved away from the (flawed) default regime. We therefore establish, for each 
of the variables identified, whether functionally the constitution of the company in question 
converges with the default regime or not. If it does converge, it receives a ‘0’ and if it 
diverges it receives a ‘1’. This enables us to establish which companies have functionally 
diverged from the default position. We can then undertake further study of any material 
deviations to establish whether they point to any discernible trends in how such deviations 
manifest. In other words, our first step is to use the crudest form of leximetrics to establish 
quantitatively whether there is any deviation from the default regime. If there is, our second 
step is to examine this deviation qualitatively to establish whether it can be said to mitigate 
the twin exacerbations. 
7.4. Empirical Study: Variables and Coding 
Having identified our sample group, the next stage is to identify our variables. We consider 
three variables to establish whether the market resolves the twin exacerbations.                   
7.4.1. Entrenchment 
We have seen that the Companies Act 2006 enabled, but did not require, any article within 
the articles of association to be ‘entrenched’.794 By way of recap, when entrenched an article 
subverts the general rule that articles of association can be amended by special resolution.795 
An entrenched article within the articles of association can be ‘amended or repealed only if 
conditions are met, or procedures are complied with, that are more restrictive than those 
applicable in the case of a special resolution’.796 Accordingly, any article within a company’s 
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articles is entrenched if it provides that it can only be amended with the agreement of 85 per 
cent of the shareholders. Entrenched articles can either be included on formation797 or 
inserted by unanimous resolution.798 If entrenchment were commonly utilised it would have 
the potential to mitigate the twin exacerbations as it would require the minority to consent 
to any change in respect of the entrenched position. Thus, if the division of powers were 
entrenched, the division-of-powers exacerbation would be mitigated as the minority would 
need to be involved in any such decision. The directors would not feel the need to act in a 
manner designed to appease the majority. Moreover, the presence of any entrenchment 
would imply an acknowledgment by the market that, on occasion, higher majorities are 
required. Thus, even if the market regularly entrenches articles, but not any articles relevant 
to the twin exacerbations, this would be as revealing – it would show that the market 
acknowledges the need, and has the ability, to entrench articles on occasion, but does not 
acknowledge a need to use the entrenchment mechanism to remedy the twin exacerbations.  
Accordingly, we can split our study into two stages: first, quantitatively, does the market use 
entrenchment, and if it does, then second, qualitatively, if this technique is used in any way 
to mitigate the twin exacerbations.  
Our first variable is to examine whether or not any articles within the articles of association 
have been entrenched by each member of the Sample group. The default regime allows for 
entrenched articles but does not mandate any. Therefore, a constitution without an 
entrenched article within their articles of association is coded with a ‘0’, and a constitution 
with an entrenched article is coded with a ‘1’.  
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7.4.2. Powers of Directors 
Our second variable examines whether there are any changes to the default regime for the 
powers of directors. It is possible that the market has established a mechanism to resolve this 
exacerbation. We shall first establish whether the market has deviated from the default 
regime and, if it has, how it has varied it. We therefore establish whether a constitution has 
any variation on the usual division of powers – that directors exercise all powers of the 
company subject to a special resolution and the rest of the constitution. If the constitution 
converges functionally with the default regime, it is coded with a ‘0’. Any variation from 
this is coded with a ‘1’, including: 
a.  any embedded restriction on the powers of directors; 
b. any ability to direct shareholders by a lesser or greater majority than 
special resolution; and/or 
c. any ability for instructions to have retrospective effect. 
If there is any such deviation we analyse the changes made qualitatively. 
7.4.3. Dismissal of Directors 
The analysis so far has concentrated on the operation of the statutory regime for removing 
directors. However, the default constitutional position provides for circumstances in which 
a director is automatically removed from office.799 These provisions are all either automatic 
or under the control of the director whose termination is in question. It is possible for the 
market to provide for removal regimes which adequately resolve this exacerbation outside 
the statutory framework. Our third and final variable is, therefore, whether or not the market 
does so. Deferring to the functionality principle, the key coding issue is that a director 
vacates her position by her own choice or automatically due to a prescribed event. There is 
no possibility under the Model Articles for the other directors or shareholders to remove a 
director, although this right obviously appears in the statutory regime. Accordingly, this 
variable is coded ‘0’ where termination events are either at the under the control of the 
outgoing director or automatic, and as ‘1’ where other parties have the ability to require a 
director to resign. The ability of directors or shareholders to remove a director only after the 
occurrence of certain events which the director controls (eg, her prolonged absence) will 
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therefore be coded as ‘0’ on the ground that rights to remove the director are inherently 
linked to, and contingent upon, the actions of that director. After coding, we undertake a 
qualitative analysis of any divergent articles. 
 
7.4.4. Summary 
A summary of the coding for the variables is as follows: 
Variable Provision for 0 (ie, 
convergence with 
default) 
Provision for 1 (ie, 
deviation from default) 
Entrenchment No entrenchment Entrenchment 
Powers of 
Directors 
Unlimited unless 
otherwise stated by 
shareholder direction 
Limited in any other way 
Dismissal of 
Directors 
Automatic vacation 
on resignation, 
financial difficulty, 
or health 
 
Ability of directors or (in 
addition to CA 2006) 
shareholders to require 
resignation 
 
On incorporation each company must file its constitution, failing which the default 
constitution applies.800 We therefore code the initial constitution of each member of the 
Sample. The constitution adopted on incorporation is not, of course, the end of the matter. 
A company is able to amend its constitution.801 We therefore explore the constitutions of the 
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Sample group over time, including any amendments. We also explore whether companies 
which have already diverged from the default position are more likely to amend their 
constitutions than those that have not.  
We therefore code any subsequent amendments to companies’ constitutions since their 
incorporation to a cut-off date of 1 December 2017. All constitutions were downloaded from 
Companies House beta, and reviewed between 1 January 2018 and 31 March 2018. This 
remains a beta service and so it is possible that there may be further additional companies 
listed which are marked as ‘none’ as at such dates, and similarly some of the companies 
which were available at such dates may not remain available.  
 
7.5. Empirical Results 
7.5.1. Sample Group 
The Sample consists of 1,417 companies. Details of the companies involved in the Sample 
are included in Table 1. When we apply our exclusions from the Sample: 
(a) 8 were incorporated using forms from the Companies Act 1985 
regime that must have been received from Companies House prior 
to 1 October 2009 but were only processed subsequently. 
Accordingly, they are incorporated under the 1985 Act's terms and 
are excluded; 
(b) 24 are not private limited companies and so are excluded (20 are 
companies limited by guarantee, 3 are public limited companies, 
and 1 is an unlimited company); and 
(c) 291 companies are not listed on Companies House beta. The 
formal paid site, Companies House Direct, confirms that the vast 
majority of these companies were incorporated in October 2009 
but had been dissolved by June 2012. These companies are listed 
as having company name ‘None’ in Table 1. No further 
information in respect of these companies was publicly available 
without charge when the constitutions were downloaded and they 
therefore are excluded. 
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Accordingly, from the initial sample the 1,417 is reduced to 1,094. 
Table 1 also shows the coding of variables for the 1,094 companies constituting the Sample 
on their incorporation.  The results appear immediately below. 
Variable Number of 
Divergent Articles 
(ie, Coded ‘1’) 
Percentage of 
Divergent Articles 
Entrenchment 0802 0% 
Powers of Directors 11 1% 
Dismissal of 
Directors 
38 3.47% 
 
From this it appears that the market does not, on incorporation, mitigate the twin 
exacerbations. From our Sample on incorporation, entrenchment is not used at all. This 
means that it is not used in the market to effect a wider mitigation of majority/minority 
agency costs arising in private companies. One per cent amended the powers of directors. 
However, of these 11 companies, one (SC367627) amended the powers to provide that 
director representatives of certain shareholders must be present for the directors to be quorate 
and to proceed to business. The other 10 companies diverged by providing specific 
overriding powers to majority shareholders to direct, in any way, the actions of the company. 
Six of these companies provided for this threshold to be 90 per cent and 4 provided for 75 
per cent This is an improvement on the twin exacerbations by requiring more of the minority 
to consent, but does not fully resolve them as there remains an unprotected minority. For the 
purposes of this thesis, we can see minimal evidence of the market providing a resolution to 
the first exacerbation on incorporation. The relevant article is not entrenched on 
                                                     
802 One constitution merely ticked a box on the incorporation form which stated that an article was 
entrenched, without actually providing for an entrenched article. Accordingly, its coding is ‘0’. 
185 
 
incorporation, nor is it varied in the market (other than a minority of companies which have 
introduced additional, majority-friendly metrics). 
It can also not be said that there is any evidence of market responses to the second 
exacerbation on incorporation. Just under 3.5 per cent of companies varied from the default 
position on their incorporation. Table 2 sets out the nature of those variations, which can be 
summarised as: 
 
Nature of Deviation from Default Regime Number of Companies 
Unanimous resolution of the other directors 7 
Repetition of statutory test without change 19 
Notice of removal by majority shareholders  5 
Notice of removal by 75% shareholders 4 
Removal by specified shareholders 1 
Removal by specified shareholders or 
removal by other directors for cause 
2 
 
Nineteen of the 38 companies which varied from the default position merely restated the 
statutory test in the same terms, which is coded as a ‘1’ because it differs from the default 
regime in the Model Articles. An additional 5 provided for removal of a director by notice 
from a mere majority, and a further 4 provided for removal of a director by notice from 75 
per cent of shareholders of their removal. Once again, this slightly improves, but does not 
resolve, this exacerbation. Seven of the other variations enabled directors to remove one of 
their number. Two of the variations allowed either a specified shareholder to remove a 
director, or for the other directors to remove a director (the latter for cause only), and one 
variation allowed only a specified shareholder to remove a director. None of these methods 
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mitigates our exacerbation, and the low number of divergent companies means that neither 
of the twin exacerbations is adequately mitigated within the market on incorporation of 
companies. 
7.5.2. Sample Change of Articles 
Having reviewed results for the incorporation metrics of the Sample, it is necessary to review 
the amendment results for the Sample (ie, the summary of changes that have taken place in 
our sample post-incorporation). Table 3 shows the details of the companies which amended 
their constitutions, and the coding of the constitutions of such companies.  
Table 1 shows us that 65 companies (or 5.94%) changed their constitution at some point 
since their incorporation. This is a very low percentage. Of these, 14 made a further change 
to their constitutions, and 2 companies changed their constitutions twice more. 24.61% of 
companies who changed their constitutions once after incorporation went on to change them 
again. This is considerably higher than the percentage of companies who changed their 
constitution since incorporation. This combination results in there being 81 changes to 
articles of association across the Sample, and shows that a company is more likely to change 
its constitution again if it has already changed it previously.  
Of the restated constitutions, the coding across the 81 is as follows: 
 
Variable Number of 
Divergent (ie, 
Coded ‘1’) on 
Amendment 
Percentage 
of Divergent 
Articles on 
Amendment 
Percent of 
Divergent 
Articles on 
Incorporation 
Entrenchment 0 0% 0% 
Powers of 
Directors 
14 17.28% 1% 
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Dismissal of 
Directors 
40 49.38% 3.47% 
 
This shows that markets are more likely to diverge from the default position on these three 
variables when they subsequently amended their constitutions. This seems inevitable given 
the high convergence on initial incorporation, but there are, of course, many other 
amendments to the constitutional framework which could be made.  
In terms of the types of deviation arising in respect of powers of directors: 
 
Nature of Deviation from Default Regime Number of Companies 
Ability for majority shareholders to limit powers of 
directors 
8 
Ability for unanimous shareholder action to limit 
powers of directors 
3 
Directors restricted by reference to private 
shareholders' agreement 
3 
 
8 of the 14 deviations amongst the amendments gave express majority power to alter the 
division of powers. 3 of the 14 deviations referred to the activities of directors being 
restricted by reference to a private shareholders' agreement. 3 of the 14 deviations provided 
for unanimous shareholder action to amend the division of powers. This is the only form 
which resolved the exacerbation caused by the division of powers, yet its take up of this 
‘market product’ for resolving this exacerbation is minimal.  
Nearly half of the constitutional amendments varied the position in respect of removing 
directors. In terms of those deviations: 
188 
 
Nature of Deviation from Default Regime Number of Companies 
Cessation of employment 2 
Notice of removal by majority shareholders 8 
Notice of removal by 75% shareholders 2 
Notice of removal by 100% shareholders 3 
Removal by class of shares who appointed 
directors 
13 
Unanimous resolution of the other directors 4 
A named individual having rights to remove 
any director 
1 
Repetition of the statutory test 1 
Removal by other directors for cause 1 
Removal of any directors by the majority of 
one class of shares 
1 
Breach of shareholders' agreement 2 
 
 
Once again, only 3 of these amendments can be said to operate to reduce the twin 
exacerbations: each by the notice of removal by 100% of shareholders. Even then, these 
constitutions did not amend the statutory regime, leading to an ability for this exacerbation 
to remain. 
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Of the 1,175 constitutions of private companies reviewed across the Sample (consisting of 
1,094 constitutions on incorporation and 81 amendments to the constitution), we can see the 
following aggregate results: 
Variable Number of 
Deviating 
(ie, Coded 
‘1’) in 
Aggregate 
Percentage 
of 
Deviating 
Articles  
Number 
Deviating in 
a way which 
mitigates 
exacerbation 
Percentage 
of 
mitigating 
articles 
Entrenchment 0 0% 0 0% 
Powers of Directors 25 2.13% 3 0.0025% 
Dismissal of 
Directors 
78 6.64% 3 0.0025% 
 
This shows a very low level of deviation from the default rule, and an even smaller deviation 
in a manner which can be stated to have mitigated the twin exacerbations.  
 
7.6. Do market forces operate? 
We can therefore conclude that the market we have analysed does not act to mitigate the 
twin exacerbations. There are two potential reasons for this: either the market does not 
consider that the twin exacerbations require to be mitigated (which can arise from deliberate 
action or lack of knowledge that the twin exacerbations exist), or there is some element 
which blocks the market from acting adequately to remedy the twin exacerbations.  
Each of the potential market remedies we explored requires the agreement of the majority: 
they are needed to entrench articles; they are needed to amend articles; to divert power from 
the directors; and to change the mechanisms for removing directors. Consequently, the 
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market approach can only operate to mitigate the twin exacerbations if the majority agree to 
such an approach. Thus, viewing constitutional flexibility as a market helps demonstrate that 
it can act to reduce owner/manager agency costs. This is on the ground that the victim of the 
costs (owner) is able to use these options against the cost-generator by amending the 
constitution – a right which only the cost-victim has. However, these tools cannot be seen 
adequately to remedy majority/minority agency costs within the same category, as it requires 
the majority of that category to sign up in the first place. 
Accordingly, an intra-shareholder, market-driven response as a method to remedy the twin 
exacerbations exhibits the same structural flaw that arose in the context of unfair prejudice803 
– it can only operate in this way if the majority agree to it. In other words, the protection 
only arises by agreement with the putative wrongdoer.  In the case of market resolution, this 
is by the majority agreeing to the company's constitution being amended in such a way. In 
the case of unfair prejudice, this is by way of the majority agreeing to act a certain way 
towards the minority, breach of which will result in a claim. But any attempted resolution of 
an agency cost which requires the agreement of the potential wrongdoer, risks becoming 
circular: those who would not act to manifest agency costs (and therefore were not a concern) 
will readily sign up to a meaningless protection, whilst those who would (and therefore are 
the concern) would not agree to be bound. This may not apply to diversified shareholders 
who hold minority stakes in a number of firms, who may have an incentive to provide a 
solution to the twin manifestations across the market. There are two comments which can be 
made in respect of this exception. First, most such investors would likely use investment in 
traded companies only in order to enable a re-alignment of their portfolios and so are 
irrelevant as regards the twin exacerbations. Second, any such investor in a private company 
is generally aiming to acquire a majority stake (eg,  private equity companies), which would 
negate her incentive to resolve the twin exacerbations across the market. 
This means that not only does the market not currently mitigate the twin exacerbations, there 
are strong theoretical reasons why it may not be able be used to mitigate them at all within 
the category of shareholders, whilst decisions are made by majority. 
                                                     
803 See Chapter 6.4.3. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8. RESOLVING THE TWIN EXACERBATIONS 
8.1. Introduction 
We have seen so far that the twin exacerbations are exceptions from a theoretical perspective: 
law generally protects potential suffers of direct or indirect manifestations of Costs by way 
of mandatory rules or through the comply-or-explain principle, but does nothing to protect 
indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in private companies. 
Majority/minority agency costs are manifested through directors – either acting on the 
instructions of the majority, or out of fear of the majority to protect their position. Indeed, 
these indirect manifestations are actively exacerbated by two features: the ability of 
shareholders to transfer the powers of the company from directors to shareholders (in both 
cases via the majority), and the ability of shareholders to remove directors. 
The presence of weaknesses in the UK regime for protection of minorities is not the received 
wisdom. La Porta and others coded that the UK had strong shareholder protection, including 
minority protection,804 and that this resulted in a well-developed financial market.805 This 
appears not align to the conclusions of this thesis. There are two reasons for this. First, La 
Porta and others have been criticised for being overly simplistic in their variables and their 
grading.806 Similarly, as noted in paragraph 7.3, any element of correlation between the 
development of the financial market and shareholder protection is not evidence of causation. 
This means that we cannot use the fact that there is such a strong financial market to 
undermine the outcomes of this thesis. Second, La Porta and others, are only interested in 
international comparisons rather than absolute outcomes. Accordingly, their analysis is that 
the UK’s legal regime is more shareholder friendly than other jurisdictions. That may well 
be the case, although it is subject to the criticisms noted. However, even if it is the case, it 
does not mean that the UK regime is flawless, or that it is not in need of reform. Merely 
because other systems may be worse does not mean that we should stop trying to improve 
the UK position. 
The twin exacerbations are a structural flaw which exists under UK law, and are not 
mitigated by other elements of corporate law. They are also not mitigated by market action, 
                                                     
804 R La Porta and others, ‘Law and finance’ (1998) 106(6) Journal of Political Economy 1113, 1130. 
805 R La Porta and others, ‘Legal determinants of external finance’ (1997) 52(3) Journal of Finance 1131. 
806 See the criticisms of the La Porta approach outlined in para 7.3. 
192 
 
and it is likely that market action is incapable of mitigating them. This, therefore, leads us to 
the conclusion that it is necessary to resolve them by some legal mechanism. This chapter 
explores potential methods to mitigate the twin exacerbations. It initially attempt to find a 
generic solution that will resolve both, and having failed to do so, it proposes individual 
methods for resolving each of the twin exacerbations. 
 
8.2. A Generic Resolution? 
The twin exacerbations are based on the ability of the majority to instruct action to their own 
advantage, without adequately considering the minority. If either of these elements are 
resolved, then the twin exacerbations are also resolved. This means that removing majority 
rule,807 or imposing duties on shareholders when acting as shareholders808 have the potential 
to resolve the twin exacerbations by making a single, generic change to UK company law. 
But is either change desirable? 
We have seen advantages to majority rule. It helps prevent the minority acting as a ‘hold 
out’ and exercising a ‘liberum veto’ over the life of the company. More than this, it helps 
collectivise shareholders to respond more efficiently and take self-help to resolve 
owner/manager agency costs.809 Removing majority rule generally would therefore increase 
the chances of deadlock, stasis, and would reduce the shareholders' ability to defend against 
agency costs from managers. A wholescale removal, therefore, appears counterproductive. 
Both Easterbrook and Fischel, and Berle and Means, agree that majority rule is an important 
tool, but that occasionally its effects need to be tempered.810 Accordingly, rather than 
replacing majority rule, a better course is to temper its effects. 
Can this be done by ascribing a duty to the majority when voting their shares, as happens in 
Delaware? After all, this would seem to be an ‘off the shelf’ resolution which could be 
adopted in UK law as a ‘package deal’. Despite dicta in the UK which claim that such a duty 
exists, it does not.811 Accordingly, introducing such a duty would fundamentally change the 
nature of owning a share in the UK: rather than a share being purely a piece of personal 
                                                     
807 See Chapter 5.2. 
808 See Chapter 6.3. 
809 See Chapter 5.2.1. 
810 See nn 505 and 506 respectively. 
811 See Chapter 6.3.2(b). 
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property, duties would attach to the rights shareholders receive from their shareholding.812 
It is difficult to establish what the scope of any such duty would be. Would it be a generic 
standard applicable to all shareholders? If so, would it cover failure to act as well as the 
actions of shareholders?813 This would place many shareholders at risk of accidental breach 
of such a new duty imposed after they became shareholders. In addition, we have seen that 
Delaware required extensive litigation to establish the precise boundaries of a majority 
fiduciary duty. This indicates that the introduction of any such duty risks uncertainty. The 
same issues arise if we attempt to apply extant directors’ duties to shareholders in instances 
where shareholders be able to act in the name of the company (as in Delaware and New 
Zealand). When does the switch take place and is it absolute? Attempting to adopt either of 
these approaches (generic shareholder duties, or shareholders having imputed directors’ 
duties) raises several variables and uncertainties which will not easily be resolved under UK 
law. It also creates further potential lacunae in which indirect manifestations may arise. 
Instead, we can attempt to find a solution which avoids the need to deal with these variables 
and uncertainties. We have seen a theoretical link between the concept of any ‘duties’ and 
the concomitant ‘powers’ which attach to them.814 This is conceptually sensible: the greater 
the power, the greater the duty associated with that power. Rather than change the ‘duties’ 
element of the equation, it may therefore be preferable to reduce the ‘powers element of the 
equation to make it unnecessary to introduce new duties for a large number of shareholders 
who have not agreed to the imposition of those duties. This would match Bainbridge's 
normative discussion of how the interaction between shareholders and directors should 
operate.815 
Indeed, it could be argued that this is the logical corollary of the UK position that shares are 
purely private property to be used however the holder wishes: early defences of shareholders' 
abilities to hold meetings were justified on the ground that their ability to hold such meetings 
was the only way that shareholders had to ‘interfere’ in the running of the company.816 If 
powers were curtailed using a method which did not remove other protections, then it would 
not be necessary to include such a duty. Perhaps, then, a generic resolution to the twin 
exacerbations is neither necessary nor desirable. Instead, if we resolve the individual 
exacerbations they will be mitigated. 
                                                     
812 Current duties are effectively limited to paying calls on any unpaid shares. 
813 See discussion in Chapter 5.3. 
814 See Chapter 5.3. 
815 See n 9. 
816 Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin (1884) LR 25 Ch D 320, 329 (per Cotton LJ). 
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8.3. Mandatory Division of Powers 
The first exacerbation, the risk that shareholders threaten (overtly or tacitly) directors with 
usurping the powers to make directors manifest majority/minority agency costs (or the 
directors act in a manner to appease the majority to avoid such threat), can be resolved by 
introducing a statutory division of powers. This would return the UK to its initial position,817 
as well as following global trends.818 This is a simple and blunt approach in that it resolves 
the exacerbations without causing any downsides. Other than the vague concept that the 
entire governance structure of a company should be able to be decided contractually by its 
participants, there are no advantages to such a rule. Whilst flexibility may be an overriding 
intention of the UK corporate law sphere,819 we have seen in this thesis that, in this area, 
flexibility causes an active harm. And it does so for limited benefit. If the first exacerbation 
exists to avoid majority shareholders being excluded from the management of the company, 
then such shareholders can become involved by also assuming the capacity of directors of 
the company: and therefore be subject to the existing regimes which govern those managing 
companies. Accordingly, the limited benefits of the flexibility in this regime can be achieved 
by other routes which avoid the harm caused by the regime. It could be argued that 
shareholders may not wish to make the transition to being directors. It is difficult, however, 
to understand this objection: the proposition is merely that those who act as managers of the 
company should be subject to the duties which apply to such management, This would avoid 
any current (and potential future) lack of clarity between the division of responsibility and 
duties between an active shareholder and a passive director: as a director then one has duties 
and powers to act on behalf of the company, whereas as a shareholder one has the right to 
act purely in your own interests on a limited number of matters.  
Indeed, the current voluntary regime is, in fact, unworkable. Even when put on notice by the 
publicly-filed articles of association that the shareholders may exercise the powers of the 
company rather than directors, it is unclear what a third party would require to interact with 
the company. Whilst company law provides a regime for third parties dealing with directors 
in good faith – to protect the third parties820– it offers no equivalent for interacting with 
                                                     
817 See Chapter 4.2. See also the proposal in the 1844 Report to clearly distinguish between the two bodies as 
a method of regulating agency costs. 
818 See Chapter 5.2. 
819 Gower and Davies, para 3-3. 
820 See Chapter 3.6. 
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shareholders. This is clearly based on the argument that directors’ powers are inherently 
delegated to them by the general meeting, and so all undelegated authority sits with the 
shareholders. This means that third parties need no evidence of the authority of shareholders. 
However, it is unclear how comfortable third parties would be transacting with shareholders 
on behalf of the company in practice. Accordingly it is unclear how the exercise of the 
existing shareholder power to assume the powers of the company qua shareholder, could be 
practical vis-à-vis third parties. The ability of shareholders to assume powers, therefore, only 
acts as a threat to directors: one which, as this thesis has shown, can have severe 
consequences. 
However, the total exclusion of shareholders from the management of the company is 
significant. Every formulation of the division of powers, whether mandatory or by default,821 
includes an ability for shareholders to mandate or restrain directors in their performance of 
some activity. If shareholders have the power to mandate activity, then whilst overt 
appropriations of funds are likely to be ineffective for other corporate law reasons,822 they 
still create a lacuna whereby directors (with duties) could be mandated to undertake activity 
by the majority (without duties) which is not in the company's interest. The directors would 
then be faced with either breaching their duties to act in accordance with the company's 
constitution (if they ignore the instruction), or breaching their duties to act in the best 
interests of the company (if they carry out the instruction). As the majority are those able to 
ratify breaches; directors would likely carry out the instruction, leaving this exacerbation 
still unmitigated. 
It is more difficult to establish whether shareholders should be able to restrain activity 
proposed by directors. On the one hand, power to stop directors from following one of a 
series of viable options, provides an important power for shareholders to direct the company 
in the manner that they wish it to develop. On the other hand, an ability to resist the only 
viable option provides the same risk that we have seen in respect of this exacerbation. We 
therefore need a mechanism whereby the shareholders are able to restrain activity by the 
directors, but directors are able to override this when necessary.823 The next issue is, 
therefore, how to test whether such an override is necessary. We have seen that in the context 
of review of shareholder decision making, Gower and Davies consider that three potentially 
possible versions of the test could be applied: that the shareholders considered the activity 
                                                     
821 See Chapter 4.2. 
822 See Chapter 6.3. 
823 The inverse of the facts in Automatic Self Cleansing, where the shareholders attempted to mandate 
something and the directors refused to do it. 
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subjectively to be in the interests of the company; that the courts objectively establish 
whether the activity was objectively in the interests of the company; and a hybrid view 
between the two.824 We can consider applying these metrics to establish when directors 
should be able to override shareholder instructions. 
It is unusual for directors to ignore the wishes of shareholders. Shareholders, subject to the 
discussion in what follows below, are able to remove directors and are required to approve 
any of their long-term service contracts.825 It can therefore be assumed that directors will use 
this override power sparingly due to the severe reputational damage the face among the 
shareholders should the veto power be exercised. The directors should therefore be able to 
exercise this veto power if they subjectively believe it is in the best interests of the company 
to do so. Apart from providing certainty for directors, concentrating on the subjective 
element avoids majority capture: it enables directors to ignore an instruction to refrain from 
action without the majority arguing that the actions of the directors were not, in fact, in the 
interests of the company (which can be conflated with the majority). 
The current wording of the default regime is: 
3. Directors’ general authority 
3. Subject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the management 
of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all the 
powers of the company. 
4. Shareholders’ reserve power 
4. (1) The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to 
take, or refrain from taking, specified action. 
(2) No such special resolution invalidates anything which the directors 
have done before the passing of the resolution.826 
Section 17 of the Companies Act 2006 is the section which deals with the company's 
constitution generally, and section 18 is the first section of the chapter which deals with the 
articles of association. It is therefore sensible for any new section which resolves this 
exacerbation to be introduced between the two.  
                                                     
824 See Chapter 6.3. 
825Companies Act 2006, s 227. 
826 Model Articles 3 and 4. 
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The first proposal of this thesis is therefore to introduce a new section 17A to the Companies 
Act 2006 which reads: 
17A  Directors' authority 
(1)  Notwithstanding any other provision in the company's constitution, the 
directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for 
which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company.827 
(2) The shareholders may, subject to subsection 3, by special resolution, direct 
the directors to refrain from taking specified action.828 
(3)  The directors may ignore such a special resolution if they honestly and 
genuinely believe that to undertake the action restrained by such special 
resolution is in the best interests of the company.829 
(4) No such special resolution invalidates anything which the directors have done 
before the passing of the resolution.830 
 
Introducing such a statutory provision would resolve the first of the twin exacerbations. 
Directors would no longer be concerned that, if they did not undertake activity to appease 
the majority, their powers would be usurped. It therefore acts to mitigate agency costs 
suffered by the minority. 
This change rights a number of wrongs: 
A. historically, there was no reason for this provision to move to the articles of 
association.831 Such transfer was, therefore, an anomaly; 
B. theoretically, it provides mandatory protection for a risk of a Cost, bringing 
the area in line with the general theoretical approach advanced;832 
                                                     
827 This retains the current default language but replaces ‘subject to the articles’ with ‘notwithstanding any 
other provision of the company's constitution’. This means that this new section will apply to all companies, 
including companies which are currently in existence. 
828 This retains the current default wording but makes two changes. Firstly it adds ‘subject to subsection 3’ to 
provide for the override of this right by directors. Secondly, the words ‘take action or’ have been deleted for 
the reasons outlined above. 
829 This enables the override by directors. 
830 This retains the existing language in the default regime which states that any such action by shareholders 
does not invalidate anything that went before – which, amongst other things, can protect third parties. 
831 See Chapter 4.2. 
832 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
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C. comparatively, it aligns UK law to other jurisdictions and to the trajectory of 
reform undertaken in other jurisdictions,833 without causing the uncertainty 
(and therefore the need for litigation) that has arisen in other jurisdictions by 
either trying to apply blanket duties to shareholders, or switching directors' 
duties to shareholders in certain circumstances; and 
D. empirically, the market does not resolve this exacerbation of Costs, and is 
unlikely to be able to do so.834 
 
 
8.4. Removal of Directors 
Resolving the first exacerbation makes the considerations which give rise to the second 
exacerbation more pressing: if shareholders are excluded from directly assuming 
management of the company, they face an increased risk of being subjected to 
owner/manager agency costs. The ability of shareholders to remove directors therefore 
assumes even greater importance. A move to protect the minority by introducing unanimity 
as a requirement for the removal of directors is therefore flawed: it would enable a director 
with one share to resist removal, and so risk direct and indirect manifestations of 
owner/manager agency costs. We therefore need to find a way to ensure that the ability of 
shareholders to remove directors remains effective if we are to combat owner/manager 
agency costs whilst at the same time mitigating the indirect manifestation of 
majority/minority agency costs arising therefrom. We have seen in several cases related to 
the obligations of shareholder voting, that courts often state that there is a duty to vote in the 
best interests of the company, but that this has generally been interpreted in a way which 
prioritises majority control.835 Whilst this approach mitigates owner/manager agency costs, 
it shifts such costs to the minority. Australia and New Zealand provide no further assistance 
in resolving this exacerbation, and it would be only partially resolved by Delaware's 
‘staggered board’ approach – Delaware relies on the duties imposed on shareholders (which 
we have rejected) to complete the resolution of the exacerbation. 
Although we have shown that a generic change to shareholder voting rules is undesirable, 
there is no reason why this specific ability could not be adapted. This would mean that voting 
                                                     
833 See Chapter 5.3. 
834 See Chapter 7.5. 
835 See Chapter 6.3.2(a). 
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shares to remove directors would be treated differently to other rights to vote shares, but this 
is the case anyway: the requirement to provided special notice;836 the right of directors to 
make representations to any such meeting;837 and that such resolution cannot be decided by 
way of written resolution838 mean that shareholder resolutions to remove directors already 
differ from other resolutions. In addition, company law acknowledges that conflicted 
shareholders should be excluded from voting when it comes to decisions involving whether 
to ratify wrongs by directors.839  Company law therefore already acknowledges that 
resolutions to remove directors should be subject to a separate regime, and that votes cast by 
shareholders can, in certain circumstances, fall outside the normal regime when it comes to 
voting. 
It is therefore a natural extension of the above to mitigate this exacerbation by adjusting rules 
on how shareholders can vote on such a resolution. This can be achieved by requiring 
shareholders to cast their votes ‘in the best interests of the company’ on a decision to remove 
a director. This would solve both policy aims: it would enable shareholders to act by way of 
majority rule to remove directors who are not acting in the best interests of the company. As, 
in effect, the best interests of the company translates as the best interests of the shareholders 
of the company,840 this would protect shareholders as a whole. It also avoids the 
displacement of this agency cost from the majority to the minority – the minority will have 
the protection that the majority cannot act capriciously when making such a decision.  
We have seen that the current formulation of the interests of the company leads to risks of 
majority capture.841 This primarily arises, however, as a result of the majority being able to 
ratify any breaches of this obligation (on behalf of shareholders as a whole). By applying 
this test within the shareholder constituency, we remove the ability of the majority to capture 
ratification of this breach and therefore avoid the concerns. This, in turn, would enable 
directors to be more objective in managing the company as they would be aware that 
shareholders would be unable to remove them for capricious reasons. 
On the other hand, there may be a concern that this amendment would create the same risks 
of providing too much power to the minority, and so create the issues which are avoided by 
the concept of majority rule. There is a risk that such a power could be used capriciously by 
                                                     
836 Companies Act 2006, s 168(2). 
837 ibid s 169. 
838 ibid s 288(2)(a). 
839 ibid s 239. 
840 ibid s 172. 
841 See Chapter 3.8. 
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minority shareholders (including removed directors who also hold shares) to challenge any 
decision to remove a director, thus embroiling shareholders in costly litigation. To avoid 
this, we should borrow techniques from the ‘derivative claim’ mechanism that works to 
protect owner/manager agency costs.842 We could require a court intervention to establish 
whether the objecting shareholder has a prima facie case prior to commencing action.,843 The 
court could refuse the action if it considers the outcome to be objectively in the best interests 
of the company,844 and a claim will be refused if the exclusion of all of the affected shares 
(held by all challenged shareholders) would produce the same result.845 This would provide 
the majority with the comfort that their decisions would not be challenged as a matter of rote 
– as the challenge would need to pass certain hurdles in order to succeed. These hurdles are 
designed, as with the derivative claim, to ensure that the mechanism provides the intended 
protection without becoming open to abuse. 
This mechanism would resolve our exacerbation as it would mean that a vote by the majority 
to remove a director could be challenged if it were not in the best interests of the company 
(ie, if it were only in the interests of the majority). It would also resolve the current issues 
with the Bushell v Faith operation: even if a director's shares were, by operation of weighted 
voting, required to obtain a majority, failure of such director to vote in favour of a resolution 
to remove her could be challenged if it could be shown that her removal is in the interests of 
the company. In other words, rather than weakening the ability for shareholders to hold 
directors to account, the proposed formulation actually strengthens it. At the same time the 
issues with both categories of agency costs would be resolved. 
Under the current regime, section 168 provides the right for shareholders to remove 
directors, and section 169 provides for the right of directors to object to such a proposal. It 
is sensible to introduce our new requirements between these two sections as section168A: 
168A  Shareholder Voting Obligations 
                                                     
842 See Chapter 6.4.2. 
843 Companies Act 2006, s 261. 
844 This is based on the Companies Act 2006, s 263(2)(a), which provides that a derivative proceeding cannot 
continue if it is not in the best interests of the company to continue it.   
845 This is based on Companies Act 2006, s 263(2)(c), which provides that the derivative claim must fail if it 
could be ratified. Applying this from owner/manager agency costs, the equivalent is if the minority would 
have decided the same way. 
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(1)  Each shareholder shall cast any vote pursuant to section 168 and any 
provision in the constitution of the company which enables shareholders to 
remove directors in the best interests of the company.846 
(2) a member of a company may raise proceedings to set aside any votes cast in 
breach of the requirement specified in subsection (1) in order to protect the 
interests of the company and obtain a remedy on its behalf with the leave of 
the court.847 
(3)  An application for leave must– 
(a) specify the cause of action, and 
(b) summarise the facts on which such proceedings are to be based. 
(4)  If it appears to the court that the application and the evidence produced by 
the applicant in support of it do not disclose a prima facie case for granting 
it, the court– 
(a) must refuse the application, and 
(b) may make any consequential order it considers appropriate. 
(5) If the application is not refused under subsection (4)– 
(a) the applicant must serve the application on the shareholder who is alleged 
to breach the requirements of subsection (1) the "relevant shareholder", 
(b) the court– 
(i) may make an order requiring evidence to be produced by the 
relevant shareholder, and 
(ii) may adjourn the proceedings on the application to enable the 
evidence to be obtained, and 
(c) the relevant shareholder is entitled to take part in the further proceedings 
on the application. 
(6) On hearing the application, the court may– 
(a) grant the application on such terms as it thinks fit, 
(b) refuse the application, or 
                                                     
846 This section provides clear statutory wording for the specific new duty on shareholders in their limited 
circumstances. 
847 This formulation is taken from derivative proceedings in s 265 of the Companies Act 2006, supplemented 
by reference to language copied in respect of the ‘leave of the court’ from s 266(1). 
202 
 
(c) adjourn the proceedings on the application and make such order as to 
further procedure as it thinks fit.848. 
(7)  The court must refuse leave to raise proceedings under this section if 
satisfied– 
 
(a)  that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote 
the success of the company) would not seek to raise or continue the 
proceedings (as the case may be),849 or 
 
(b)  the outcome of the resolution in which the cause of action arose 
would have occurred without the votes of the relevant shareholders 
and any other shareholders who are alleged to have breached such 
duty.850 
 
(8) In considering whether to grant leave to raise proceedings under this section, 
the court must take into account, in particular– 
 
(a) whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to raise the 
proceedings, 
 
(b)  the importance that a person acting in accordance with section 172 
(duty to promote the success of the company) would attach to raising 
or continuing them (as the case may be).851 
 
The introduction of such a provision resolves the second of the twin exacerbations. It also 
strengthens protections offered to shareholders in respect of owner/manager agency costs: 
whilst it is acknowledged by all that shareholders that they can agree between themselves to 
apportion different weighting to their votes,852 and that the right to vote generally is a right 
of ownership that a shareholder may have, it does not follow that this should give the 
shareholders a right to harm the minority. In various cases, courts have found legal methods 
to prevent such an outcome.853 This additional reform will make this the case for votes to 
                                                     
848 The language included in subsections 3–5 is taken from Companies Act 2006, s 266, but amended to be 
made applicable. 
849 This is the provision which reflects that the action should only continue if it is in the best interests of the 
company, thus avoiding the minority abusing their position. 
850 This language is taken from Companies Act 2006, s 268, but has been is narrowed from any general future 
or current acts to a specific resolution, the wording has been simplified. Similarly, reference to prior approval 
is no longer relevant as the act must have taken place post-resolution. Accordingly, we can simplify the past 
and future language in the derivative proceeding formulation to refer to past actions only. 
851 This language is also taken from Companies Act 2006, s 268. It merely concludes the analysis to discuss 
the factors that the court should weigh when deciding whether to allow the proceeding – being the good faith 
of the challenger, and the best interests of the company 
852 See discussion in Bushell v Faith in ch 4.3  
853 For example, Automatic Self Cleansing; Shaw & Sons; etc. 
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remove directors as well. This reform would, however, result in an asymmetric shareholder- 
voting regime with section 168 resolutions subject to the best interests of the company, but 
other resolutions not. There are two reasons why this is irrelevant. First, section 168 
resolutions already differ from the general shareholder voting regime: they cannot be passed 
by written resolution;854 require the possibility for directors to present representations as to 
why they should not be removed;855 and require special notice856 of 28 days.857 As a result, 
section 168 resolutions already operate on an asymmetric footing. Second, textbooks 
normally state that resolutions to amend the articles of association are subject to a bona fide 
requirement,858 even if (as we have seen above) they are not. Accordingly, asymmetry in 
form currently applies to the section 168 regime, and there is a perception of asymmetry in 
substance across different types of resolution. 
This reform will mean that directors are more difficult to remove. There is, accordingly, a 
risk that directors could become entrenched. However, there are two mitigations for this. 
First, shareholders can still remove errant directors using the above reform. Following the 
derivative-claim mechanism, someone challenging a shareholders’ vote to remove a director 
would need to present evidence in court of a prima facie case that the vote was not in the 
interests of the company. Second, the directors owe their duties to the company. Whilst this 
mechanism will prevent the risk of ‘majority capture’ which undermines the current 
regime,859 it does not prevent shareholders collectively holding directors to account by way 
of their fiduciary duties. Accordingly, this reform of company law can mean that instead of 
the directors being subject to majority capture, they become accountable to the shareholders 
as a whole: either by being removed, or on the basis of a breach of duty. 
 
8.5. Removing a Negative?  
This thesis has identified that indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in 
private companies are an exception to the theoretical framework for the law of business 
organisations in that they do not provide mandatory protection to the minority in a situation 
                                                     
854 Companies Act 2006, s 288(2)(a). 
855 ibid s169. 
856 ibid s 168(2). 
857 ibid s 312. 
858 For example, Gower and Davies, para19-4 – ‘Scattered throughout the reports are statements hat members 
must exercise their votes “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole.’ Gower and Davies proceed to 
reject this notion, but nonetheless acknowledge that it is a perception. 
859 See para 6.3.2(b). 
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where they are at risk of being exposed to such manifestations of Costs. It has identified that 
these Costs, far from being mitigated, are actually exacerbated by the twin exacerbations 
highlighted. It has then proposed methods to mitigate the exacerbations.  
This raises the question whether the reforms proposed above are sufficient to bring indirect 
manifestations of majority/minority agency costs into line with the theoretical position 
advanced. After all, the above resolutions remove a negative (ie, the situation will no longer 
be exacerbated), but this does not automatically translate into providing a positive (ie, it is 
not automatic that removing the exacerbations will fully mitigate the underlying problem, 
which is a lack of mandatory protection for the minority from indirect manifestations of 
majority/minority agency costs). One of Bellenden Ker's primary criticisms of the repeal of 
the Bubble Act was that it removed a bad measure but did not replace it with a corresponding 
good measure. Does the proposed reform, therefore, adequately address the concerns 
highlighted by this thesis, or merely remove elements which currently make them worse? 
The effect of the foregoing reforms is to restrain the majority. Easterbrook and Fischel, Berle 
and Means, and Cheffins all agree that the majority can be so restrained if there is an 
adequate provision requiring them to do so. It is submitted that the current flaws in the twin 
exacerbations highlighted throughout this thesis provide such a requirement. The majority 
would no longer be able to shift powers away from directors to shareholders, or threaten to 
do so, and would only be able to vote to remove a director were it in the bests interests of 
the company as whole to do so. Accordingly, the reforms act to provide directors with greater 
freedom (subject to their existing constraints), and avoid majority capture. Resolving these 
two exacerbations acts to remove the risk of indirect manifestation of agency costs; the 
directors cannot be threatened or forced to act in a manner which ignores the minority. 
Therefore, the act of removing the exacerbations in accordance with the foregoing provides 
a mandatory method to resolve indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs. 
Not only are we removing a negative, we are replacing it with a positive which brings this 
area of Costs into line with the theoretical propositions advanced in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Accordingly, resolving the twin exacerbations in the manner proposed does more than 
merely remove exacerbations: it provides an active protection. 
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CHAPTER 9 
9. CONCLUSION 
Private companies function under a fundamental structural flaw. Most of the literature on 
agency costs is concerned with owner/manager agency costs, which means that 
consideration of how the majority can indirectly exert pressure on the minority is avoided.860 
For most legal entities, this is not important as the minority have the ability to withdraw their 
capital at will: either by withdrawing from the company, or by selling their shares on a public 
market to third parties. However, for private companies with limitations on the removal of 
capital and no ready market, this remains an exception within the category of 
majority/minority agency costs. Worse still, two tools used to mitigate owner/manager 
agency costs by subjecting managers to greater control by shareholders, actively exacerbate 
the problem. This makes indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs in private 
companies an exception: every other high Cost is mitigated by mandatory rules. 
These twin exacerbations exist as historical exceptions: when faced with Costs, company 
law history has traditionally –since 1845 – attempted to reduce them. Watson states that the 
transfer of the powers of the company from a mandatory provision to a default position 
occurred accidentally.861 Judgments on this exacerbation have always made for uneasy 
reading: whilst they have tended to protect the minority by requiring that the majority can 
only act in accordance with specified procedure, this leaves the question of substance 
unanswered. Why should the majority be able to act in such a way if they follow the 
procedure? Comparatively, most jurisdictions provide for a statutory regime – albeit one that 
can be displaced by shareholders should they resolve to do so. This, in turn, leads to more 
questions. Should this mean that duties which apply to directors should shift to the 
shareholders? If so, should the duties act on a sliding scale, or ‘tip’ at one point between 
directors and shareholders? In either case, delineating who owes which duties becomes very 
difficult. In the absence of a compelling reason for the default rules of such parties, other 
than a (flawed) belief that the company consists (or should exist) of entirely voluntary 
contracts in which mandatory rules are (or should be) minimised, it is difficult to justify such 
a provision: for (at best) nebulous gain, it exacerbates a serious harm. 
                                                     
860 Often deliberately, on the flawed grounds that the majority/minority costs are not as likely to arise (eg, see 
n 505).   
861 See discussion in Chapter 4.6. 
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On the other hand, shareholders' ability to remove directors does produce a tangible benefit: 
it aids in the mitigation of owner/manager agency costs between shareholders and directors. 
However, there are two flaws with its current interpretation. First, the Bushell v Faith 
iteration of this right neutralises its ability to provide the desired protections. Second, the 
operation of this iteration creates indirect majority/minority agency costs: directors will be 
subject to majority capture arising from either a threat by the majority to remove directors 
unless they carry out their bidding, or directors acting in a certain way to avoid such a threat. 
Delaware enables company constitutions to require that directors can only be removed ‘for 
cause’ in certain situations, but other jurisdictions allow for directors to be removed by the 
majority. This exacerbation can be resolved to protect the minority, whilst also providing a 
better resolution of owner/manager agency costs. 
Neither of these exacerbations is resolved by general legal protections. Directors' duties are 
subject to capture by the majority – in fact, are often expressly subject to the majority. 
Shareholders are not under a duty to vote their shares any particular way, although they may 
be barred from directly appropriating the property of the minority. This does not provide any 
protection against the triangulation which underpins the twin exacerbations. Ostensible 
minority remedies are inadequate, and the lack of a market for shares in private companies, 
means that we cannot rely on any ‘soft laws’ to remove the twin exacerbations. In addition, 
action by the market currently does little to resolve the twin exacerbations in constitutions 
of companies: there is a minimal deviation from the (flawed) default regime, and where there 
is deviation it appears to advance majority rule rather than remove it. Indeed, it is doubtful 
whether the current market will ever be able to resolve the exacerbations in and of itself: 
whilst it can do so to enable shareholders to protect themselves against directors (as 
shareholders pick the articles), it cannot do so to enable the minority to protect themselves 
against the majority (as the majority are (tautologously) the largest constituency within the 
category of those able to amend the articles). 
Accordingly, introducing mandatory rules aligns with the theoretical and historical 
propositions advanced. They also help resolve issues arising in comparative jurisdictions as 
regards the same subject matter, and resolve the doctrinal and empirical issues analysed. The 
proposals above resolve the twin exacerbations, and, accordingly, succeed in providing 
mandatory protections against indirect manifestations of majority/minority agency costs. 
Private companies are important: by number, they dwarf public companies. Their economic 
realities make them conceptually different to public companies, yet the majority of academic 
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analysis of companies has been directed at resolving owner/manager agency costs. By these 
two, relatively minor, changes to UK company law, we can resolve indirect manifestations 
of majority/minority agency costs in private companies.  
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Table 2 
Director Removal on Incorporation 
 
Company Number Purpose of Removal 
366440 Unanimous director removal 
366499 Repetition of statutory test only 
366501 Repetition of statutory test only 
366528 Repetition of statutory test only 
366563 Unanimous director removal 
366564 Unanimous director removal 
366565 Unanimous director removal 
366566 Unanimous director removal 
366567 Unanimous director removal 
366568 Unanimous director removal 
366809 Repetition of statutory test only 
366868 Repetition of statutory test only 
366909 Notice of removal by majority 
366918 Removal by specified shareholder 
and removal by other directors for 
cause 
366940 Repetition of statutory test only 
366943 Repetition of statutory test only 
366971 Notice of removal by majority 
367034 Repetition of statutory test only 
367128 Repetition of statutory test only 
367146 Notice of removal by majority 
367212 Repetition of statutory test only 
367257 Repetition of statutory test only 
367311 Repetition of statutory test only 
367358 Removal by specified shareholder 
and removal by other directors for 
cause 
367413 Repetition of statutory test only 
367428 Repetition of statutory test only 
367438 Repetition of statutory test only 
367461 Repetition of statutory test only 
367482 Repetition of statutory test only 
367627 Specified shareholders are able to 
remove directors appointed by them 
367663 Removal by notice from majority 
(75%) 
367664 Removal by notice from majority 
(75%) 
367738 Notice of removal by majority 
367739 Notice of removal by majority 
367767 Repetition of statutory test only 
367768 Repetition of statutory test only 
367794 Removal by notice from majority 
(75%) 
 328 
 
367800 Removal by notice from majority 
(75%) 
Table 3 
 
Sample Group Amendments 
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
N
u
m
b
er
 
N
u
m
b
er 
o
f 
P
o
st-
In
co
rp
o
ra
tio
n
 
A
m
en
d
m
en
ts 
W
h
ich
 
a
m
en
d
m
en
t 
is 
th
is?
 
E
n
tren
ch
m
en
t 
Directors 
Powers Director Removal 
367055 2 2 0 0 
1 (Cessation of 
employment or removal 
by appointer) 
367442 1 1 0 0 0 
367807 1 1 0 0 0 
367108 1 1 0 0 0 
367146 1 1 0 0 
1 (Removal by notice 
from the majority 
shareholders) 
367433 2 2 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
366674 1 1 0 0 0 
366593 1 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
366595 1 1 0 0 0 
367627 2 2 0 
1 (Restricted 
actions by 
reference to 
a private 
shareholders' 
agreement)  
1  (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
366564 1 1 0 
1 (90% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Unanimous director 
removal) 
366566 1 1 0 
1 (90% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Unanimous director 
removal) 
367121 1 1 0 0 
1 (Individual has right to 
remove directors) 
367491 1 1 0 0 0 
366647 1 1 0 0 0 
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A
m
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d
m
en
ts 
W
h
ich
 
a
m
en
d
m
en
t 
is 
th
is?
 
E
n
tren
ch
m
en
t 
Directors 
Powers Director Removal 
367738 2 2 0 0 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority) 
367739 1 1 0 0 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority) 
366463 1 1 0 0 0 
366487 1 1 0 0 0 
366510 1 1 0 0 0 
366514 1 1 0 0 0 
366583 1 1 0 0 0 
366629 1 1 0 0 0 
366755 3 3 0 0 
1 (Repetition of statutory 
test only) 
366792 1 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
366894 1 1 0 0 0 
366939 1 1 0 0 
1 (Removal by directors 
for cause) 
366960 1 1 0 0 0 
367047 1 1 0 0 0 
367078 1 1 0 0 0 
367161 1 1 0 0 0 
367170 1 1 0 0 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority of one class of 
shares) 
367229 1 1 0 0 0 
367232 1 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
367344 1 1 0 0 0 
367412 1 1 0 
1 (90% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Unanimous director 
removal) 
367458 2 1 0 0 
1 (Breach of private 
shareholders' agreement) 
367460 2 1 0 0 0 
367466 2 1 0 0 0 
367490 2 1 0 
1 (Restricted 
actions by 
reference to 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
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en
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is 
th
is?
 
E
n
tren
ch
m
en
t 
Directors 
Powers Director Removal 
a private 
shareholders' 
agreement) 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
367526 1 1 0 
1 (50% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority shareholders) 
367529 1 1 0 0 0 
367547 1 1 0 0 0 
367665 1 1 0 
1 (90% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Unanimous director 
removal) 
367711 1 1 0 0 0 
367712 1 1 0 0 0 
367727 1 1 0 0 0 
367747 1 1 0 0 0 
367772 1 1 0 0 0 
367781 2 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
367420 2 1 0 
1 (75% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
75% shareholders) 
367794 1 1 0 
1 (75% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
75% shareholders) 
367517 1 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
366425 1 1 0 0 0 
366432 2 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
366433 1 1 0 0 0 
366427 1 1 0 0 0 
366569 3 1 0 0 0 
366562 2 1 0 
1 (100% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
100% of shareholders) 
366854 2 1 0 0 0 
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h
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d
m
en
t 
is 
th
is?
 
E
n
tren
ch
m
en
t 
Directors 
Powers Director Removal 
367516 2 1 0 0 0 
367667 1 1 0 0 0 
367684 1 1 0 0 0 
366755 3 2 0 0 0 
366755 3 1 0 0 0 
366569 3 3 0 0 
1 (Majority director 
removal) 
366569 3 2 0 0 
1 (Majority director 
removal) 
367516 2 2 0 
1 (100% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
100% of shareholders) 
366854 2 2 0 0 0 
366562 2 2 0 
1 (100% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
100% of shareholders) 
366432 2 2 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
367420 2 2 0 0 
1 Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
367781 2 2 0 0 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority shareholders) 
367490 2 2 0 
1 (Restricted 
actions by 
reference to 
private 
shareholders' 
agreement) 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
classes can be removed by 
those classes) 
367466 2 2 0 0 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority) 
367460 2 2 0 0 0 
367738 2 1 0 0 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority) 
367627 2 1 0 
1 (75% 
shareholder 
override) 
1 (Notice of removal by 
majority) 
367433 2 1 0 0 
1 (Nominated directors 
representing certain 
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Directors 
Powers Director Removal 
classes can be removed by 
those classes)  
367055 2 1 0 0 
1 (Cessation of 
employment or removal 
by appointer) 
367458 2 2 0 0 
1 (Breach of private 
shareholders' agreement) 
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